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What is the place of the family in legal scholarship and teaching, and in
deep, implicit ideas about how our legal order is arranged? How did it get
to be that way? Published in two separate Parts, this Article tells a story of
American family law: how the law of Domestic Relations emerged as a
distinct legal topic in late-nineteenth-century legal treatises, and what
ideological conditions facilitated its renaming and reconstruction as
Family Law in the Family Courts and casebooks of the twentieth century.
Almost without exception, throughout this account Domestic
Relations/Family Law are what they are by virtue of their categorical
distinction from the law of contract and, more broadly, the law of the
market. This distinction did not always seem natural: this Article tells
how it was invented. The resulting market/family distinction remains a
latent but structural element of the legal curriculum and the legal order
more generally today. This Article calls that distinction into question and
suggests that family law should be restructured to connect it for the first
time to domains of law more readily understood to relate directly to the
market: economically significant productivity, social security provision,
and the fair or unfair distribution of economic resources.
My story comes in three time periods, corresponding with Duncan
Kennedy's three globalizations of legal thought.' The first is the classical
* Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to lain Frame, Duncan Kennedy, Benjamin
Levin and James Q. Whitman for substantive contributions and criticism; to Janet Katz and David
Warrington for superb librarianship; to Lesley Schoenfeld and Steve Chapman at the Harvard Law
Library, Michael Widener at the Lilian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, Stephen
Wasserstein and Karen Lee at Gale, and the Harvard College Library Imaging Service for help
securing the appendix images and for granting the permissions to reproduce them; to the Up Against
Family Law Exceptionalism conference for the context for this work; and to Cary Mayberger for top-
notch research assistance. Thanks to Lama Abu-Odeh and Philomila Tsoukala for alerting me to a
question on which this piece is based: "When is Family Law?" If one could dedicate an article, I
would dedicate this one to Duncan Kennedy. All errors of fact and judgment are mine alone.
1. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW
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era, roughly the last half of the nineteenth century. The second is the era
of "the social" -characterized by the sociological jurisprudes' and legal
realists' attack on the classical legal order and restructuring of legal
taxonomy-spanning roughly the first half of the twentieth century. And
the last is the era of conflicting considerations, roughly the last half of the
twentieth century.
In the early nineteenth century, there was no family law. The law of
husband and wife and the law of parent and child were separate, parallel,
and closely related legal topics, but they were equally proximate to the
law of guardian and ward and-most significantly, for my purposes-the
law of master and servant. This pattern corresponded with a social order
in which cohabitation, legitimate sexual relations, reproduction, and
productive labor were assumed to belong in one place: the household. A
single figure was assumed to serve as husband, father, and master. He was
not one but three legal persons. The wife, the child, and the servant were
not just subordinate; they were similarly subordinate. By mid-century and
for various reasons, some of them quite conspicuously legal and others
social, this ordering came to seem inopportune. A pressure to divide
marriage from the law of an emerging capitalist market order began to
build. Meanwhile, inside legal thought, the critical category became
marriage (not husband and wife), and the question of whether marriage
"was contract" became salient.
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, it was easy to answer
that question affirmatively: marriage was a civil contract (like many other
types of contract). But with the rise of classical legal thought, of free
labor, and of separate spheres ideology, the answer to that question
increasingly had to be "no." By the 1860s, the consensus view, even
among early opponents of the idea, was that marriage was not contract.
Instead it became status.
This double transformation-of the law of husband and wife into the
law of marriage, and of marriage from contract to status-marked the
separation of the law of familial intimacy from the law of productive
labor. It coincided with the emancipation of the servant from indenture
and slavery and with the emergence of the laborer and employee selling
his work for a wage. Socially, it coincided with the emergence of a market
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. A CRrIcAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Kennedy, Three Globalizations]. The same basic periodization receives
different explanations in Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western
Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195 (1994).
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for labor, an ideology of laissez faire for the market, and an ideology of
domestic intimacy that could be articulated as the opposite of the market.
The linkage between the law of husband and wife and that of master and
servant was not merely dissolved; transformed into marriage and contract,
the linkage became an opposition. Contract law housed the will of the
parties, while the law of marriage, the law of quasi-contract (invented to
segregate unintended contractual obligations from those based on an
exercise of will) and tort provided the legal channels for the will of the
state. Contract, quasi-contract, and tort became the law of everyone-the
faceless individual of liberalism-while the law of marriage became the
law of special persons, incapacitated to varying degrees from contract: the
wife and the child across the board or nearly so, and the husband in his
role as a husband. Whereas Blackstone's rights of persons embraced
everyone, the new legal persons became deviants, "abnormal persons" -
abnormal because they lacked the capacity to contract. The wife became
detached from the husband and began to appear in lists alongside children
and the insane.
In the corresponding ideology, the husband, wife, and child constituted
"the family" and lived in an affective, sentimental, altruistic, ascriptive,
and morally saturated legal and social space. The market was the family's
opposite: rational, individualistic, free, and morally neutral. In my
genealogy, each side of this market-family pair got its legal, social, and
ideological clarification from the idea that the other was its opposite. With
Kerry Rittich, I call this "family law exceptionalism" ("FLE"), the
construction of the legal order to render the family and its law distinctive,
special, other, exceptional.2
Because of the developments detailed in this Article, FLE was an
intrinsic, not merely an accidental, part of the emerging classical legal
order that American jurists constructed over the course of the nineteenth
century. I give an account here of how Americans received the global
diffusion of the idea that law was a system and needed systematic
structure, and the subsidiary idea that the law of family was radically
distinct from that of contract. This idea-set emanated from German legal
thought of the mid-nineteenth-century and was carried around the world
not only through the sheer prestige of German legal ideas but in the
formation of the colonial legal order and the rise of global capitalism.
2. Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies
and Contemporary Studies ofFamily Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010).
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America was no longer a colony, but it followed a path into the
market/family distinction that is strikingly parallel to what scholars have
detected in the colonial experience of Egypt, Algeria, West Africa, and
Taiwan, as well as in the rise of nationalist legal thought in West Africa,
India and Greece. Connecting the American version of this story to its
global counterparts is a long-term aim of this project.
While this transformation was taking place, marriage and divorce were
the ruling preoccupations of the treatise writers, tracking legislative
changes to the wife's coverture and the introduction of judicial divorce.
Both of these reforms had the character of contract: the wife's contractual
capacity was expanded, and marriage, now that it could be terminated for
breach, more closely resembled other contracts. Proponents of marriage as
status, however, insisted on the enduring investment of the state in the
ascriptive character of ongoing marriages. The nomenclature for this
change revived the old legal idea that husband and wife were bound by
legal relations. The term chosen to describe those relations was
"domestic": the law of "Domestic Relations" was born. The term
"domestic relations" had been in common use among lawyers in the early
decades of the nineteenth century but did not become the official name for
the field, in the United States, until 1870. This shift in nomenclature
coincided with the dawning perception among jurists that the field could
not coherently retain the master and servant or the guardian and ward:
husband and wife, parent and child remained in the new legal category
Domestic Relations, corresponding with the emergence of "family" as a
tiny nuclear unit housing only the intimacies that we often call the
bourgeois or affective family. In the concluding sections of this Part, I
show how this development coincided with the emergence of contract law
as the law of labor and the evanescence of the law of master and servant.
Part II tells what happened when the proponents of sociological
jurisprudence and the legal realists set out to destroy and replace the
3. On FLE in colonization, see, for example, Lama Abu Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law:
The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043 (2004); Judith Surkis, Civilization and the Civil
Code: The Scandal of "Child Marriage" in French Algeria, in JUDITH SURKIS, SCANDALOUS
SUBJECTS: INTIMACY AND INDECENCY IN FRANCE AND FRENCH ALGERIA (forthcoming); Hedeyat
Heikal, Family as Jurisdiction: from Dispossession to the Family in Colonial Algeria (on file with the
author); Yun-Ru Chen, Maneuvering Modernity: Family Law as a Battlefield in Colonial Taiwan (on
file with the author); and Sylvia Kang'ara, Western Legal Ideas in African Family Law (on file with
the author). On FLE in anti-colonial, postcolonial, and nationalist projects, see, for example, Partha
Chatterjee, "The Nation and its Women," in PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS
FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLoNIAL HISTORIES 113 (1993); Philomila Tsoukala, Marrying
Family Law to the Nation, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.873 (2010); and Sylvia Kang'ara, Western Legal Ideas.
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classical legal edifice. At first they understood that FLE was an
impediment to their work and sought to reunite domestic relations with
the law of the market; but it was too hard for them to do it and they gave
up. FLE retained its grip as the classical order disintegrated, eventually
emerging as modem Family Law.
Family Law remains our topic in law schools today. It houses the entry
rules of marriage, divorce, and some of the above for marriage
alternatives (cohabitation and civil union). It includes the law of parentage
(who is a parent?), including adoption. Constitutionally-driven rights in
reproduction and parenthood take up a big segment of the course. But the
course is mostly about the formation of the core relationships, which are
paradigmatically marital and parental, and about the dissolution of
marriage and its consequences for adults and children. Throughout the
successive waves of change that I limn in Part II, what has remained
constant is the division of intellectual labor between the law of the market
and the law of the family, introduced in the 1850s for long-gone reasons.
The property rules of ongoing marriage are almost never taught; the law
of inheritance lives in another course; and the course omits welfare law,
the law of poor families. The actual ways in which marital partners share
their wealth (or don't) are completely off the agenda. The ways in which
marriage and "infancy" condition the availability of credit and liability for
joint and separate debts are similarly overlooked (the sole exception being
the doctrine of necessaries). A lot of explicit rules about marital and
parental wealth and obligation are parked in other courses and
acknowledged in Family Law only fleetingly: employment benefits like
health insurance and retirement savings with rights of survivorship, for
instance, are taught if at all in employment and health law; marital and
parent-child eligibility for public assistance, immigration, and intestate
succession are taught in welfare law, immigration law, and trusts and
estates. These omissions track the old family/market distinction.
What happens to family law if we rigorously suspend that distinction?
Should we do that? In collaboration with colleagues, my hope is to
reconstruct family law so that it becomes possible to teach the family and
its law as distributive. We posit that the family and family law are hidden
but crucial mechanisms for the distribution of social goods of an immense
variety of kinds: material resources like money, jobs, nutrition; symbolic
resources like prestige and degradation; psychic resources like affectional
ties, erotic attraction and repulsion, the very conditions of access to
human personality. We seek to study the ways in which it serves as a
5
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legally regulated private welfare system, as a site of legally regulated
productive labor, as a crucial unit of production and consumption. Many
of the "culture wars" fights that now occupy the field obscure these
distributional consequences and make it impossible to have descriptively
adequate discussions of the stakes of various policy choices. We seek to
change that, and to usher in a new range of work and new approaches to
teaching that could expose the distributional stakes of rules that affect the
family, whether they are housed in family law or elsewhere.
To conclude: this Article is divided into two Parts. Part I, published
here, addresses the first phase of my story, in the rise and triumph of
classical legal thought among American jurists of the nineteenth century.
It addresses legal treatises primarily, spanning from 1765 to 1896. It tells
the story of the status/contract distinction and of the emergence of
Domestic Relations as the opposite of Contract. Part II addresses the
second and third phases of my story, in the legal realist assault on the
classical structure of the legal field during the first half of the twentieth
century and politicization of it in the postwar era. This narrative thus
spans from the 1920s through the 1990s. Because, as Morton Horwitz
observes, the treatise ceased after about 1920 to be the modal form in
which legal professionals produced and shared large changes in legal
thought,' Part II considers law review articles, curricular reforms,
conference programs, casebooks, and book reviews of casebooks. It tells
the story of the struggle to introduce Family Law into the American legal
vocabulary, and shows how wave after wave of change left the
status/contract distinction in place.
I. THE LEGAL RELATIONS: BLACKSTONE AND REEVE
Is marriage contract or status? Should it be contract or status? These
questions loom large in U.S. legal discussions of the institution.5 What
4. Morton Horwitz, Part III-Treatise Literature, 69 LAW LIBR. J. 460 (1976).
5. At least five contemporary family law casebooks address the question whether marriage is
status or contract (though they often then supplant that question by others, typically the question of
the enforceability of an antenuptial contract). See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN,
CATHERINE J. Ross & DAVID D. MEYER, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 819-20 (2006); HARRY D.
KRAUSE, LINDA D. ELROD, MARSHA GARRISON & J. THOMAS OLDHAM, FAMILY LAW: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 175-77 (5th ed. 2003); PETER N. SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER & JANA
B. SINGER, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 2-3 (1998); WALTER 0. WAYRAUCH,
SANFORD N. KATZ & FRANCES OLSEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS
AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 89-90 (1994); D. KELLY WEISBERG, MODERN FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 114-15 (2006). The holding of Maynard v. Hill, committing contracts-clause
doctrine to the idea that marriage is status-not-contract, is often invoked in conservative interventions
6 [Vol. 23:1
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seems oddly absent from considerations of this question is an awareness
of how ideological it was when it was first asked and, eventually,
answered. As Duncan Kennedy explains in his account of the rise of
classical legal thought and in particular of the "Transformation of
Contract" by jurists and judges in the last half of the nineteenth century,
the reclassification of marriage as status was unknown to American legal
minds before 1852.6 But as he also notes, by 1890 the Supreme Court
could intone that marriage was status without offering a citation.7 It had
become legal common sense. It took several decades of work to produce
this obviousness.
In the first three parts of this essay, I want to ascertain as precisely as I
can what the classical legal thinkers meant by the word status, and what
they meant by invoking it to define marriage. To do that I will retell
Kennedy's story of the emergence of the status/contract distinction inside
the emergence of classical legal thought, though with a stronger focus on
marriage. Kennedy once said: "Marriage went from contract to status."
He was right. What did this mean to those who made it happen?
Really to get it, we have to go back to William Blackstone and Tapping
Reeve.
Blackstone classified the laws governing marriage in Book I of his
Commentaries, where they appear in a series of topics as "Rights of
Persons." 8 Appendix I shows the Table of Contents of Book I.
Many things could be said of a legal mind in which Blackstone's Rights
of Persons have a lot in common. The law created not only "individuals"
who have general rights, but also distinct "persons" with highly particular
social beings. It provided the rules by which one could become one or the
other kind of person. Once one was one or another type of person,
into US marriage politics. See, for instance, the epigraph to INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES,
MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 6 (2006). For a very savvy explosion of the status/contract distinction for
describing modem marriage and developing a normative view of the place of prenuptial contracts in
it, see Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65,
111-20 (1998). For my own critique of the status/contract distinction in contemporary American
family law thinking, see Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage, Part I: From Status/Contract to
the Marriage System, - UNBOUND: HARVARD J. OF THE L. LEFT - (forthcoming 2011); and Behind
the Law of Marriage, Part II: Travelling Marriage, - UNBOUND: HARVARD J. OF THE L. LEFT -
(forthcoming 2011).
6. DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Transformation of Contract, in THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT 195-96 (1975) [herinafter KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL].
7. U.S. v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151 (1890); KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at 203-
04.
8. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Table of Contents,
(photo. reprint 1979) (1765).
72011]
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furthermore, the law set forth the rules governing one's relations with
other persons. The rights of the king and of corporations were equally the
rights of persons; the reciprocal rights and duties of master and servant
were equivalent to those of the husband and wife.
The rights of persons cut sweepingly across Blackstone's own
private/public distinction. Chapters II through XII contain the "public
relations of magistrates and people"'; then Blackstone sets forth "their
rights and duties in private oeconomical relations."'o "[M]arriage" is his
second "private . . . relation of persons"; master and servant come first. "
The "private oeconomical relations" house what we would now call
employment (master/servant), marriage (husband/wife), parentage
(parent/child), and wardship (guardian and ward). It also houses
corporations.
Blackstone's term oeconomical derives from the ancient Greek word
oiicoq and is our etymological root for the term economy. At the time
Blackstone used the term, it meant "of or relating to household
management, or to the ordering of private affairs; domestic[.]"l 2 In that
legal space, husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward,
master and servant (and where slavery was recognized, though not in
Blackstone's England, master and slave) lived out their hierarchical lives;
reciprocal, not equal, rights prevailed. These legal relations were,
moreover, no more or less economical than corporations. Beyond the
world of legal concepts, considered as an architectural space and a social
form, this classification invokes not the home or the family but the
household, a space for both human and material production, for the
making, consumption, and distribution of wealth and material goods. The
legal distinction between the family and the market finds no expression in
this legal or social order; the future trajectory of the word "economy" is
one index of the gradual, as-yet-unforeseen emergence of that distinction
as a structural element of Classical Legal Thought.
Finally, there is no suggestion that marriage is a "status"; the closest
Blackstone seems to come to that term is when he discusses the "military
9. Id. at 410.
10. Id..
11. Id. at 421.
12. Economic Definition B.I.a, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryenty/Entry/59385 (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). The OED declares
that this sense of the word "economic" is obsolete and gives a final example dated 1791. Id.
8 [Vol. 23:1
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and maritime states" l3-a usage closer to the medieval concept of estates
as ranks in the social order (which of course Blackstone retained) than to
status as the term was to enter into American legal language.
Blackstone was a crucial authority for nineteenth-century American
jurists, but he was joined by distinctly American sources. Tapping
Reeve's 1816 The Law of Baron and Femmel4 tracks Blackstone's
classification with some key modifications. Reeve's full title page is
included here as Appendix 2.
By omitting all of the "public relations" and corporations, Reeve takes
Blackstone's "private oeconomical relations" one step further: this book
collects the law of the household. And Reeve puts its legal relations in
their conventional nineteenth-century order: husband and wife, then
parent and child, then guardian and ward, and then master and servant.
The social hierarchies are now graphically represented. These shifts also
intensify the boundedness of this legal space to the architectural and
social household. Reeve introduces into Anglo-American law, perhaps for
the first time, a legal classification that can meaningfully be tied,
genealogically, to modem family law.
By the time Reeve published his treatise, the modem uses of the word
"economic," turning it from the household to the market, were just
beginning to emerge-and as a result, he avoided it. To Reeve, an
"oeconomical relation" could still have been one "relating to the
management of domestic or private income and expenditure[.]""s But in
newly emerging meanings, it could also have been "of, relating to, or
concerned with the science of economics or with the economy in general;
relating to the development and regulation of the material resources of a
community or state[."l 6 Reeve dropped Blackstone's term, silently
rejecting the new meanings of "economic" as inapt to his topic. His
omission tacitly anticipates what will become the family/market
distinction.
Before that distinction could take its classical form, the association of
marriage with contract had to be effaced. The chief literary impediment to
this process was Blackstone's famous insistence that "our law considers
13. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 395.
14. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME; OF PARENT AND CHILD; OF GUARDIAN
AND WARD; OF MASTER AND SERVANT; AND OF THE POWERS OF COURTS OF CHANCERY, WITH AN
ESSAY ON THE TERMS, HEIR, HEIRS, AND HEIRS OF THE BODY (New Haven, Oliver Steele 1816).
15. OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, supra note 12, at B.La.
16. Id. at B.Lb and B.4.a. The OED's first example of "economic" used to describe a national
economic system dates from 1815. Id.
2011] 9
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marriage in no other light than as a civil contract."" What did
Blackstone's equation of marriage with contract mean to him? I think it's
perfectly clear that, if he were to hear jurists of the mid-nineteenth century
insist that "marriage is a civil contract," he would have thought they were
putting the accent on the wrong syllable. For him, the point was that
marriage was a civil contract. Up until the passage of Lord Hardwicke's
Act in 1753-a mere twelve years before the publication of Blackstone's
volume on the Rights of Persons-the validity of particular marriages had
been subject to ecclesiastical law and was most finally determined in
ecclesiastical courts. Blackstone's locution registers the important change
wrought by the Act: civil law took upon itself the authority to determine
the rules of marital validity. Though ecclesiastical courts persisted, the
ultimate power to determine marital validity had shifted from religious to
civil control.'"
Moreover, though contracts come up constantly in his discussion of
almost every major topic except Public Wrongs in Volume IV, Blackstone
was completely innocent of any idea that contract constituted a distinct
legal topic. As the great contractarian Theophilus Parsons would
complain in the opening lines of his 1853 treatise The Law of Contracts,
17. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 421.
18. The shift from sacrament to contract was an effect of the Protestant revolution: none of the
Protestant sects carried forth the Roman Catholic idea that marriage was a sacrament, but they all
emphasized the religious significance of the relationship and the contract that commenced it. See
JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION (1997). It is against this backdrop that Blackstone repeatedly emphasizes the
civil character of the marriage contract. After defining marriage as a civil contract, as quoted in the
text, he alludes to some marital matters that remained within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts and then concludes: "Thus taking it in this civil light, the law treats it as it does all other
contracts; allowing it to be good and valid in all cases where the parties at the time of making it were,
in the first place, willing to contract; secondly, able to contract; and lastly, actually did contract, in the
proper forms and solemnities required by law." BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 421. It's almost a
given that marriage is a contract: what call for italics are the specific requirements for its formation.
It is applicability of civil law and its various requirements of contract that impress him here, not the
fact that marriage is formed by (is) contract. Indeed, it is not formed by contract alone: as he goes on
to explain, Lord Hardwicke's Act put the kibosh on all of that, so that the verbal contracts of canon
law "are now of no force, to compel a future marriage." Id. at 427 (footnote omitted). Instead, the Act
requires celebration in church or a public chapel by an authorized person; Blackstone looks for a
precursor to this requirement and reports "it being said that Pope Innocent the Third was the first who
ordained the celebration of marriage in the church: before which it was totally a civil contract." Id.
Again, Blackstone is tracking the civil or religious character of the marriage contract.
Joel Prentiss Bishop, who as we will see was the chief exponent if not the inventor of the idea that
marriage was status-not-contract, read Blackstone in just this way: "To distinguish, . . . it is presumed,
marriage as the law views it from marriage as a religious rite, the courts and text-writers almost
uniformly speak of and describe it as a 'contract,' a 'civil contract."' JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS
26-27 [hereinafter BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE] (l ed., Boston, Little, Brown 1852)].
10
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"The title of the thirtieth chapter of the Second Book of Blackstone's
Commentaries is, 'Of title by gift, grant, and contract.' And in no other
chapter does he treat the law of contracts under that name."' 9 Contract
pervaded Blackstone's legal universe without provoking in his mind any
need to attribute to it any taxonomic or conceptual coherence, or indeed
any particular importance. Marriage was a contract because, as in all
contracts, it could be formed only by willing parties, capable of
contracting marriage, who did actually contract marriage according to the
procedures required by law (another reference to Lord Hardwicke's Act).
Full stop. As we will see, the emergence of contract as a distinct legal
topic was produced in part through the gradual exile of marriage from its
domain. Blackstone shows no indication that he saw it coming.
One of the marks of this process will be the gradual separation between
the law of husband and wife and of parent and child, on one hand, and the
law of master and servant on the other; in the process the law of guardian
and ward will morph into trusts and estates and evolve down a third path
of legal development. Early in the nineteenth century, American legal
minds saw no big differences between these topics. Users of Reeve's
treatise almost immediately dubbed it Reeve's Domestic Relations-
perhaps they found "baron and femme" too aristocratic in flavor for their
actual clients-and they did so in cases involving all four of these legal
relations indifferently.20 But by 1843 one court could shorten the list to
two, "the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child[.]" 2 1
And another judge, writing in 1893 to reject two servants' claim that a
miserly decedent had made a will bequeathing his property to them rather
than die intestate, did so in language that decisively ejected them from
this now narrower, more hallowed domestic sphere:
The relations between Mr. Chappell [the decedent] and him [Ned
Trent, one of the claimants] were those of employer and employd,
or, more strictly speaking, that of principal and agent, or master
and servant; nothing more, nothing less. Eliza Trent [the other
19. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (photo. reprint 1980) (Buffalo,
William S. Hein 1853) [hereinafter 1 PARSONS].
20. Four cases citing Reeve as an authority turned up on a Westlaw search for "Reeve & "Baron
and Femme." Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281, 285 (N.Y. Supp. 1819) (discussing the duty of a child
to support its parents); Welborn v. Little, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 159, 161 (S.C.L. 1818)
(discussing the rights and duties of parties to an indenture); Cusack v.White, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 279,
281 (S.C.L. 1818) (discussing the husband's rights in his wife's chattels); Snook ex rel. Coursen v.
Sutton, 10 N.J.L. 133, 136 (1828) (discussing the rights of a ward when he comes of age).
21. Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523, 533 (1843).
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claimant], on the death of her mother, succeeded to the duties and
obligations of housekeeper. She did, unaided, the milking,
cooking, washing, and other drudgery incident to housekeeping.
Such were the social and domestic relations existing between Mr.
Chappell, on the one hand, and Ned and Eliza Trent, on the other.
22
As we will see, in 1893 it was not at all clear whether the legal
relationship between Mr. Chappell and the Trents would turn out to be
employment, principal/agent, or master/servant. The Court was
appropriately circumspect about the correct term to use: it hadn't been
decided. But it was quite certain that the only "domestic relations" Eliza
Trent shared with her employer/principal/master were those of
degradingly necessitous and hierarchical co-residence in the household.
Domestic labor and domestic love were taking divergent ideological
paths. Both were domestic, but they were starkly opposed in law; there,
only the latter deserved the term. We see emerging here the mark of the
modern legal family.
II. CONTRACT ... AND A CIVIL INSTITUTION:
STORY AND PARSONS ... AND STORY
For American jurists of the mid-nineteenth century, the idea that
marriage is contract did some important work. Our examples can be
Justice Joseph Story and Theophilus Parsons. Story is a pivotal figure in
this chapter: he first insisted that marriage was contract, with strong
constitutional consequences, and later repented. His change of mind
signals the defeat of Parsons's articulation of marriage as contract, and
contract as virtually coterminous with the legal order tout court. The
mutual segregation of marriage and contract is the overall theme of this
chapter in our story.
While Story was a sitting Justice on the Supreme Court, he was
presented with an opportunity to classify marriage. Dartmouth College v.
Woodward was the challenge of Dartmouth College trustees to an act of
the New Hampshire legislature that voided the College's precolonial
charter and enacted a new one. 23 The new charter replaced the trustees,
reclassified the College as a university, and substantially changed the
22. Chappell v. Trent, 19 S.E. 314, 338 (1893).
23. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
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rules of governance. 24  A key question in the case was whether the
Legislature had violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution, which
requires that states not "impair[] . .. the Obligation of Contracts." 25 Was
the original charter a contract, and did the legislative overhaul impair it?
Lawyers for New Hampshire argued that the charter was a "matter of
civil institution" and thus subject to legislative control-like marriage.26
Just as the legislature could determine the obligations of husband and wife
by providing a means for divorce, it could devise new terms for the
operation of the College.27 Justice Marshall writing the opinion of the
Court, and Justice Story writing a long concurrence, thought otherwise.
We will concentrate here on Story's thinking because his change of heart
fifteen years later marks the turning point in our story.
Story classified the charter as a contract. This was not easy to do. It cost
him hard legal work, spanning many pages, to construe a charter
establishing a purely charitable institution, to be run by persons other than
the recipient of the original grant, as a contract. In the course of those
pages, Justice Story depended on rules of contract-especially a web of
implied contracts to supply consideration-which would seem completely
archaic by the end of the status-not-contract genealogy we are pursuing
here. 2 8 Much more swiftly, he went on to find that the imposition of the
24. Id.
25. The Contracts Clause stipulates that "No state shall ... pass any ... law . . . impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
26. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 600.
27. Id. at 600-01 ("Thus, marriage is a contract, and a private contract; but relating merely to a
matter of civil institution, which every society has an inherent right to regulate as its own wisdom
may dictate, it cannot be considered as within the spirit of this prohibitory clause. Divorces
unquestionably impair the obligation of the nuptial contract; they change the relations of the marriage
state, without the consent of both the parties, and thus come clearly within the letter of the prohibition.
But surely, no one will contend, that there is locked up in this mystical clause of the constitution a
prohibition to the states to grant divorces, a power peculiarly appropriate to domestic legislation, and
which has been exercised in every age and nation where civilization has produced that corruption of
manners, which, unfortunately, requires this remedy.").
28. If executory, Story argued, the grant once performed was a contract, id. at 683-84, and if it
were deemed to be executory but not performed and thus to require consideration to be classed a
contract - "which I utterly deny," said Story, id. at 690 - consideration could be found in the
implied agreements of the original grantor to relinquish his own funds and funds he held in trust to the
new trustees, to agree to the removal of the College from his home to a new location, and to serve as
its first President, id. at 686, in the implied contract of the trustees to perform their assigned duties, id.
at 688-89, in the implied contract of the Crown to the benefactors to protect their donations by
respecting the terms of the charter, and in the implied contract between the new corporation and the
donors to do the same, id. at 689-90. All of these were relinquishments of established rights and
assumptions of new duties; if in a commercial contract payment of "a pepper-corn" was good
consideration, in an agreement to establish a charitable institution, these relinquishments and promises
surely constituted good consideration as well. Id. at 684, 687.
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new charter impaired that contract. 29
As part of his first argument, Justice Story explained why bringing
marriage within the constitutional oversight of the Contracts Clause did
not trouble him. A divorce granted for breach of marital obligations did
not impair the marital contract; instead, it might be the only effective
remedy for the breach:
A general law, regulating divorces from the contract of marriage,
like a law regulating remedies in other cases of breaches of
contracts, is not necessarily a law impairing the obligation of such
a contract. It may be the only effectual mode of enforcing the
obligations of the contract on both sides. A law punishing a breach
of a contract, by imposing a forfeiture of the rights acquired under
it, or dissolving it, because the mutual obligations were no longer
observed, is, in no correct sense, a law impairing the obligations of
a contract. 30
The Contracts Clause applied-marriage was contract. But just as it was
no impairment of contract for a state to grant remedies for breach of
contract in bailments and sales of goods, it could be no impairment to
grant similar remedies for breach of marital contracts.
Story went on to give substance to his vision of the marital contract.
Contracts-Clause control over legislative action in this area might be not
only tolerable but necessary to protect marital rights-primarily, it would
appear, the marital-property rights of husbands:
But if the argument means to assert, that the legislative power to
dissolve such a contract, without such a breach on either side,
against the wishes of the parties, and without any judicial inquiry
to ascertain a breach, I certainly am not prepared to admit such a
power, or that its exercise would not entrench upon the prohibition
of the constitution. If, under the faith of existing laws, a contract
of marriage be duly solemnized, or a marriage settlement be made
29. Id. at 706-12.
30. Id. at 697-98.
31. Story here agrees with Chief Justice Marshall that marriage was a contract, but differs in his
reasons for seeing no impairment in fault-based divorce. The latter saw divorce for breach of the
marriage contract as no impairment because the breach had already destroyed the contract. The
Contracts Clause, he said, "never has been understood to restrict the general right of the legislature to
legislate on the subject of divorces. Those acts enable some tribunals, not to impair a marriage
contract, but to liberate one of the parties, because it has been broken by the other. When any state
legislature shall pass an act annulling all marriage contracts, or allowing either party to annul it,
without the consent of the other, it will be time enough to inquire, whether such an act be
constitutional." Id. at 629. As Kennedy notes, both logics are equally contractarian. KENNEDY, RISE
AND FALL, supra note 6, at 195.
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(and marriage is always in law a valuable consideration for a
contract), it is not easy to perceive, why a dissolution of its
obligations, without any default or assent of the parties, may not as
well fall within the prohibition, as any other contract for valuable
consideration. A man has as good a right to his wife, as to the
property acquired under a marriage settlement.
He has a legal right to her society and her fortune; and to divest
such right, without his default, and against his will, would be as
flagrant a violation of the principles of justice, as the confiscation
of his own estate.32
Marriage is represented here as a transaction primarily affecting
property rights. It is as clearly contractual as a man's promise to marry in
exchange for the bride's father's marriage settlement on his daughter. The
exchange of marriage for property rights was a contract, and the Contracts
Clause should bar its legal impairment by divorce. At first Story imagines
divorces entered against the will of both spouses, but note that by the end
of my quotation (also the end of his discussion of this conundrum) he
slips to divorces imposed on a husband, depriving him of the rights under
a marriage settlement, against his will and without his fault. No wonder
that Story, considering it in that way, was blithe about the prospect-held
out to him as a bugaboo by counsel for New Hampshire-that the
Contracts Clause might limit the scope of divorce laws. The clause should
police legislation allowing sharp dealing in the making of marriages just
as it would in bargains for the exchange of goods.
Another way to include marriage as contract was to expand contract to
include virtually the entire legal order. This imperialism of contract is
exemplified, for Kennedy, by Theophilus Parsons." Writing in 1853,
Parsons was ambitious for his category: "The Law of Contracts, in its
widest extent, may be regarded as including, directly or indirectly, almost
all the law administered in our courts."34 Or even more grandly:
The Law of Contracts, in its widest extent, may be regarded as
including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of human
life. Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of human society.
All social life presumes it, and rests upon it; for out of contracts,
express or implied, declared or understood, grow all rights, all
duties, all obligations, and all law. Almost the whole procedure of
32. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 697-98.
33. KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at 207.
34. 1 PARSONS, supra note 19, at vii.
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human life implies, or, rather, is, the continual fulfilment of
contracts.
Parsons's ambitions for contract caused him to overhaul Blackstone's
taxonomy quite completely. Appendix 3 reproduces the Table of Contents
for his Book III, on "The Subject-Matter of Contract." 3 1
Marriage is now a contract in full earnest. It has its own special rules,
but so do all the contract types. These rules were voluminous: Parsons
devotes more than three hundred pages to the legal requirements of the
various kinds of contractual obligation. According to Parsons, the law had
a lot to say about the contents of particular contracts.
And it was entirely possible for a contract to arise without the parties'
knowledge or assent or their performance of initiatory formalities:
[I]n all the relations of social life, its good order and prosperity
depend upon the due fulfillment of the contracts which bind all to
all. Sometimes these contracts are deliberately expressed with all
the precision of law, and are armed with all its sanctions. More
frequently they are, though still expressed, simpler in form and
more general in language, and leave more to the intelligence, the
justice, and honesty of the parties. Far more frequently they are
not expressed at all; and for their definition and extent we must
look to the common principles which all are supposed to
understand and acknowledge. In this sense, contract is coordinate
and commensurate with duty: and it is a familiar principle of law
that . . . whatsoever it is certain that a man ought to do, that the
law supposes him to have promised to do."
The ample scope allowed to implied contract here is continuous with
Story's way of reasoning about contract in Dartmouth College. Implied
contracts, Parsons concludes, "form the web and woof of actual life."
We are as far from the world of laissez faire, the idea that contract is par
excellence the domain of the will of the parties as opposed to the will of
the state, and the idea of freedom of contract--and as far from the world
of marriage-as-status-not-contract-as it is possible to be.
But these classical ideas and distinctions are aborning. Parsons's Book
III contains material culled from Books I, II and III of Blackstone's
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at xxiii-xxviii. Parson's Law of Contracts is a two-volume set, which he further
subdivided into "Books."
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Commentaries: only Blackstone's Book IV, on Public Wrongs, was not
ransacked for the rules of contract. In the course of this overhaul, the law
of personal relations evaporated. Most of the rules formerly resident there
which could not be fitted into the substantive rules of the various contract
types became rules about capacity to enter those contracts. These rules
migrated to "Parties to a Contract," the topic of Parsons's first Book, and
became a catalogue of parties lacking general or specific capacity-a list
of "disabled persons." 3 9 Capacity to contract was the norm; the "persons"
that had been intrinsic to a body of general law governing everybody
became aberrational, problematic, exceptional. The faceless individual of
liberalism is the rule; Parsons's Book I collects the exceptions.4 0 The
chapters in Parsons's Table of Contents which address the disabled
persons appear in Appendix 3.
Note that Parsons's restructuring of his Blackstonian material
abandoned the relations; what we find are persons. Kennedy notes that,
for Parsons's contract regime, "[t]he idea of relationship was important if
not essential to the plausibility of the idea of implication because it
provided a source for the intentions and duties the judge imposed on the
parties." 4 1 But Parsons's "disabled persons" have departed this enmeshed
and morally saturated world, to stand alone in a new singularity.
Parsons was clearly troubled that he had to classify wives cheek by jowl
with infants, bankrupts, insolvents, idiots, aliens, slaves, outlaws, and
persons attainted and excommunicated. He described the "old rules" of
coverture as "oppressive and unjust" and approved a trend in many states
to "improve and liberalize the marital relation" by treating the wife as
more "independent and equal." But he also noted that the shift was
provoking controversy, and with good reason: he doubted that it could be
desirable to make husband and wife "altogether, or in a great degree
independent and equal. . . . The tendency of this would seem to be,
necessarily, to make them bargainers with each other; and as watchful
against each other, as careful for good security, as strict in making terms,
and in compelling an exact performance of promises or conditions, and as
prompt to seek in litigation a remedy for supposed wrong, as seller and
buyer, lender and borrower, usually are[.]" 42 The rules of the marriage
contract, therefore, justifiably enforce more altruism than do or should the
39. Id. at 242.
40. Id. at xix-xxii.
41. KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at 168.
42. 1 PARSONS, supra note 19, at 284.
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rules of sales contracts, which expect and require more individualism.
This was not because marriage is a status-indeed, nowhere in the text
of The Law of Contracts did Parsons use the term status, not once.43
Rather, it was because "inconvenience and danger" would attend too
expansive an equality of husband and wife. Parsons's admiration for
equality between husband and wife registered a significant advance for
feminist thinking from Story's somewhat masculinist slant on marital
rights in Dartmouth College. But his hedged endorsement of the
conservative countertrend suggests that he saw some need for a
distinction between marriage and market contracts. He was a little foggy
on what that distinction would be, and the prominent place he gave to
social obligations recognized as implied contract surely worked to blunt
any need for clarity on this point. Marriage could remain contract under
these logical circumstances: Parsons did not need marriage-as-status.
Parsons devoted a whole section of his chapter on constitutional law to
the question whether marriage falls within the prohibition of impairment
of contract in the Federal Constitution. Not only that: he segregated it
from his discussion of the effect of the Contracts Clause on other
contracts, most of which he clumped together for this purpose. Once
again, a difference between marriage and all other contracts is inchoate
but discernable. And Parsons provided a very diffident account of the
various answers to the question whether divorce is an unconstitutional
impairment of contract, finding good authority for three completely
inconsistent theses. They were that a divorce statute cannot change the
indissolulability of existing marriages (implying, I guess, that it could
provide for divorce ex ante, for new marriage contracts) "; that divorces
for adultery or other breach of the marriage contract escape the Contracts
Clause because there is then no contract to impair (impliedly states have
43. PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1860). 1 was able to search only the fourth
edition of Parson's The Law ofContract, the first available to me electronically via the online library
of legal treatises, The Making of Modem Law: Legal Treatises 1800-1926.
http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezp-
prod l.hul.harvard.edu/servlet/MOML?af=RN&loclD=camb55135&srchtp=a&c=1&an=l 9001590201
&ste=12&stp=Author&docNum=Fl0 1177816&ae=Fl01 177816&tiPG=1. To be sure, the term status
appears in the index, under Slavery, referring to the "effect of marriage during slavery on the status of
emancipated slaves," 2 PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 890 (4th ed., Boston, Little, Brown
1860), but the text referred to does not use the term. Id. at 341 n.i. The index of the original edition
has no entry for Slavery. Clearly, the compiler of the index to the fourth edition was subject to the
influence of legal developments that - following Kennedy - I attribute below to Joel Bishop,
developments which Parsons himself could have known about but did not take into account.
44. 2 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 528 (photo. reprint 1980) (Boston, Little,
Brownl853) [hereinafter 2 PARSONS].
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the constitutional authority to grant divorces for cause but not in cases of
collusion, mutual fault, or no fault)45 ; and "that marriage is not only a
contract, but much more than a contract, and so much more that it is not to
be considered as within the scope or intention of this clause of the
constitution."46 Once again, it did not occur to Parsons to dub that "so
much more" status; nor does the term appear in his case excerpts cited for
this view. And it wasn't at all clear to him which rationale protecting the
trend towards divorce, if any, was "right" or would prevail. In Parsons's
view, as of 1853, the question was too close to call.
Unbeknownst to Parsons, the seeds for the defeat of marriage-as-
contract and the eventual triumph of marriage-as-status-not-contract had
already been planted, and by none other than Joseph Story. Recall that, in
his Dartmouth College opinion, Story had rejected the defendant's
argument that marriage was a civil institution.47 It was a contract, and
legislatures establishing laws allowing divorce had to heed limitations
imposed by the Contracts Clause. But in the course of writing the first two
editions of his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834
and 1841, Story changed his mind. The first edition introduced a chapter
on interstate recognition of divorce with an observation justifying rules
quite different from those described in the subsequent chapter on
interstate enforcement of contract:
Marriage is not treated as a mere contract between the parties,
subject, as to its continuance, dissolution, and effects, to their
mere pleasures and intentions. But it is treated as a civil
institution, the most interesting and important in its nature of any
in society. Upon it the sound morals, the domestic affections, and
the delicate relations and duties of parents and children, essentially
depend.4 8
45. Id.
46. Id. at 529. Consistently with his contract imperialism, Parsons does not note a fourth theory,
recognizable in some cases cited by Kennedy, that because marriage is a relation, like master/servant
etc., it is not a contract at all and is thus untouched by the Contract Clause. Maguire v. Maguire, 37
Ky. (7 Dana) 181, 183-85 (1838); In re Justices' Opinion, 16 Me. 479, 481 (1840); White v. White, 4
How. Pr. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). As we will see below, Maguire was an important citation for
Parsons's chief opponent on this point, Joel Prentiss Bishop.
47. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES,
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS AND JUDGMENTS § 200, at 168 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and
Company 1834) [hereinafter STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.)] (emphasis added). This passage
appears unchanged in the second edition: JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND
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At first Story remained loyal to his view that marriage is contract. But it
is no longer just that: it is also a civil institution. To be sure, he said in
1834 and repeated in 1841 that "[m]arriage is treated by all civilized
nations as a peculiar and favored contract. It is in its origin as a contract
of natural law." 49 But in the 1841 edition of Conflict ofLaws, he added a
footnote insisting on the peculiarity of this contract:
I have throughout treated marriage as a contract in the common
sense of the word, because this is the light in which it is ordinarily
viewed by Jurists, domestic as well as foreign. But it appears to
me to be something more than a mere contract: it is rather to be
deemed an institution of society, founded upon the consent and
contract of the parties; and in this view it has some peculiarities in
its nature, character, operation, and extent of obligation, different
from what belong to ordinary contracts.s0
By now, marriage was not a mere or ordinary contract; it was founded
on contract, but it should "rather" be deemed an institution of society. He
has almost come around to the view of the attorney for New Hampshire in
Dartmouth College.
Story's Conflict Table of Contents segregates the law of abnormal
persons into its own place (Chapter IV), but also makes a new, categorical
distinction between marriage, divorce, and contract. An excerpt from his
Table of Contents presenting this division is included as Appendix 4. His
title goes even further, making contracts modal and marriage special:
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, in Regard
to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to
Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions and Judgments. Marriage is not
only becoming distinctive; it is becoming exceptional.
III. RECEIVING "STATUS": STORY AND LORD ROBERTSON
"Family law exceptionalism" (FLE) will be my term for the extremely
ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS AND JUDGMENTS § 200, at
262 (2d ed., London, A. Maxwell 1841) [hereinafter STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed.)].
49. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 108, at 100; STORY, CONFLICTS (2d
ed.), supra note 48, § 108, at 170.
50. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed.), supra note 48, § 108, at 170 n.3 (emphasis added). All
these passages remain unchanged in the third, posthumous edition of Story's Conflict ofLaws. JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES,
wILLS, SUCCESSIONS AND JUDGMENTS § 108, at 193; § 200, at 302 (3d ed,, Boston, Little, Brown
1846) [hereinafter STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.)].
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broad range of ideas and practices-legal, cultural, social, economic,
ideological, aesthetic-that set marriage, reproduction, the family,
childhood, sexuality, the home (the list could go on) aside from domains
of life deemed to be more general, more political, more international,
more economic (and again the list could go on indefinitely).5 ' The term
"family law" in this formulation is completely anachronistic for mid-
nineteenth century American legal thought, as we will see: classicizing
jurists had the option of adopting Family Law from new German
taxonomies of law, but they rejected it, and a complex struggle had to be
fought over the first five decades of the next century before Family Law
could find its place among the topics of Anglo-American law. So please
allow me to put "FL" in scare quotes when I say that the specific
emergence of "FL"E in Story's Conflict of Laws was actually marriage
exceptionalism: marriage was not simply contract; it was something else
too, an institution of society. From this apparently small seed grew a great
taxonomic tree, one shaped by winds-some highly welcome amongst
U.S. legal elites, others not so much-from civilian Europe.
Story's recharacterization of marriage in Conflict of Laws depends
largely on Scottish legal sources, and his analysis of interstate recognition
of divorce turns on a sharp and unresolved disagreement on this topic
between Scottish and English jurists.52 This strong "Scottish turn" in
Story's work is of a piece with his will to be influenced by civil law
generally. 3 But it was specifically Scottish legal thought that provoked
51. Halley & Rittich, supra note 2.
52. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I" ed.), supra note 48, § 113, at 103-04. These are the cases
Story cites at this point; note that many involve conflicts between Scottish and English law of
marriage and divorce: Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, (1811) 166 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B.) (upholding the
conjugal rights of a Scottish woman who was married to an Englishman quartered in Scotland);
Ilderton v. Ilderton, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 476 (enforcing dower rights in England for English subjects
married in Scotland); Conway v. Beazley, (1831) 162 Eng. Rep. 1292, 1296-99 (holding that a
divorce in Scotland was ineffective for two English subjects married in England with English
domicile, since they had no domicile in Scotland); Gordon v. Pye (1815) 3 Eng. Eccl. R. 430, 468
(holding that Scottish courts were without power to dissolve the marriage of English subjects married
and domiciled in England); HENRY HOME OF KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUiTY (Edinburgh, Adam Neill
and co. 1800) (discussing Scottish equity jurisdiction over foreign contracts, marriages and legitimacy
issues). Several of Story's cases involve other national conflicts of laws: Ryan v. Ryan, (1816) 161
Eng. Rep. 1162 (affirming the intestate succession of the second wife of an Irish man domiciled in
Denmark); Herbert v. Herbert, (1817) 161 Eng. Rep. 737 (upholding the validity of marriage between
two English subjects in Sicily, although the ceremonials did not conform to Sicilian requirements);
Middleton v. Janverin, (1802) 161 Eng. Rep. 797 (invalidating a Flanders marriage between English
subjects not valid by Flanders law); Lacon v. Higgins, (1823) 171 Eng. Rep. 813 (following
Dalrymple in a case involving a marriage between English subjects in France).
53. Michael H. Hoeflich, Annals ofLegal Bibliography: J.G. Marvin, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 333, 337-
38 (2004) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Annals]; Michael H. Hoeflich, Bibliographical Perspectives on
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his pentimento in Conflict ofLaws.
As we have seen, Story begins his discussion of marriage by
acknowledging the common law definition of marriage as contract. To be
sure, it is "a peculiar and favored contract," but "[t]he common law of
England (and the like law exists in America) considers marriage in no
other light than as a civil contract."54 For the idea that it is also a civil
institution, Story turns to "some remarks on this subject made by a
distinguished Scottish judge." 5  His source is Lord Robertson in a series
of Scottish cases, of which Duntze v. Levett is perhaps the legal high-
watermark.
Jane Duntze (or Levett) and Philip Stimpson Levett were English
subjects; they married in England; and in the holdings of all the judges
who decided the question, their legal residence was England." Mr. Levett
nevertheless took up temporary lodgings in Scotland and shared them
with a paramour.s" Mrs. Levett sued him in Scotland for divorce based on
his adultery-a ground for divorce and a procedure for divorce that were
well settled in Scottish law but categorically unavailable in England.ss
Mr. Levett objected to the application of Scottish law to his English
marriage. The final Court of Sessions opinion, issued in 1816, held that
Roman and Civil Law, 89 LAW LIBR. J. 41, 49 (1997) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Bibliographical
Perspectives]; Michael H. Hoeflich, John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth-Century
Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 36
(1885) [hereinafter Hoeflich, John Austin]; Michael H. Hoeflich, Roman Law in American Legal
Culture, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1723, 1725 (1992); Michael H. Hoeflich, Translation and Reception of
Foreign Law in the Antebellum United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 760, 763 (2002) [hereinafter
Hoeflich, Translation and Reception]; Michael H. Hoeflich, Transatlantic Friendships & the German
Influence on American Law in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 599
(1987) [hereinafter Hoeflich, Friendships]; Gerhard Kegel, Story and Savigny, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 39
(1989) (providing many parallels but no evidence that Story was directly influenced by Savigny).
54. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 108, at 100.
55. Id. § 109, at 101.
56. JAMES FERGUSSON, REPORTS OF SOME RECENT DECISIONS BY THE CONSISTORIAL COURT OF
SCOTLAND IN ACTIONS OF DIVORCE, CONCLUDING FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGES
CELEBRATED UNDER THE ENGLISH LAW 68 (Edinburgh, Archibald Constable and Company 1817)
[hereinafter FERGUSON, REPORTS]. A few words about this text, which is not a regular case reporter.
At the time Fergusson published his Reports, neither the Consistorial Court nor the Court of Session
had a settled practice for publishing decisions, and Fergusson's way of presenting the cases is quite
dauntingly complex. He first presents summaries of the cases, with parsimonious quotations but
including the dizzying career of each case up and down the ladder of appeal and remand. Id. at 23-
247. He then presents an Appendix in which matter from all four cases is collected with lengthy
thematic Notes. Id. at 249-470. He presents the name of the wife in Duntze v. Levett in the alternative
("Jane Duntze or Levett"), I surmise, because it was unclear throughout the litigation whether she
would be able to obtain her divorce and revert to her maiden name. Id. at 68.
57. Id. at 69-70.
58. Id. at 72.
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Scottish courts had jurisdiction over the husband because of his temporary
presence in Scotland and over the wife because of her husband's presence
there and that Scottish law applied."
Lord Robertson wrote in support of this outcome. A choice of law rule
favoring Scottish law was, he said, necessary to protect Scotland from the
barbarities of English marriage law:
If a man in this country were to confine his wife in an iron cage, or
to beat her with a rod the thickness of the Judge's finger, would it
be a justification in any court, to allege, that these were powers,
which the law of England conferred on a husband, and that he was
entitled to the exercise of them, because his marriage had been
celebrated in that country?60
White men saving white women from white men. It appears that, in the
federal experience of Edinburgh vis A vis London, no less than in the
colonial experience of London vis A vis Bombay, 6 1 civilization could be
marked by legally mandated decencies in the relations of husband and
wife, and barbarism by legally sanctioned abuse of wives.
The claim that marriage was contract formed a doctrinal impediment to
Lord Robertson's assertion of Scottish legal independence. If marriage
were contract, Lord Robertson acknowledged, lex loci contractus would
be the rule; English law would apply; and benighted, feudal English
marriage rules could easily be imposed on Scottish courts. To fend off this
result, he produced an expansive distinction between marriage and
contract, in which marriage appears-for the first time in our story-as
status-not-contract. Story found Lord Robertson's arguments in this case
"so striking, that they deserve to be quoted at large";62 his quotation of
them runs three pages. I have shortened Story's quotation somewhat to
eliminate duplication:
Marriage being entirely a personal consensual contract, it may be
thought, that the lex loci must be resorted to in expounding every
question, that arises relative to it. But it will be observed, that
marriage is a contract sui generis, and differing, in some respects,
from all other contracts, so that the rules of law, which are
59. Id. at 166-67.
60. STORY, CONFLICTS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 111, at 102-03 (quoting FERGUSSON, REPORTS,
supra note 56, at 399 app., n.G).
61. See, e.g., Janaki Nair, "Social Reform" and the Woman's Question, in WOMEN AND LAW IN
COLONIAL INDIA: A SOCIAL HISTORY 49 (2000),.
62. STORY, CONFLICTS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 109, at 101.
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applicable in expounding and enforcing other contracts, may not
apply to this. The contract of marriage is the most important of all
human transactions. It is the very basis of the whole fabric of
civilized society. The status of marriage is juris gentium, and the
foundation of it, like that of all other contracts, rests on the
consent of the parties. But it differs from other contracts in this,
that the rights, obligations, or duties, arising from it, are not left
entirely to be regulated by the agreements of the parties, but are, to
a certain extent, matters of municipal regulation, over which the
parties have no control, by any declaration of their will. It confers
the status of legitimacy on children born in wedlock, with all the
consequential rights, duties, and privileges, thence arising; it gives
rise to the relations of consanguinity and affinity; in short, it
pervades the whole system of civil society. Unlike other contracts
it cannot, in general, amongst civilized nations, be dissolved by
mutual consent; and it subsists in full force, even although one of
the parties should be for ever rendered incapable, as in the case of
incurable insanity, or the like, from performing his part of the
mutual contract.
§ 110. "No wonder that the rights, duties, and obligations, arising
from so important a contract, should not be left to the discretion or
caprice of the contracting parties, but should be regulated, in many
important particulars, by the laws of every civilized country. And
such laws must be considered as forming a most essential part of
the public law of the country. As to the constitution of the
marriage, as it is merely a personal, consensual contract, it must be
valid every where, if celebrated according to the lex loci; but, with
regard to the rights, duties, and obligations, thence arising, the law
of the domicil must be looked to. It must be admitted, that, in
every country, the laws relative to divorce are considered as of the
utmost importance, as public laws affecting the dearest interests of
society.
§ 111. "It is said, that, in every contract the parties bind
themselves, not only to what is expressly stipulated, but also to
what is implied in the nature of the contract; and that these
stipulations, whether express or implied, are not affected by any
subsequent change of domicil. This may be true in the general
case, but, as already noticed, marriage is a contract sui generis,
and the rights, duties, and obligations, which arise out of it, are
matters of so much importance to the well-being of the State, that
they are regulated, not by the private contract, but by the public
laws of the State, which are imperative on all, who are domiciled
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within its territory. . . ."
On this reasoning, Scottish courts would be obliged to recognize the
validity of the Levett marriage, but equally obliged to apply their own law
when Mr. Levett brought the marriage to Scotland and committed
adultery there.
Large shifts in the position of marriage in the legal order are visible in
these paragraphs, and Story drew remarkably parsimoniously from them.
For Story, marriage is "something more than a mere contract" because it
is an institution of society. Whereas contract is the site of the parties'
"mere pleasures and intentions," marriage is a civil institution. These are
important shifts: contract is mere, and is the site of mere whim; marriage
is an institution, is of the utmost gravity, and belongs to society as a civil
institution. But there is much more in Lord Robertson's representation of
the contract/marriage distinction than that. Story did not explicitly adopt
Lord Robertson's additional ideas that the law of marriage is public law,
and distinct from the law of contract (which is private?); that marriage is
ius gentium, a matter of the international law of nature; that it has
generality and fundamentalness that are not necessarily captured in any
particular country's positive law; and that it confers status. Note that this
new term appears in Story's block quotation in italics: it is a foreign word.
The legal rules about the formation, continuance, dissolution, and
effects of marriage are, Story acknowledged, matters for each country to
determine when it adopts laws to govern this special civil institution. Lord
Robertson made a stronger point: marriage is fundamental to social order,
and therefore completely public and under the exclusive control of the
territorial state. This fundamental and foundational posture of marriage
explains why it cannot be left to the "discretion or caprice" or the "will"
of the parties. Lord Robertson did not say, but he did imply, that mere
contracts can be left to the caprice, discretion, and will of the parties.
Parsons would have found this assertion incomprehensible.
The distinction between contract as private and marriage as public is
emerging here. Recall that for Parsons, neither marriage nor contract was
"private"; implied contract was the web and woof of actual life, and
marriage was just as saturated with express and implied contract as
commerce. By quoting Lord Robertson at length, Story has set up the
template upon which later jurists would write that contract is the site of
63. STORY, CowucITs (1" ed.), supra note 48, § 109-111, at 101-02 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, at 397-99 app. n.G).
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individual will, private pleasures, selfish intentions, and hard bargains-
and in which they would insist that marriage is a public institution
pervaded by public enforcement in the name of the public good. As
Kennedy demonstrates, the will theory would find a home in this
template, and the drive to make marriage the opposite of contract would
encourage legal thinkers to make it the repository of mandatory altruism
and communal life." Only some of those embellishments appear here, but
Story has introduced into American legal thought the conceptual armature
which will house them.
Why was Story so committed to Scottish law as a source of authority?
One possible explanation is simply that Story looked to civil law for
answers to international matters-and conflicts was basically international
law; and that Story apparently did not know German, which was during
his lifetime the preeminent civilian legal language"s while Scotland was
the only civil law jurisdiction producing treatises and other legal materials
in English. If this were the only reason, it is pretty empty of ideological
significance.
But there was possibly a more substantive motive, one which will
emerge in the next stage of our story, and which I introduce here because
I think it was already at work. By writing a treatise on the conflict of laws
at all, Story was attempting to construct legal rules that could mediate the
interjurisdictional resentments of the various states of the Union. Story
thought that the English/Scottish encounter provided particularly apt
material for his effort to bring international law home for a federation: "It
is to the decisions of the English and Scottish courts, that we must look
for the most thorough and exact discussions of this subject [i.e., interstate
recognition of divorce]. From the different nature of their respective laws
on the subject of divorce, from their national union, and from their
constant and easy intercourse, the courts of both countries have been
frequently called upon to pronounce very elaborate judgments on the
jurisdiction and law of divorce in contestations before them.""
To figure out what this might have meant, we need to pause for a
64. See KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at 171, 185 for the conclusion that this
emerging distinction and strengthening opposition between individualist and communal orders was an
important driver in the direction of a strong contract/status distinction.
65. Story commissioned translations of German legal materials into English for his personal use,
a fact from which Hoeflich plausibly concludes that he did not know German. Hoeflich, Translation
and Reception, supra note 53, at 758-59; see also Hoeflich, Annals, supra note 53, at 336; Hoeflich,
Bibliographical Perspectives, supra note 53, at 49.
66. STORY, CONFLICTS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 215, at 178.
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moment to identify the national context of the Scottish marriage cases.6
Scotland and England were separate nations, their intercourse governed
by the Treaty of Northampton of 1328. This treaty settled thirty-two years
of war between the two countries. But their relations were continually
vexed by the idea of a legal merger or takeover. One major shift in that
direction occurred in 1603 with the Union of the Crowns-the accession
of Scottish King James VI to the throne of England as its James 1.68 A
decisive shift occurred in 1707 when, through Acts of Union passed by
the Scottish and English Parliaments, Scotland and England formed the
United Kingdom.
The two nations purported to be coequal states in this Union, but in
several ways Scotland actually ended up in a subordinate position. The
Acts of Union required that the Scottish Parliament be dissolved;
Scotland's representation in the new Union's Westminster-based
Parliament would always be a minority stake. 70 The authority of that
Parliament to change Scottish law was vast. The laws governing trade,
customs and excises were to be made uniform; a new Scottish Court of
Exchequer was required to apply the law and use the procedures of the
parallel English court; the laws of "publick right Policy and Civil
Government" were to be made uniform. That is to say, all law governing
commerce and all law structuring government were to be converted to
English law. '
Important provisions preserved Scottish legal identity, however.
Scottish courts-including the Court of Session-were to be preserved;
ferocious language forbade English courts from hearing "Causes in
Scotland" or interfering with the execution of Scottish judgments. 72 Three
67. Special thanks to lain Frame for guidance on Union and Scottish legal nationalism and legal
union.
68. MICHAEL LYNCH, SCOTLAND: A NEW HISTORY 244 (1991)
69. An Act for the Union of the Two Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 8 STATUTES OF THE
REALM 566 (George Eyre & Andrew Strahan, eds., London 1702-1707) [hereinafter ENGLISH UNION
ACT]; An Act for the Union of The Two Kingdoms of England and Scotland, I 1 ACTA
PARLIAMENTORUM ANNAE 406 (1707) [hereinafter SCOTTISH UNION ACT].
70. SCOTTISH UNION ACT, art. III; see also C. Paul Rogers Ill, Scots Law in Post-Revolutionary
and Nineteenth-Century America, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 216, 234 n. 157 (1990).
71. John W. Cairns, Scottish Law, Scottish Lawyers and the Status ofthe Union, in A UNION FOR
EMPIRE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE BRITISH UNION OF 1707 at 243, 266-67 (John Robertson, ed.,
1995) [hereinafter Cairns, Scottish Law].
72. The Act provided that "no Causes in Scotland be cognosible by the Courts of Chancery,
Queen's-Bench, Common-Pleas, or any other Court in Westminster-hall; and that the said Courts, or
any other of the like nature after the Union shall have no power to Cognosce, Review or Alter the
Acts or Sentences of the Judicatures within Scotland, or stop the Execution of the same[.]" SCOTTISH
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domains of law were excepted from union and allocated to Scottish
courts: what we would now call property law (this included heritable
jurisdictions and other offices deemed property rights7 3 ), the law of
defamation and libel, and the law governing marriage, divorce, legitimacy
and inheritance. Thus, Scottish law and Scottish jurisdiction were
preserved for "private Right," which could be altered from London only
"for evident utility of the subjects within Scotland."74 The Consistorial
Courts of Scotland had jurisdiction to decide cases in a narrow range of
subject matters, all of which embodied crisp conflicts between Scottish
and English law." According to James Fergusson, who published the
treatise in which Story discovered Lord Robertson and who was a judge
on the Consistorial Court of Scotland, these were "Marriage"; "Conjugal
Rights and Redress" (including divorce), "Legitimacy and Bastardy,"
"Confirmation of Executors and Testementary Causes"; and "Slander,
Defamation and Libel."7 Appeals from the Consistorial Court went to the
Court of Sessions, on which Lord Robertson sat. Decisions of the Court of
Session were appealable not to a Scottish highest court but to the British
House of Lords.77
After Union, Scottish legal minds were preoccupied by controversies
about the right amount of English law to take on board. Though it would
be easy to see this as a process of the forceful merger of the weaker into
the stronger power, apparently that would be a mistake. Union had been
supported by a variety of political forces within Scotland, and in its wake
the Scottish legal intelligentsia debated whether to move Scotland onto
the English constitution, whether their legal systems were predominantly
alike or mutually alien, whether to look to common law sources and
methods, and indeed whether Scottish and English law shared origins or
were each other's origins.78 The idea of Anglicization presides over a
UNION ACT, supra note 69, art. 19.
73. Id. art. 20; see also Cairns, supra note 71, at 251.
74. Id. art. 18.
75. JAMES FERGUSSON, A TREATISE ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CONSISTORIAL LAW IN
SCOTLAND, WITH REPORTS OF DECIDED CASES (Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfute 1829) [hereinafter
FERGUSSON, CONSISTORIAL LAW].
76. Id. at Table of Contents.
77. Rogers, supra note 70, at 216,.
78. Many students of Scottish legal history posit entrenched opposition within Scottish legal
circles to English law, for instance C. Paul Rogers, who refers to a "long antagonism to England
resulted in its strong resistance to English common law." Rogers, supra note 70, at 215 (1990).
Others set out the terms of a profound ideological disagreement within a general consensus that
adopting some elements of English law was a good idea. See Cairns, Scottish Law, supra note 71, at
252-67 (setting forth a range of Scottish opinion for and against "Anglicization" of Scottish law and
28 [Vol. 23:1
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1
Halley
thoroughly ideological thicket into which one ventures at one's peril.
Enter we must, but it is important to do so forewarned that the degree of
antagonism of the two legal systems and the Scottishness of Scottish law
were themselves contested in post-Union Scotland.
Controversy extended to marriage law. On the question which
interested Story-jurisdiction and choice of law for divorce-the
Consistorial Court and the Court of Session took opposing positions. The
former thought that English spouses should not be able to construct
jurisdiction in Scotland and to trigger the choice of Scottish law by mere
residence there, and then proceed to violate the most basic duties of
marriage on Scottish soil and to secure what were almost surely collusive
divorces. Fergusson was a vigorous proponent of the Consistorial Court's
position.79 He published his Reports in Scotland and in London, making a
direct appeal both to Scottish judges to stop divorcing English couples
and to Parliament to pass a statute prohibiting the practice.80 But the
Court of Session took the opposite view; there, Lord Robertson's
contempt for the English husband's iron cage and his stick as thick as the
judge's thumb prevailed. Appeals to the House of Lords did not follow
from Court of Session judgments, moreover, probably because the
divorces were indeed collusive. They were effectively final. More
broadly, the Court of Session played a pivotal role in anchoring Scottish
legal nationalism (for instance, it made a large symbolic point by moving
into the chambers vacated by the dissolved Scottish Parliament).' And
specifically, it turned the law of marriage into a pivotal spot for Scottish
resistance to English law. 8 2
The conflicts in the law of marriage between England and Scotland
concluding that the trend to adopt English law, especially for commercial matters, was "not
necessarily imposed . . . but to some extent willing adopted as modernization"); NICHOLAS
PHILLIPSON, THE SCOTTISH WHIGS AND THE REFORM OF THE COURT OF SESSION, 1785-1830 at 178-
179 (1990) (arguing that, despite the "apocalyptic" tone of Scottish dirges over Scottish legal
particularity, all the actual "Anglicisers" were Scottish); Hector L. MacQueen, "Regiam Majestatem,"
Scots Law, and National Identity, 74 SCOTTISH HIST. REV. 1, 2, 20-23 (1995) (discussing how Whig
pressure to modernize Scottish law "into a law fit for a polite and commercial country" was opposed
by Tory nationalists, but within a consensus that preservation of Scottish legal distinctiveness was
important).
79. FERGUSSON, CONSISTORIAL LAW, supra note 75, at 18-22, 102-04.
80. Id. at 20-21. Fergusson would have been dismayed to learn that his publication of Lord
Robertson's famous quotation, far from defeating it, disseminated it!
81. N.T. Phillipson, Lawyers, Landowners and the Civic Leadership of Post-Union Scotland, 21
JURID. REV. 97, 98 (1976); MacQueen, supra note 78, at 24.
82. Leah Leneman, English Marriages and Scottish Divorces in the Early Nineteenth Century, 17
J. LEGAL HIST. 225, 234, 241 (1996).
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were large. The two legal orders' paths to secularization of marriage law
were intertwined but strikingly different. Where England had had
Anglicanism as its national religion since 1534, Scotland had remained
Catholic until its Revolution in 1560 and then became Presbyterian;83
whereas England had jealously ejected canon law and gave pride of place
in its legal order to the common law and its own statutory law, in 1560
Scotland excluded papal jurisdiction and shut down ecclesiastical courts,
but retained canon law.8 4 And whereas English law imagined marriage as
part of an order based on a constitution and the common law, the Scottish
Enlightenment flourished in the legal languages of customary law, Roman
law, civil law, and regally-sponsored statutes.
At the time Lord Robertson decided Duntze v. Levelt, the differences in
the two nations' laws on marriage and divorce were stark and a point of
considerable resentment on either side of the border. Marital formation
rules differed." Scotland had a set of prescribed formalities for entering
marriage, but it also recognized "irregular marriage" formed by the mere
consent of the two parties.87 Partly in order to protect English parents'
control over their children's marriages, England had by this time adopted
Lord Hardwicke's Act,88 which invalidated marriages entered into using
the verbal formulae of canon law, required the publication of banns and a
public church ceremony for the formation of a valid marriage, and made
secular courts the only site for adjudication of disputes over whether a
legal marriage had been properly formed. As we have amply seen,
83. See Charles J. Guthric, A History of Divorce in Scotland, 8 SCOTTISH HIST. REv. 39, 48
(1910) ("The Established Church was Presbyterian from 1560 (or 1567) to 1610, Episcopalian from
1610 to 1638, Presbyterian again from 1638 till Cromwell's 'usurpation,"' Episcopalian again from
the [Glorious] Restoration in 1660 till the Revolution in 1688, and since then Presbyterian.").
84. MacQueen, supra note 78, at 14.
85. Rogers, supra note 70, at 216; Peter Stein, The Influence of Roman Law on the Law of
Scotland, 8 JURID. REV. 205 (1963) [hereinafter Stein, Influence]. This claim is of course part of the
controversy about the degree to which Scottish and English law converged or differed. Two provisos:
First, Roman law deeply influenced English law, though in different ways at different times. David J.
Scipp, The Reception of Canon Law and Civil Law in the Common Law Courts Before 1600, 13
OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 388 (1993); John W. Cairns, Blackstone, An English Institutist: Legal
Literature and the Rise of the Nation State, 4 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 318 (1984); Daniel R.
Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation, /: The English Civilian Writers, 1523-1607, 61 B.U.
L. REV. I (1981). And Hector L. MacQueen makes a brilliant case that the degree to which Scottish
law drew from Roman law not only varied from era to era but was ideologically contested between
unifiers and Scottish nationalists in highly contingent and sometimes contradictory ways. MacQueen,
supra note 78, at 13-25.
86. FERGUSSON, REPORTS,supra note 56, at 1, 72.
87. FERGUSSON, CONSISTORIAL LAW, supra note 75, at 108-12.
88. 26 Geo. II. c. 33.
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England permitted divorce by parliamentary bill only, while Scottish
spouses were entitled to judicial divorce for adultery and "continued non-
adherence."" And legitimacy rules differed: Scotland retained the canon-
law rule that parents could legitimate an otherwise bastard child by
marrying after its birth; the English common law had long resisted
legitimation per subsequens matrimonium, and, at the Reformation, had
eliminated it.90 According to Fergusson, the "several laws" of England
and Scotland, "as to this most important relation of domestic life, have
been perhaps the most opposite of Christendom."'
These differences and the social events they gave rise to were notorious
and politically sensitive. "Gretna Green" marriages-"clandestine"
procedures joining English subjects in marriage under permissive Scottish
rules, so called because the town of Gretna Green was so accessible to
maritally inclined English subjects-were made possible by the marriage-
entry difference plus a strong choice of law rule requiring recognition of
marriages valid where performed.92 English parents were horrified:
"'Edinburgh!' was always the answer-'the very last place in the world
we should think of sending our son to: he would be married in 24 hours;
there is no saying what would happen."' 93
In one notorious case, Sugden v. Lolly, English courts had gone so far
as to convict an English man of bigamy for remarrying in England after
obtaining a Scottish divorce that was perfectly valid under Scottish law;
he was sentenced to transportation and only escaped this severe penalty
by a pardon.94 In 1755 Parliament ordered the Lords of Session to prepare
a bill banning clandestine marriages in Scotland-a Scottish Lord
Hardwicke's Act -but it died in the face of Scottish claims that it would
interfere with Scotland's religion, which had been preserved by the Acts
of Union.95 When transportation by rail made elopement to Scotland
ridiculously easy and interference by parents all but futile, Parliament
89. FERGUSSON, CONSISTORIAL LAW, supra note 75, at 102.
90. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.), supra note 50, at 137; STEIN, Influence, supra note 85,
at 209.
91. FERGUSSON, CONSISTORIAL LAW, supra note 75, at 18.
92. FERGUSSON, REPORTS, supra note 56, at 464. For a colorful account, see T. C. Smout,
Scottish Marriage, Regular and Irregular 1500-1940, in MARRIAGE AND SOCIETY: STUDIES IN THE
SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARRIAGE 204, 207-10 (R. B. Outhwaite ed., 1981).
93. Smout, supra note 92, at 207 (quoting Lord Brougham before a parliamentary select
committee in 1849).
94. This is the famous "case of Lolly." FERGUSSON, REPORTS, supra note 56, at 9-10. For an
account, see LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE, 1530-1987, at 358-9 (1992).
95. Smout, supra note 92, at 208.
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crammed down a residency requirement of 21 days on Scottish
marriages. 9 6
On his side, Fergusson saw the divorce holdings of the Court of Session
as political retaliation against these English initiatives and insisted that
such a motive was an improper one for a court to adopt.97 We have to see
Lord Robertson's ruling and logic in Duntze v. Levett as making a strong
assertion-understood at the time to be saturated with political meaning-
of continued Scottish legal independence.
In the Scottish/English encounter, marriage and divorce became indicia
of federal union and national separation. Jurists on both sides were willing
to sharpen the national character of marriage law. Meanwhile, the
commercial law of England flooded Scotland without any similar
resistance. No one questioned that parties to a business contract formed in
England would be subject to English law even in Scottish courts. Hector
L. MacQueen argues, moreover, that by the time Fergusson published his
treatise, not even a Tory nationalist would stand outside the consensus
view that "[a] commercial and industrial country increasingly" should
seek, "not a nationally distinctive law, but a law which would not put
difficulties in the way of cross-border [commercial] activity."9
The bracketed addition to MacQueen's conclusion is necessary because
marriage was excluded from the consensus for unification. As marriage
became "something more than a mere contract," it became not only
exceptional but national. And note that Lord Robertson did not craft a
distinction between contract on one hand and marriage-legitimacy-
inheritance-property law-and-defamation on the other. As we have seen,
all the legal terms described legal domains that remained distinctively
Scottish upon the Union. For Lord Robertson, however, they reduced to
status, and status reduced to marriage. Marriage was taking up a decisive,
first-order place in the symbolic order of a modernizing capitalist world.
Back to Story. As we have seen, he very selectively adopted elements
of Lord Robertson's status/contract distinction. I think that's because the
idea of a commercial law that unleashed individual will was completely
alien to his thought. Instead, Story praised the legal world in which
"commerce shall extend its social influences; . . . justice shall be
96. Id.at210.
97. FERGUSSON, REPORTS, supra note 56, at 107 ("Reprisals and retaliation are extraordinary
measures, which independent states may sometimes find reason to adopt, but which are totally foreign
to the duties of courts of law.").
98. MacQueen, supra note 78, at 24.
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administered by enlightened and liberal rules; . . . contracts shall be
expounded upon the eternal principles of right and wrong."9 9 He was
much closer to Parsons than to the emerging classical jurists on implied
contract as the carrier of decent social norms. But by quoting Lord
Robertson at length, he unleashed into American legal thought the idea of
marriage-as-status-not-contract, complete with its corollary idea that
marriage housed the will of the state while contract gave effect to the will
of the parties. Subsequent legal thinkers would take Story's formulation
much further than he was willing to go. Thus the classical divisions began
to take shape in the U.S. well before one can discern any role for the will
theory as a conscious motive.
And a glance forward. If Lord Robertson's view of marriage prevailed,
states would have dominion over marriages domiciled within their borders
because marriage was status. At the time that Story imported this idea
from Scotland, it brought with it implications for the greatest American
conflict of the nineteenth century: after all, master and servant were also
status. At the time Story wrote, it was not necessarily clear that choosing
the law of domicile for controversies involving slaves would eventually
lead to Dred Scott and help set the terms for the Civil War.'o As we will
see, the rise of free labor-through the abolition of slavery, the
disappearance of indenture, and the expansion of contract labor to cover
the field-was going to require that the husband and wife follow a
different legal path to modernity than the one taken by master and servant.
The former was headed to status and the domestic sphere, the latter to
contract and the market. The cataclysm of the Civil War changed many
things: one of them was the legal idea that marriage and labor were in any
way similar.
IV. STATUS NOT CONTRACT: BISHOP
Joel Prentiss Bishop published the first edition of his Commentaries on
the Law of Marriage and Divorce in 1852,10' just one year before Parsons
first published his Law of Contracts. Bishop laid out a path virtually
opposite to Parsons's, and, as we will see, the American legal
99. Joseph Story, An Address Delivered before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their
Anniversary, on the Fourth of September, 1821, at Boston, I AM. JuR. 1, 7 (1829) [hereinafter Story,
Address to the Suffolk Bar].
100. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
101. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18.
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intelligentsia soon followed him down it.
Bishop was distressed by the incoherence of the legal rules governing
marriage and divorce in the conflict of laws and under the Contracts
Clause. Marriage was presenting a crisis for federalism: "Many of the
peculiar questions of constitutional law and conflict of laws relating to
divorce, . . . arising under the constitutions of the United States and of the
several States of this Union, have proved more embarrassing than almost
any other to our courts, and have led to irreconcilable diversities of
decision." 0 2
Bishop thought that the classification of marriage as contract was the
cause of the mischief. He cited Scottish cases and treatises more
thoroughly than Story, 1o3 and relied expressly on, and quoted, Story's
"something more than contract" passages.'" But he went further, to say
decisively what that elusive "something more" was. It was status:
The word marriage is used to signify the act of entering into the
married condition, or the condition itself. In the latter and more
frequent legal sense, it is a civil status, existing in one man and
one woman, legally united for life for those civil and social
purposes which are founded in the distinction of sex. Its source is
the law of nature, whence it has flowed into the municipal laws of
every civilized country, and into the general law of nations ....
[M]arriage may be said to proceed from a civil contract between
one man and one woman of the needful physical and civil
capacity. While the contract remains executory, that is, an
agreement to marry, it differs in no essential particulars from other
civil contracts, and an action for damages for breach may be
maintained on a violation of it. But when the contract becomes
executed in what the law recognizes as a valid marriage, its nature
102. Id. at 33.
103. Id. at 27-29. Bishop relied not only on the sections of Story's Conflict ofLaws that we have
studied, on Fergusson's Records, and on Duntze v. Levett, Ferg. R. 38, 385, 397 (3 E.E.R. 360, 495,
502); he also brought in LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE, AND REGISTRATION; AS ALTERED BY THE RECENT STATUTES: CONTAINING ALSO THE
MODE OF PROCEEDING ON DIVORCES IN THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS AND IN PARLIAMENT; AND THE
RIGHT TO THE CUSTODY OF CHILDREN; VOLUNTARY SEPARATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
THE HUSBAND'S LIABILITY TO WIFE'S DEBTS; AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
AND SCOTLAND RESPECTING DIVORCE AND LEGITIMACY. WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES (London,
S. Sweet 1841) and PATRICK FRASER, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, AS APPLICABLE TO
THE PERSONAL AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS, COMPRISING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD,
GUARDIAN AND WARD MASTER AND SERVANT AND MASTER AND APPRENTICE (1st ed. Edinburgh, T.
& T. Clark 1846) [hereinafter FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.)]. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE, supra note 18, at 27 n.5, 28 n. 1.
104. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, at 26, 33.
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as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the status. And,
though the new relation may retain some similitudes to remind us
of its origin, the contract does in truth no longer exist, but the
parties are governed by the law of husband and wife.'s
For Story, as we have seen, marriage was contract, but a "peculiar
contract," involving "something more than contract," and that something
more was the social institution of marriage. For Bishop, the contract of
marriage dissolves upon solemnization into something new and different:
marriage is status and as such it is not contract.
This innovation seems to be Bishop's own. He claimed credit for it
modestly in 1852106 and not so modestly in 1891.0' And he strongly
associated it both times with self-conscious legal modernization:
Thus to say, that marriage is a contract, when speaking of the
marital condition, and not of the agreement to assume it, is, as we
have seen, according to the general current of authorities,
inaccurate; since they further declare, that it differs in many
particulars from other contracts. And when the differences are
pointed out, we perceive that they have covered every quality of
the marriage, and left nothing of the contract. To term it, therefore,
a contract, is as great a practical inconvenience as to call a certain
well-known engine for propelling railroad cars "horse," adding,
"but it differs from other horses in several important particulars,"
and then to explain the particulars. It would be more convenient to
use at once the word locomotive.108
In 1891, near the end of his life, Bishop concluded that this locomotive
was headed for the consolidated legal order described by Kennedy as
105. Id, at 25 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 26 ("Various definitions have been given of marriage; and the foregoing is not in the
language of any former one. It is believed to be free from some of the objections which may well be
urged against all former definitions, whatever defects it may have of its own.") (footnote omitted).
107. "Bishop on Marriage and Divorce was published in 1852. In it the author, it is believed for
the first time in any legal treatise or judicial opinion, broke away from the old shackles, and defined
marriage as a status. The result has already been stated, citing many subsequent cases, the forms of
expression from the bench have been gradually modified, until now those earlier ones above quoted
would seem quite antiquated." JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION AS TO THE LAW, EVIDENCE, PLEADING, PRACTICE, FORMS AND THE
EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES ON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION 13-14 (Chicago,
T.H. Flood and Company 1891) [hereinafter BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES]. As Kennedy quite aptly
put it, Bishop took the opportunity of his newly revised treatise to "crow." KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL,
supra note 6, at 198.
108. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, at 34. Bishop gives a more decisive
version of this passage in the New Commentaries. After "left nothing of contract" he added: "All is
subsumed in the status." BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 107, at 14.
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classical legal thought.
As Bishop saw it in 1852, the idea that the Contracts Clause applied to
marriage and divorce was producing intolerable inconsistency in the
American legal system:
In England and continental Europe, little inconvenience can result
from making use of the word contract rather than status as applied
to an executed marriage, for the jurists of those countries were not
troubled with many of the peculiar questions of constitutional law
and the conflict of laws relating to divorce, which, arising under
the constitutions of the United States and of the several States of
this union, have proved more embarrassing than almost any other
to our courts, and have led to irreconcilable diversities of
decision.109
In 1891, in a substantially overhauled treatise entitled New Commentaries
on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, Bishop congratulated himself on
bringing order to the field:
[W]ith gratitude to the Author of all Light, I soon began to
discover that the courts, as fast as occasions arose, and they
became acquainted with the reasonings of my book, dropped their
former reasonings and substituted those therein suggested. The
result was that the decisions themselves were rendered uniform, so
that to-day the conflicts on marriage and divorce law are probably
less than on any other legal subject." 0
The revelation that marriage was status-not-contract was "General and
Fundamental,""' and allowed the classical ordering of the whole legal
field which it redefined. Bishop was a self-conscious classicizer, and
shifting marriage from contract to status was a key building block of his
classicizing legal taxonomy.
V. WHAT DID STATUS MEAN?: STORY, LORD ROBERTSON AND BISHOP
This section presents a purely legal genealogy of marriage as status,
without suggesting that law was the only contributor to the rising ideology
of marriage law exceptionalism and its ideological and material
counterpart, the separate spheres.11 Bishop not only imported heavily
109. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, at 33.
110. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 107, at v.
111. Id. at Table of Contents.
112. For the best account of how law and society diverged in the development of American
marriage law, see Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward a History of
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from Lord Robertson and other sources; he also received ideas and
representations from his broader culture. The account given here focuses
on the specifically legal strand of the larger genealogy. What did "status"
mean to Story, Bishop, and other mid-century American legal minds?
What follows is a short, partial genealogy of the reception of the civil-law
term status into the American legal vocabulary, and then an account of
what Bishop thought marriage-as-status was.
As we have seen, in Lord Robertson's and in Bishop's taxonomies,
marriage became diacritical with contract. Each defined the other by
negation and thus became more dependent on that other for its own
conceptual bite. Bishop's invention was not only categorical; it was also
substantive. The very meaning of marriage and of contract had to change
if they were to be thinkable as opposites.
Clearly, status was, for Story, a foreign term, coming from civilian
sources and of interest only because it helped supply an international-law
concept useful in the conflict of laws. He adopted it very gradually,
always in italics, which indicate that, to him, it was a foreign term. Over
time his followers dropped the practice of printing it in italics. Between
the first edition of Story's Conflict of Laws in 1834 and Bishop's 1852
Marriage and Divorce, the word became a commonplace term in
American legal writing. In the course of this transition, it acquired
specific meanings, some of which survive today (transformed, of course)
while others have become obsolete.
In 1834, the date of the first edition of his Conflict of Laws, Story
silently declined to adopt the term. When it appeared in his Latin sources,
he translated it as "state."'1" Story's word choice here seems motivated by
a desire to stick close to the French term-l'dtatl14- hedged by an
equally strong desire to avoid "estate"-which had been good enough for
Blackstone-presumably because of its antiquated, even feudal
connotations. Beyond these associations, it seems that, for Story writing
in 1834, the term status had no English-language signification of its own:
it was embedded in the French Code Civil distinction between "les lois
personelles" and "matibre rdelle"-between the "personal laws" and "all
consideration of property"-which forms the great taxonomic distinction
Family Law, 1985 WiSC. L. REV. 919 (1985).
113. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, at 51-52, 58.
114. Thus Story quotes the Code Civil, for instance, for the general rule: "Les lois concernant
I'dtat et la capacitd des personnes rdgissent les Frangois mime rdsident en pais dtranger." Id. at 67
(quoting the Code Civil, art. 3).
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of the Napoleonic Code."' It was thoroughly foreign.
It seems that Story started to use the word "status" as an English-
language term largely because the English/Scottish conflict-of-law
sources on which he depended did so. It begins to appear in English only
in his Scottish quotations. We have already seen Lord Robertson's dicta
defining marriage as a status. Story's only other English-language use of
the term status in 1834 appears in a quotation from an English case
refusing inheritance of landed property in England to a child who-said
the court-was a bastard in England though legitimate in Scotland." 6
Legitimation per subsequens matrimonio might be good enough for
inheritance of property in Scotland, but impossible in England. But again,
though Story quoted at great length from this case-Birthwistle v.
Vardell-he did not follow up by designating legitimacy as a status.
By 1846, the date of the third edition of Conflict of Laws, Story had
decided to adopt the term as an English law term. He always italicized it,
but it began to appear in his own sentences." I think it's clear that Story
adopted status as an English law term in part because English and
Scottish judges were doing so, and that English and Scottish judges were
doing so because civil law concepts of international law-what came to
be known as Conflict of Laws-were acknowledged on both sides of the
border as the decisive legal language for intrafederal disputes over
marriage and legitimacy rules.
Story had a second large influence leading in the same direction, but
more explicitly international, indeed imperial, in character. The
Introduction to Story's third edition acknowledged William Burge's 1838
Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laws Generally, and in their
115. Id. at 51 ("[c]es loix personnelles" translated by Story as "[p]ersonal laws"); id. at 56
("matibre rdelle" translated by Story as "subject-matter").
116. Id. at 86 (quoting Doe dem. Birthwistle v. Vardell, 5 B. and Cresw. 438).
117. Story's first, fourth and fifth adoptions of status as an English-language term appear in
discussions of Birthwistle, to which entire new sections are devoted. Almost 15 pages are devoted to
full-page footnotes presenting diverging opinions from Birthwistle, STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d
ed.), supra note 50, at 145-59, this despite the fact that the case was still on appeal to the House of
Lords. Id. at 127 n.I. The case clearly had Story's attention. His initial adoptions of status in these
passages are chary: for instance, "It seems then generally admitted by foreign jurists, that, as the
validity of the marriage must depend upon the law of the country, where it is celebrated, the status, or
state, or condition, of their offspring, as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, ought to depend upon the same
law." Id. at 134. See also id. at 144 (further new material discussing Birthwistle and using status).
Another entirely new section is devoted to a famous English case involving the validity of a Scottish
divorce; here we find Story's second and third uses of the status as an English-language word. Id. at
137 (discussing Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 665-68 (K.B.)).
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Conflict with Each Other, and with the Law of England'18 as one of two
new works to which he owed his most substantial revisions. Story
incorporated large-scale references to and quotations from Burge,ll 9 and
citations to Burge accompany most of Story's uses of the term status as an
English legal term.120
Burge's handbook, published in London in 1838, disseminated the
know-how of "the supreme appellate tribunal of the British Colonial
Empire" about the law in force in the British colonies-and because most
of them were civil law countries, Burge made the civil law generally, and
Dutch, Spanish, and French law in particular, his first sources of law to
compare with the English law already known to his readers. 12 1 In doing
so, Burge adopted the Latin term status as an English word, explicitly
borrowed from Roman sources, that would be crucial in settling conflicts
of laws questions. For instance: "We now proceed to the consideration of
the civil qualities or capacities of persons. . . . They are frequently
expressed by the terms 'status,' '1'6tat,' . . . . "Status est qualitas, cujus
ratione homines diverso jure utuntur."' 1 2 2 Burge went on to use the term
status not as a foreign word but as an English one, and gave a list of
statuses that must be honored in choice of law decisions: "the status of
legitimacy and illegitimacy, minority and majority, marriage, alienage by
birth, and naturalization... . To these may be added the status of slavery,
the incapacity or status consequent on sentences of interdict against
prodigals and lunatics, of excommunication, outlawry, and civil death."l23
By 1838, status had arrived-explicitly from civil law-as a crucial term
for the legal managers of an Empire. It carried the French legal idea that
persons had statuses which did not change as they moved from place to
place around the world, and that required the application of their home
law to legal disputes putting the existence and consequences of those
statuses at stake.
I don't think that Story noted any tension between his Scottish sources
and the French idea transplanted by Burge. Both legal federations like the
United States and Great Britain on one hand, and colonial rule on the
118. WILLIAM BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS GENERALLY, AND IN
THEIR CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER, AND WITH THE LAW OF ENGLAND (London, Saunders and
Benning 1838) (hereinafter BURGE, COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS).
119. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.), supra note 50, at viii.
120. Id. at 134 n.1, 135 nn.1, 2 & 137 n.5.
121. BURGE, COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS, supra note 118, at ii-iii & xiv-xvi.
122. Id., at 57 (quoting "Heinic. Elem. Juris. Civil lib. 1, tit 3, § 76").
123. Id. at 57-58.
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other, provoked conflicts of laws; only a body of international law could
resolve them; and the Roman law heritage, including French law,
provided what the common law did not by way of concepts, terms, and
rules. But there was a huge tension between them: the Scottish rule
insisted on the territorial power of the newly assimilated weaker state to
choose and apply its own law, while Burge's French rule insisted on a law
of persons that would have required Scottish courts to enforce English
marriage rules.
This was about as far as Story got in assimilating Lord Robertson's
understanding of marriage as status. A large taxonomic problem attached
to the term loomed, but there is no sign that Story saw it. The common
law did not divide itself into the law of persons and the loi rdelle; indeed,
it did not divide itself systematically at all. And the civil law idea that the
"states and capacities of persons" constitute a "personal law" that travels
with different human beings wherever they go contains no inherent
derogation of persons or their capacities. It could happen to anyone. But
in a legal order in which the will theory and the law of contract gain
increasingly strong purchase and begin to command taxonomic control
over the emerging American classical legal order, the competing
distinction between the droit des personnes and the droit r&lle would
become an irrelevancy, and Burge's list of persons will begin to seem
problematic, deviant, exceptional. The persons who have statuses will
seem not privileged but incapacitated.
As it became received into emerging classical legal thought in later-
nineteenth-century Anglo-America, status was parole shifting into a new
langue. My argument is that this new langue resituated status-eventually
naturalized as status-in a contract/status distinction that was new and
that gave marriage a distinctly retardataire role to play in the grand
march of history towards contract. The very idea that marriage required
definition was new. Blackstone, Reeve, and Parsons were content to
classify marriage and spell out the legal rules, but Story, Bishop, and their
sources seemed compelled to define it. As we have seen, Story's efforts in
this direction are tentative, at least in retrospect. Bishop, on the other
hand, has almost too much to say.
First, marriage has become the important legal topic, displacing the
relation of husband and wife. Recall that for Blackstone and Reeve, the
relation of husband and wife sat with other legal relations, and the legal
rules spelled out the reciprocal rights and duties of the paired persons
inhabiting the relation. For Story and Bishop, the topic is marriage, a
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condition shared by husband and wife. This shift is both taxonomic and
lexical. When Bishop cited authorities from English and American courts
describing the personal statuses of husband and wife, he seamlessly
concluded that the rules applicable to them were applicable to marriage
because "[w]e have seen that marriage is a status[.]"l2 4 We are seeing the
partial, to be sure incomplete, displacement of husband and wife as
legally distinct persons by marriage as an institution.
In this emerging classical understanding, marriage is fundamental to the
legal and social orders; it is necessary for civilized society. It is "the most
important of all human transactions" 2 5 and "the very basis of the whole
fabric of civilized society[.]"l 26 By constituting the statuses of parent and
child and the relations of affinity and consanguinity, "it pervades the
whole system of civil society." 2 7 Marriage is fundamental, crucial, and
elementary: "Marriage . . . establishes fundamental and most important
domestic relations. . . . [E]very well organized society is essentially
interested in the existence and harmony and decorum of all its social
relations, [and] marriage.. . [is] the most elementary and useful of them
all[.]"t 21 Human civilization depends on it:
[T]his union of marriage ... produc[es] interests, attachments, and
feelings, partly from necessity, but mainly from a principle in our
nature, without which, perhaps, it [presumably referring to "our
nature"] could not exist in a civilized state[.] So it has been
deemed in all societies, civilized, and not corrupt, in all ages." 29
Marriage "is a contract coeval with, and essential to, the existence of
society[.]"'o When the U.S. Supreme Court adopted Bishop's view in
Maynard v. Hill, it put this point in the form which American lawyers
know so well: marriage "is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress."'
124. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, at 583-84 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). The question under consideration at this point in the text is whether a state court can divorce
a married couple when its only ground for jurisdiction is the current residency of one of the parties.
125. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 109, at 101 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
126. Id. § 109, at 101.
127. Id. (quoting FERGUSSON, REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
128. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 34, at 29 (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at
183).
129. Id. § 35, at 30 (quoting Dickson v. Dickson's Heirs, I Yer. 110, 112-13 (1826)).
130. Id. § 34, at 28 (quoting FERGUSSON, REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 401 (Lord
Bannatyne)).
131. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
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For Blackstone, the relations of husband and wife were private; in the
emerging classical formulation, marriage was erased from the private and
reinscribed as public. Marriage is public and communal, not private and
individual; and it is therefore governed by public law, not private law. We
can detect this in the lexical shift from "the law of husband and wife" to
"the law of marriage." Lord Robertson, quoted at such length by Story
and requoted by Bishop, insisted repeatedly it was governed by "public
law"-unlike "mere contract" which was governed by private law.' 32
Neither Story nor Bishop quite groked the civil law implications here. To
Story, this meant that marriage was an "institution of society."' 33 And
Bishop understood that "[m]arriage, though in one sense a contract . .. is,
nevertheless, sui generis, and unlike ordinary commercial contracts, is
publicijuris[.]"l34 The German/Roman idea that the entire legal order was
divided into public and private law was being haltingly adapted to
common law conditions here; the marriage/contract distinction was
clearly one conduit for its importation.
As Story and Bishop constructed marriage-as-status, they also
constructed contract, its diacritical other. In the passage quoted by Story,
Lord Robertson used the formula "rights, duties, and obligations" five
times to designate the ascriptive contents of marriage; whereas marriage
was thus saturated by law, "other contracts" are "left entirely to be
regulated by the agreements of the parties" and are "control[led]" by the
"declaration of their will."l 35 Lord Robertson even described this will as
nothing more than the "discretion or caprice" of the contracting parties.' 6
Bishop insisted on it: marriage "can be violated and annulled by law,
which no other contract can; it cannot be determined by the will of the
parties, as any other contract may be; and its rights and obligations are
derived rather from the law relating to it, than from the contract itself."'"
'Obligations . . . arising from voluntary engagement, take their rule and
substance from the will of man, and may be framed and disposed of at his
132. STORY, CONFLICTS (I" ed.), supra note 48, § 109-111, at 101-02 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, at 397-99 app. n.G).
133. Id.
134. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 34, at 29 (quoting Maguiree, 7 Dana at
184).
135. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, §§ 109-12, at 101-03 (quoting
FERGUSSON, REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
136. Id. § 110, at 102 (quoting FERGUSSON, REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 398 (Lord
Robertson)).
137. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 35, at 30 (quoting Townsend v. Griffin,
4 Del. 440, 442 (1846)).
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pleasure[.]"' 3 8 That is to say, the obligations of contract are defined
entirely by the will of the parties, or their mere pleasure; once a contract is
formed it is governed by its own terms, not by law; the parties, and only
the parties, can terminate it completely. This is the famous "will theory"
of contract; it was explicitly hostile to the richly ascriptive contract order
envisioned by Parsons. This understanding would eventually morph into
the ideas that contract is by definition free; that the role of the state in
contract is to "let it be"-laissez faire; and that contract is the paradigm
body of law for emerging modern capitalism and its market.
For Bishop, marriage creates not only "rights, duties and obligations,"
but "disabilities, and . .. privileges between husband and wife."l39 This is
a small lexical move, but one that is pregnant with possibility. Bishop's
formulation is continuous with Parsons's segregation of married women
into his list of "disabled persons." For Bishop, however, it is not the wife
alone but both parties who are disabled: no one can "take the power over
the wife from the husband, and place it in her or any other; or the right of
provision and protection of the wife from her husband[.]"' 4 0 We are
seeing here the inception of the legal idea that rights belong to contract
and are general, while the obligations of marriage are not rights but
disabilities, and are special, exceptional.
The public, ascriptive, and special character of marriage finds its
warrant in several other rules that are deemed alien to contract. Lord
Robertson, as we've seen, observed that, even though insanity rendered a
spouse permanently incapable of fulfilling essential marital duties, the
marriage remained indissoluble.14 ' An equally indissoluble marriage
could be created by parties "who are not capable of forming any other
lawful contract"-for instance, minors.'42 And the public will applies
criminal penalties to violations of the most important obligations of
marriage:_"The breach of some of its obligations has in general been
considered as a violation of the fundamental laws of the State, and
138. Id. § 36, at 31 (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.),supra note 103, at 89).
139. Id. § 35, at 30 (quoting Dickson, 1 Yer. at 112).
140. Id. § 36, at 31 (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note 103, at 89); see
also id. ("it is not in the power of the parties, though of common consent, to alter any substantial
[element]") (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note 103, at 89) (emphasis
added).
141. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 109, at 101-02 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397-98 (Lord Robertson)).
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therefore visited with severe penalties[.]"l 4 3
Finally, marriage-as-status contains not only the husband and wife but
the parent and child. As we've seen, Lord Robertson saw these relations
as radiating weblike throughout society: marriage " . . . confers the status
of legitimacy on children born in wedlock, with all the consequential
rights, duties, and privileges, thence arising; it gives rise to the relations of
consanguinity and affinity; in short, it pervades the whole system of civil
society."'" And these relations, too, reflect not the will of the parties but
the will of the state: the statuses of parent and child "can never be taken
away, or in the slightest degree infringed by the will or acts of one or both
of the parties."1 45
This understanding of marriage as fundamental was remarkably
sentimental, but the sentiments are very stern. The late-nineteenth-century
cult of domesticity-with its insistence on mutual affection, mutual
succor, and the delights of mutual companionship-makes a very scant
appearance in Story's and Bishop's definitions of marriage. Instead, all
the references to that effect that I have been able to gather so far are
basically about social control and moral self-regulation. Thus, Story
acknowledged the moral and affective dimensions of marriage this way:
"Upon its sound morals, the domestic affections, and the delicate relations
and duties of parents and children, essentially depend."' 46 This is far more
tender than Story's assertion of the husband's right to the wife's property
in the Dartmouth College case, but it is not about mutual affection either:
the ordering of domestic affections and delicate relations by sound morals
is the new point. Bishop never alludes to the emotional life of marriage,
except though his quotations from a single case, Dickson v. Dickson's
Heirs: there, marriage is said to produce "feelings" arising from "a
principle in our nature" which require marriage if we are to "exist in a
civilized state[.]"l 47 That is to say, marriage transforms potentially
destructive natural appetites into well ordered civilized feelings.
143. Id. § 36, at 31 (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note 103, at 89).
144. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 109, at 101 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)); see also BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 36, at 30 (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note
103, at 89).
145. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 36, at 30 (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note 103, at 89).
146. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 200, at 168.
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To sum up: marriage is fundamental, public, controlled by the will of
the state rather than that of the parties. It is the opposite of contract, which
is variable, private, and controlled by the will of the parties not that of the
state. One consequence of this transformation can be detected through
another Reeve/Bishop comparison: whereas for Reeve the law of husband
and wife belonged in the same book with the law of master and servant-
a housing continuous with Blackstone's "private oeconomical
relations"-for Bishop the law of marriage and divorce was a separate
legal topic. The law of master and servant was migrating to contract,' 4 8
partly because it was being delinked from marriage and divorce.
Dividing marriage from labor was a fundamental change of immense
social and political importance, in part because it implicated slavery, the
single most controversial and politically decisive issue in mid-nineteenth-
century America. The necessity of this transformation did not occur to
Bishop, who seems a little tone deaf to what was at stake here. Bishop
quotes Chief Judge Taney's decision in Strader v. Graham 49 as
consistent with his rule about jurisdiction and choice of law in interstate
divorces: the right law to apply was the law of the domicile-the slave's
domicile, it seems, in Strader, and that of the spouses in divorce cases.
Thus as Chief Justice Taney intoned in Strader, "Every State has an
undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition,
of the persons domiciled within its territory."'s In Strader itself, this
meant that Kentucky courts were entitled to apply Kentucky law to the
question of the status, slave or free, of two enslaved musicians who
travelled to Ohio at their owner's behest and then fled; slave-state courts
could award damages against those who received the slaves in Ohio and
let them escape; nor could the defendants maintain in their defense that
the musicians had become free upon arrival in Ohio. Strader was
immediately and intensely controversial, because it implied that private
and legal actors in free states were obliged to respect and enforce the
enslavement of sojourners in the North who were held to slavery in the
South.
Bishop seems not to have grasped that, though technically the domicile
148. For a gripping exposition of this process as it rearranged, through wave after wave of
restructuring and recharacterization, the relations of master and slave, master and servant, and
contract for the sale of free labor, see ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991).
149. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82 (1850),
150. Id. at 93, quoted in BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, at 583.
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rule is the same for slavery and marriage, abolitionists in the North would
see the Strader rule as the equivalent of a rule requiring Scottish courts to
allow English husbands sojourning in Scotland to cage up and beat their
wives because that was allowed under the English law of marriage.
Instead, he gives a bold misreading of Strader, making it consistent with
his choice of law rule for marriage: "if two persons in South Carolina
sustain the mutual status of master and slave, the tribunals of
Massachusetts will take cognizance of it while they remain there; but if
they remove to Massachusetts, the relation will not be recognized in the
latter State, because slavery is against the policy of its laws, and because,
indeed, they know of no such condition existing within its borders."''
The strongest suggestion that he senses something is awry here comes
when he deduces from his Strader quotation, plus another from Burge's
Colonial and Foreign Laws' 5 2-both of which speak of the status of
persons-a rule about the status of marriage: "We have seen that
marriage is a status; and the question of divorce, therefore, is one of
status." Bishop summarizes these propositions without mentioning that he
is also substantially transforming them. I think we are seeing here the
beginnings of a very American resistance to the civilian "law of persons,"
and to the choice of law consequences of that legal idea, in particular to
the idea that slave status belonged to enslaved persons and had to be
respected even in free states. Dividing marriage from the law of labor was
a crucial move, as it allowed them to develop different choice of law
rules: marital status could be untethered from the emerging idea that labor
was always contractual.
For Bishop, the locus of marriage was complex. Marriage was both
universal and local. On one hand, it was iuris gentium and therefore an
inescapable part of every sovereign legal order.' As Bishop put the
point: "Marriage, being founded in nature, is a thing of natural law, and
under that law it is entered into by the mutual consent alone of two
competent persons. From the law of nature it has ascended through the
municipal institutions of all civilized countries into the general
151. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 718, at 585.
152. Burge, Bishop reports, "says the status of persons is 'conferred by the laws of the domicil';
and within this principle he expressly includes the condition of marriage, in respect both to its
institution and dissolution." Id. at 582-83 (quoting BURGE, COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS, supra
note 118, at 57-58).
153. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 109, at 101 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 397 (Lord Robertson)).
46 [Vol. 23:1
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international code."' 54 No civilized state could disestablish marriage, and
every state must recognize particular marriages that were entered into
according to the law in force where they were contracted. The formation
of marriage was contract, and contract was universal: "As to the
constitution of the marriage, as it is merely a personal, consensual
contract, it must be valid every where, if celebrated according to the lex
loci[.]"155
But unlike contract, which must also be performed and enforced under
the lex loci, the law of the ongoing marriage could, did and should vary
significantly according to the law of the state of domicile, and that (unlike
slave status for Justice Taney) could change as the parties moved about
the face of the earth. These rules were not universal; they were local:
particular sovereigns had exclusive power to set down the particular laws
governing marriages within their territories. Bishop insisted on sovereign
control again and again: "Now all courts recognize the laws both of nature
and of nations, and draw from them rules for decision in proper cases,
when not controlled by any superior provisions of the municipal,
statutory, or common law"s. "[m]arriage ... is regulated and controlled
by the sovereign power of the State"15 1; the power over marriage and
divorce "cannot be surrendered or subjected to political restraint or
foreign control, consistently with the public welfare. And therefore,
marriage, being much more than a contract, and depending essentially on
the sovereign will, is not, as we presume, embraced by the constitutional
interdiction of legislative acts impairing the obligation of contracts."' 58
Whereas the contracts within a given sovereign state might be governed
by law from different foreign states, and thus were, in our contemporary
parlance, legally plural, the marriages resident there were legally all the
same. And whereas the terms of particular contracts varied immensely
according to the will of the parties, the terms of marriage did not: as
Bishop insisted, "The obligation is created by the public law, subject to
the public will, and not to that of the parties."' 59 This is a major division
of law; its implications would not be clear, even to Bishop, until the
154. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 144, at 113 (footnotes omitted)..
155. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed.), supra note 48, § 109, at 102 (quoting FERGUSSON,
REPORTS, supra note 56, app., n.G, at 398 (Lord Robertson)).
156. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 144, at 113.
157. Id. § 34, at 29 (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at 183).
158. Id. (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at 183).
159. Id. § 34, at 30 (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at 184).
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architecture of classical legal thought worked itself pure.
VI. THE PARADOX OF MARRIAGE AS STATUS NOT CONTRACT:
MA YNARD V HILL
The U.S. Supreme Court's 1888 decision in Maynard v. Hill cemented
into our constitutional order the idea that marriage is status, almost
verbatim as Bishop described it:
[W]hile marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions
of courts as a civil contract, generally to indicate that it must be
founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require
any religious ceremony for its solemnization, it is something more
than a mere contract. The consent of the parties is of course
essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is
executed by the marriage, a relationship between the parties is
created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be
modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the
consent of the parties. The relation once formed, the law steps in
and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its public character the
public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress.160
Despite the fact that this passage foregoes use of the term "status"-the
Supreme Court would not define marriage as status until 1890161-it has
become the locus classicus for marriage-as-status thinking. What is less
often noticed is the deeply paradoxical relationship between the Court's
idea of marriage and the actual attributes given to marriage in its actual
holding. In order to understand this paradox, it will be helpful to review
the history of the case.' 62
David and Lydia Maynard married in Vermont in 1828; soon they
moved to Ohio and had several children. In 1850 David left for what is
160. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
161. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151 (1890).
162. I derive the following story behind this famous case from Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190
(1888); Maynard v. Valentine, 3 P. 195 (Wash. 1880) ; and THOMAS W. PROSCH, DAVID S.
MAYNARD & CATHERINE T. MAYNARD: BIOGRAPHIES OF Two OF THE OREGON IMMIGRANTS OF 1850
(1906). 1 have tried to make the story told above perfectly consonant with all these sources. This was
not difficult, as - though each text provides more detail here or there - there are no material




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1
Halley
now Seattle, promising to bring his wife to join him within two years and
to pay support in the interim. He did neither; instead, in 1852 he obtained
through political means of some sortl 63 a bill of divorce from the Oregon
Territorial legislature. Lydia Maynard received no notice of, and did not
know about, this event. There seems to be no evidence that the legislature
did, or was legally required to, inquire into the existence of any grounds
for the divorce. (At that time in the Oregon Territory, as in many states,
legislative bills were the only way to obtain a divorce; judicial divorce
was still a controversial novelty.) Very promptly after the bill was issued,
David married another woman.
The case began with David's effort to perfect his title under the
Donation Act in some land located in what was to become Seattle. He had
applied to the General Land Office in Oregon Territory, and it, in turn,
found Lydia Maynard somehow and notified her of the proceedings. (As
his wife she would have dower rights that would travel with the title of
any land of which David was seized during the marriage. Without her
waiver of those rights, she would be entitled on his death to a life interest
in a portion of those lands, even if they had been sold to others.) Lydia
travelled to Seattle to assert her interests: her claim was not against David
or against David's second wife, who made no claim to the land, but
against various other settlers to whom David had made conveyances. In
the first hearing of the matter Lydia won. When David appealed to the
same commissioner, however, he prevailed.'" Well after both David and
Lydia died (in 1873 and 1875, respectively), her children sued in the
territorial court, lost at every level, and appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
As we have amply seen, by that time a crucial question had emerged
that posed a deep challenge to a well-entrenched representation of
163. Prosch tells us that Maynard was one of the small group of settlers who formed the then-
brand-new legislature for the Oregon Territory, that he got his bill of divorce at its initial session; and
that at the same session he also successfully proposed the formation of new counties and secured the
location of the King County seat on Maynard's donation claim. Prosch concludes: "It is plain from the
results that the Doctor was looked upon at Salem as a pretty good fellow. That he could have anything
he chose to ask for that the Legislators could give was quite evident." PROSCH, supra note 162, at 33.
Maynard's biographer is clearly concerned here about the fairness of this unilateral divorce and of the
home cooking that produced it.
164. This is one of the few facts for which I have only one source. PROSCH, supra note 162, at
55-56. Prosch was very sympathetic with the interests Lydia would have displaced, "the Terry estate,
Hugh McAleer and others who had bought of Maynard and did not want to lose their properties." Id.
at 55. "Of course, all this made much commotion in Seattle.... It was felt that if the new claimant
from Wisconsin [Lydia's residence by that time] won her case the people of Seattle would have to
pay." Id. at 56.
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marriage as contract: in issuing the divorce, had the Territorial legislature
violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution? The Contracts Clause
stipulates that "No state shall . . . pass any . . . law . . . impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." 6 1 If the divorce were an impairment of
contract, the Maynard divorce would be void; Lydia would be recognized
as David's lifelong wife; and under the Donation Act she would have
legally protected dower rights in David's land. For her (actually, by the
time the Supreme Court ruled on the case, for her kids) to get any relief,
then, the Court would have had to say that Lydia and David Maynard's
marriage was a contract.
It would have been easy: there was massive legal authority in place to
support a description of marriage as contract. Blackstone had described
marriage as a "civil contract," and myriad courts had followed suit.166 But
it would have been a highly disruptive move for the Court to make. Many
controversial questions-whether states had the power to grant divorces at
all, and if so, whether courts or legislatures were empowered to do this
and what grounds were needed to justify particular divorces-would be
instantaneously federalized and constitutionalized if the Contracts Clause
invalidated David and Lydia Maynard's divorce.
But here is the rub: in the name of honoring marriage-as-status, the
Court effectively validated David Maynard's decision to walk away from
his first marriage with Lydia Maynard with fewer legal consequences than
would have followed if he had failed to fulfill a contract to deliver a peck
of grain. Because marriage is a status, completely public in character, an
invariable obligation, and the foundation of family and society-David
was divorced from Lydia without having performed any of the elemental
duties of his marriage to her, without her fault, without even notice to her!
Lydia lived out her life in Ohio as a wife; if she had sued David there to
enforce his marital obligations, the marriage would have been "status"
there too; meanwhile her husband was for a brief time single and then
validly married to another!'6 1
165. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1.
166. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at 421. A Westlaw search for state cases describing marriage
as a "civil contract" before 1888 yielded 245 decisions.
167. The idea that domicile produces both subject matter jurisdiction and choice of the forum's
law was behind the validity of David Maynard's divorce: as the Territorial Supreme Court reasoned,
"it is said that the wife was never domiciled in the said territory of Oregon, and consequently said act
can have no effect upon her or her rights; but with this claim we cannot agree, for if we admit that
under the facts pleaded she was domiciled in the state of Ohio, still, as the husband was a resident of
said territory, the legislature could regulate his status therein; and, having released him from the
bonds of his marriage, he was, at least while in said territory, absolved from all its duties and thus
50 [Vol. 23:1
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David and both of his wives had a pretty clear idea of their plural status.
On the day Lydia arrived in Seattle to put in her presence in the initial
litigation over the land claim, we are told by his biographer,
He stepped into the barber shop, and said: "Dixon: fix me up in
your best style." "What's up, Doctor? What are you going to do?"
"I am going to give the people here a sight they may never have
again. I'm going to show them a man walking up the street with a
wife on each arm." Sure enough; when the steamer came in from
the upper Sound Maynard and his second wife were there to meet
the first wife, and they walked together to his home where they
dwelt until Lydia left on her return to Wisconsin, somewhat to the
surprise of the general public.' 8
That is to say, marriage as status-not-contract is a doctrinal and
ideological reality, but its contents do not entirely correspond with
marriage as a positive, enforced, lived legal institution: marriage as its
effects.
This paradox may be even clearer if we contrast Bishop's repeated
insistence that marriage is not terminable with the cases he depended on
for his underlying proposition that marriage is status. As we have seen,
Bishop insisted that "marriage . . . is regulated and controlled by the
sovereign power of the State, and cannot, like mere contracts, be
dissolved by the mutual consent only of the contracting parties[.]"' 69 Nor
can spouses "make the marriage for a time[.]" 7 o Indeed, "society has
even more interest in preserving it than the parties themselves.""' "[I]t is
a civil status, existing in one man and one woman, legally united for
life[.]"' 72 You would think that divorce did not exist.
Furthermore, all of the cases that Bishop cites to assert the central
importance of marriage to the stability of society, on inspection, turn out
to hold particular divorces valid. Not only that: they consistently elect an
expansive rather than a narrow reallocation of rights arising from the
released he occupied the status of a single and not that of a married man, and the wife could not come
here and assert any right as such wife thereafter." Maynard v. Hill, 5 P. 71 (Wash. 1884). Note the
proviso that the court's own ruling probably did not apply in Ohio, and that David Maynard was
probably married to Lydia Maynard there. The same idea, adopted in the jurisdiction of Lydia
Maynard's domicile, would produce exactly the opposite, equally correct outcome.
168. PROSCH, supra note 162, at 60.
169. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 34, at 29 (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at
184).
170. Id. § 36, at 31 (quoting FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note 103, at 89).
171. Id. § 35, at 30 (quoting Dickson, I Yer. 110, 113 (1826)).
172. Id. 9at 25.
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divorce. They all intensify their commitment to the idea that marriage and
its stability were fundamental to social order, while simultaneously
intensifying the exposure of actual marriages to divorce, to the
consequences of divorce, and to the interstate effects of divorce decrees.
In one of Bishop's marriage-as-status cases, a woman who had obtained
a divorce on the grounds of her husband's fault sought to assert her rights
to her separate property, which her husband had encumbered in the
exercise of his curtesy rights. The court held that the divorce had
dissolved his property rights arising from the marriage just as effectively
as his death would have done. 7 1 In another case, the court was faced with
a statute rendering all divorce decrees final. Even though the challenged
divorce had been granted to a nonresident wife against a nonresident
husband in clear legal error, the court upheld it. The best it could do for
the husband was to void and remand the property decree. 174
Clearly both courts had alternatives that could have protected the
objecting husband: in the first case, they could have protected his curtesy
rights; in the second they could have found a way to invalidate his wife's
jurisdictionless divorce. Instead, the judges ratified sovereign power to
terminate marriages-and thereby rendered marriage more, not less,
socially fragile. The third case makes the point with striking &lat. In that
case, the wife had abandoned her first husband, refused to return to him,
and moved to Tennessee. He sued for divorce in the state of their
domicile, Kentucky. Her answer admitted her fault and averred that she
"never would again live with him: that in so doing she had consulted her
own happiness, which she supposed it was her duty to do."' 7 1 Under
Kentucky law, once divorced she was not free to remarry and would have
been liable to a charge of bigamy if she attempted it. But she remarried in
Tennessee. When her second husband died soon thereafter, she asserted
dower rights there. In a challenge brought by the second husband's other
heirs, the Tennessee Court was unable to find any legal basis in its own
law for invalidating this second marriage. Bishop quotes a paragraph that
can only be read as the Court's protracted cry of horror at this gap in local
law which left it bound to grant her dower rights in the second husband's
estate. 176
173. Id. § 35, at 30 (quoting Townsend, 4 Del. at 442).
174. Id. § 34, at 29-30 (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at 184-85, 189).
175. Id. § 35, at 30 (quoting Dickson, I Yer. at I11).
176. Id. These excerpts from the original passage will convey some of its intensity of feeling: "I
think not too much will be asserted, when it is said, that when a community, upon every slight pretext,
[Vol. 23:152
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The paradox of all these cases lies at the disjuncture between the state's
control over marriage and marriages, on one hand, and individuals'
strategies exploiting choice-of-law rules to wrest control into their own
hands. But this power of the sovereign to determine the validity of
marriage and divorce obscured a profound contradiction between the
jurists' ideology that marriage-as-status-not-contract constituted marriage
as fundamental to social order and the actual outcomes of these and
dozens if not hundreds of other cases. Bishop does emphasize that divorce
is available only as a sanction on marital wrongdoing: "The suit for
divorce . . . is not an action upon contract, but a proceeding sui generis,
founded upon the violation of duties which the law enjoins[.]" 1" This
justification for the rise of divorce served to mediate the contradiction that
is so patent here.178
In at least one of Bishop's own cases, the court thought that the judicial
power reached so far as to dissolve marriages in which both spouses were
happy, if dissolution served the public good or justice. According to the
court in Maguire v. Maguire, marriage
. . . establishes fundamental and most important domestic
relations. And therefore, as every well organized society is
essentially interested in the existence and harmony and decorum
of all its social relations, marriage, the most elementary and useful
of them all, is regulated and controlled by the sovereign power of
the State, and cannot, like mere contracts, be dissolved by the
mutual consent only of the contracting parties, but may be
abrogated by the sovereign will, either with our without the
consent of both parties, whenever the public good, or justice to
both or either of the parties, will be thereby subserved. Such a
remedial and conservative power is inherent in every independent
grants divorces, to gratify the lust or interest of particular individuals, as a general rule of polity,
corruption and political death are approaching... .Every honest and prudent man, who wishes well to
the society in which he lives, ought to shudder whenever he sees the supreme power of the country
legislating upon this topic." Id.
177. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 38, at 32.
178. It was an important part of the Supreme Court's articulation of the new doctrine in Grimley:
"Marriage is a contract; but it is one which creates a status. Its contract obligations are mutual
faithfulness, but a breach of those obligations does not destroy the status or change the relations of the
parties to each other. The parties remain husband and wife, no matter what their conduct to each other
- no matter how great their disregard of marital obligations. It is true that courts have power under
the statutes of most States, to terminate those contract obligations and put an end to the marital
relations. But this is never done at the instance of the wrongdoer. The injured party, and the injured




Halley: What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
nation[.] 179
The Maguire court saw a smooth, coherent legal order in which the
sovereign held all relevant powers and individual spouses none (aside
from the decision to enter into the marital relation). What made the bond
between individual husbands and wives more contingent, strengthened
sovereign control over marriage. That is what intensified its
fundamentalness. But it left individual marriages more fragile than
contract: "it can be violated and annulled by law, which no other contract
can[.]"so This contradiction between the law on the books and the law in
action is a deep trait of Bishop's invention, marriage-as-status-not-
contract.
VII. RECEIVING "SYSTEM": SAVIGNY
In an 1829 address to the Suffolk Bar, Story looked with dread at the
"mass of the law, . . . accumulating with an almost incredible rapidity"
and warned of the "fearful calamity, which threatens us, of being buried
alive, not in the catacombs, but in the labyrinths of the law."' 8 ' Impending
chaos could be averted only if American lawyers acquired "habits of
generalization[.]"l 82 Very early on, Story felt the impulse to classicize
which, around the time of his early death in 1845, was sweeping the
American legal intelligentsia and, by the 1880s, transforming American
law.
The classicizing impulse in America was driven by envy not of the
Code Napoleon but of modern Roman law, which was being built mainly
in Germany in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Story
counseled the Boston bar that their salvation lay in foreign, civilian, and
especially Roman sources:
Where shall we find such ample general principles to guide us in
new and difficult cases, as in that venerable deposit of the learning
and labors of the jurists of the ancient world, the Institutes and
Pandects of Justinian. The whole continental jurisprudence rests
upon this broad foundation of Roman wisdom; and the English
comion law, churlish and harsh as was its feudal education, has
condescended silently to borrow many of its best principles from
179. BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 18, § 34, at 29 (quoting Maguire, 7 Dana at
184) (emphasis added).
I80. Id. § 35, at 30.








Story was not alone. In 1818, Hugh Swinton Legard, a South Carolina
lawyer hungry for legal enlightenment, was foiled by political turmoil on
the Continent in his original desire to study law in Germany, and went
instead to Scotland.184 (We will see again and again that the Scottish
connection played an important role in transmitting civilian influence to
America.) Legar6 was in the vanguard: as Michael H. Hoeflich relates,
over the next two decades American lawyers joined the global trend, and
went to Germany for legal study.' To Legar6, Blackstone's
Commentaries was a throwback: "in spite of all the pompous eulogies that
have been passed upon" this classic treatise, "'it is a good gentleman's
book, clear, but not deep."' 8 6 Instead, American jurists should emulate
the civil law of his time:
In comparing what the Civilians have written upon any subjects
that have been treated of by English text writers, or discussed in
the English courts, it is, we think, impossible not to be struck with
the superiority of their truly elegant and philosophical style of
analysis and exposition. Their whole arrangement and method-
the division of the matter into its natural parts, the classification of
it under the proper predicaments, the discussion of principles, the
deduction of consequences and corollaries-everything, in short,
is more luminous and systematic-everything savors more of a
regular and exact science.1 87
In making this turn, American jurists joined what Duncan Kennedy has
called the "first globalization of law and legal thought,"'18 an ascendency
of German legal thought and a complex process of transplanting it
through colonization, indirect rule, inspiration of local elites, travel for
legal education, political and economic forces seeking uniformity of law,
and the sheer fashionableness and charisma of Roman law. Ugo Mattei
observes that, by the early nineteenth century, "German scholarship
became the most prestigious source of law. . . . Everywhere, in the
183. Id. at 29.
184. Michael H. Hoeflich, Savigny and his American Disciples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 17,28 (1989)
[hereinafter Hoeflich, Disciples]; Hoeflich, Friendships, supra note 53, at 607.
185. Hoeflich, Friendships, supra note 53, at 609-11. See also Peter Stein, The Attraction ofthe
Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403 (1966) [hereinafter Stein, Attraction].
186. Stein, Attraction, supra note 185, at 429 (quoting 2 WRITINGS OF HUGH SWINTON LEGAft
110 (1845) [quoting Home Tooke, without citation]).
187. Id. See also Hoeflich, Friendships, supra note 53, at 607 (quoting the typescript of a letter
dated April 2, 1829 in the Library of Congress).
188. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 1, at 21, 25-37.
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common law, in the civil law, and even in non western legal systems 'the
German systematic and dogmatic method and the concepts defined within
it were spreading triumphantly.' . . . In the common law world, basic
introductions to English law . . . employed the typical German
terminology to analyze common law structures."189 And it wasn't just
German terminology that travelled: German legal ideas, legal books, legal
methods, legal education and legal taxonomy were charismatic and, in
some colonial settings, virtually unavoidable.' 90
Story and Legard yearned for system, and many of the things they
wanted turned out to be highly salient characteristics of classical legal
thought. The passages just quoted show that they hungered for general
principles, elegance of analysis and exposition, and a philosophical style
of analysis; that they loved the idea that deduction and analogy, working
down from general principles, would render the law logical and coherent.
But the desideratum that boosted the status/contract distinction to
structural dignity was premised on the idea that law divides into natural
parts, so that writing about it should imitate its form through the use of
correct classifications. In the late 1820s, Story and Legar6 already thought
that the arrangement of legal topics expressed something essential about
each of them individually and about the system of which they are the part.
This is precisely the impulse which, in art and architecture, characterizes a
classical style. I will call it the classical ideal and will speak of a desire
for system. And I am going to argue that, as the yearning for system
emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century in America-and not
coincidentally all over the world-it carried the ideas that, within private
law, contract and marriage differed on an axis dividing the general from
the particular.
Nor was legal thought the only driving force behind the segregation of
family law/domestic relations/personal status law. Again and again, in
different ways in different places, an emerging global market known as
capitalism found the contract/marriage distinction in legal thought and
189. Mattei, supra note 1, at 202-03 (quoting Rodolfo Sacco, "Legal Formants: A Dynamic
Approach to Comparative Law," 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 240 (1991)). The exceptions were the
relatively few sites primarily attuned to French influence. Id. For a fascinating account of how
Quebeyois lawyers resisted German influence in favor of French sources, and of the political and
ideological implications of this move, see Eric H. Reiter, Imported Books, Imported Ideas: Reading
European Jurisprudence in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Quebec, 22 L. & HIST. REV. 445 (2004).
190. Compare Mattei, supra note 1, who explains the spread of ascendant legal ideas as a
function of desire for them in sites of reception, with Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 1,
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made it newly important. Indeed, Story's address to the Suffolk Bar
specified the need for modernization and uniformity of commercial law as
a primary reason to turn to civilian sources: "The whole continental
jurisprudence rests upon this broad foundation of Roman wisdom; and the
English common law, churlish and harsh as was its feudal education, has
condescended silently to borrow many of its best principles from this
enlightened code . . . . The law of contracts and personalty, of trusts and
legacies, and charities, in England, have been formed into life by the soft
solicitudes and devotion of her own neglected professors of the civil
law."'' Just a few years later he wrote to Francis Lieber that "I look
chiefly to the study of foreign law, and especially foreign commercial
law, for the most important improvements which are likely to be made in
our commercial jurisprudence."' 92 Other American jurists concurred.
David Hoffman, a professor of law at the University of Maryland from
1816-36, and perhaps the first designated professor of law in America,
advised: "In our courts of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, also, and
in our courts of Equity, on various subjects, as likewise in the law of
Contracts, of Executors, of Bailments, Legacies, Presumptions,
Accession, Confusion, Extinguishment, Set-Off, &c. &c we should appeal
to the Civil Law ... ."193 The rise of capital brought with it the rise of
contract, and as contract moved into place as the general, it drew its
opposite, status, into place as the particular.
Thanks to bibliographical research by Hoeflich' 94 and political
historical analysis by John W. Cairns, 95 together with the resources of the
Harvard Law Library, we can watch the desire for system emerge in
American legal life. I will pay special attention to indications that
Americans noticed in the work of Gustav Hugo, the founder of the
German Historical School, and Freidrich Carl von Savigny, the proponent
of a contract/family distinction which was to infiltrate Bishop's
contract/status distinction and raise it to structural importance. Once
again, the Scottish avenue for civil-law influence in America is crucial.
Cairns argues that, as English initiatives to modify Scottish law-
191. Story, Address to the Suffolk Bar, supra note 99, at 29 (citation omitted).
192. Letter from Joseph Story to Francis Lieber (Jul. 24, 1833) in Hoeflich, Friendships, supra
note 53, at 604.
193. 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 508 (2d ed. 1836).
194. In this research, I found Hoeflich, Disciples, supra note 184, particularly useful: he
identified most of the texts that I inspected to calibrate Savigny's influence in American law.
195. John W. Cairns, The Influence of the German Historical School in Early Nineteenth Century
Edinburgh, 20 SYR. J. INT'L. L. & COM. 191 (1994).
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especially the law of marriage and divorce-accelerated in the early
nineteenth century, Scottish jurists resisted by claiming that law was
historically contingent and local, not universal and rational."' This, he
plausibly claims, made them particularly happy to adopt the German
Historical School as their favorite source of authority for legal ideas.'9 7
Both Cairns and Hoeflich focus on two important figures in the early
years of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Irving and John Reddie, both
active promoters of the German Historical School.' 9 What I add to their
work here is some very telling detail about how Irving's and Reddie's
books were received in America.
In 1846 the Harvard Law Library published a catalogue, almost
certainly composed by law student John Gage Marvin, showing that it not
only had Irving's Civil Law in its 1837 edition but held two copies of it, a
rare practice perhaps motivated by an expectation of heavy use. 9 9 It also
listed two copies of Savigny's History of the Roman Law in the Middle
Ages in the original German, two copies in the 1839 French translation,
and two copies of the 1829 Edinburgh-based English translation, plus two
topical treatises by Savigny in French translation.200
In 1847, John Gage Marvin published a massive Legal Bibliography
constituting his then-ideal law library.201 Here Marvin listed Irving's Civil
Law,2 02 and added Reddie's 1826 Historical Notices of the Roman Law,
and of the Recent Progress of its Study in Germany,203 each with a
paragraph of special praise. When Story died in 1845, he owned an
196. Id. at 193.
197. Id. at 194.
198. When Legar6 studied in Edinburgh, Irving was his teacher. Hoeflich, Friendships, supra
note 53, at 607.
199. HARVARD LAW SCH. LIBRARY, A CATALOGUE OF THE LAW LIBRARY OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY IN CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 120 (4' ed., Cambridge, Metcalf & Co, Printers to the
University, 1846) [hereinafter HARVARD 1846 CATALOGUE]. Hoeflich indicates that this list was
compiled by John Gage Martin. Hoeflich, Annals, supra note 53, at 333. For a fascinating account of
commercial and auction catalogues during this period, see M.H. HOEFLICH, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2010), especially Chapter 3, "Spreading the Word: Catalogues and
Cultivation," id. at 74-104, and Chapter 4, "Bidding for Law Books," id. at 105-24.
200. HARVARD 1846 CATALOGUE, supra note 199, at 217.
201. J.G. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OR A THESAURUS OF AMERICAN, ENGLISH,
IRISH AND SCOTCH LAW BOOKS: TOGETHER WITH SOME CONTINENTAL TREATISES.
INTERSPERSED WITH CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS UPON THEIR VARIOUS EDITIONS AND
AUTHORITY. To WHICH IS PREFIXED A COPIOUS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, 404, 631
(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson, 1847) [hereinafter J.G. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY].
202. Id. at 415.
203. Id. at 602.
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autographed presentation copy of Reddie's book.2 04 Irving, "an early
exponent of Savigny," 205 was the Keeper of the Advocates' Library in
Edinburgh from 1820 to 1848.206 He had published a first edition of
Observations on the Study of Civil Law for his students in 1815,
dedicating it to Gustav Hugo and referring particularly to Hugo's first
edition. 207 Irving's 1837 edition-the one listed by Marvin-adds
significant passages dependent on Savigny's History of the Roman Law in
the Middle Ages, specifically admiring Savigny for restoring the
continuity of Roman Law throughout the feudal er208 Marvin also added
recently published English-language translations of Hugo's Survey of the
Roman or Civil Law, and of Savigny's History of the Roman Law in the
Middle Ages and Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and
Jurisprudence.209
Marvin's Legal Bibliography thus manifests a growing appetite for and
access to knowledge about the German Historical School. The book's
structure is a further innovation among general booklists, as it integrates
foreign with Anglo-American sources in a single list. Hoeflich comments:
The great genius of Marvin's work lay precisely in his integration
of foreign legal materials with Anglo-American materials and in
treating them all in exactly the same way. The signal to the reader
was clear: for purposes of legal authority, foreign materials could
be just as useful as Anglo-American materials. . . . Marvin's 1847
Legal Bibliography may well be viewed as one of the most
important practical tools in Story's attempt to foster the spread of
continental legal learning in the United States.2 10
A remarkable manuscript inscribed The Property of John Gage
Marvin[,] Librarian of Dane Law School[,] 1845 shows Marvin coming
up with his classicizing idea. This MS is a handwritten alphabetical list of
legal books. On the recto of the first leaf we find the following dialogue
204. PHILLIPS AND SAMPSON, CATALOGUE OF LAW AND MISCELLANEOUS BOOKS
BELONGING TO THE LIBRARY OF THE LATE MR. JUSTICE STORY 8, entry #199 (Boston, Alfred
Mudge, 1846).
205. Hoeflich, Bibliographical Perspectives, supra note 53, at 52.
206. David Laing, Memoir of Dr Irving, in DAVID IRVING, THE HISTORY OF SCOTTISH POETRY
xix, xxi-xxii (Edinburgh, Edmonston and Douglas, 1861).
207. DAVID IRVING, OBSERVATIONS ON THE STUDY OF THE CIVIL LAW ded. p., 56 n.x
(Edinburgh, A. Balfour, 1815).
208. DAVID IRVING, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CIVIL LAW, ded. p., 83-84, 164-165
(London, A Maxwell 1837).
209. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 201, at 404, 631.
210. Hoeflich, Annals, supra note 53, at 340-41.
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between Marvin and himself. I use different typefaces to indicate
Marvin's shifts from pencil to pen and back; clearly he wrote these entries
at intervals, not all at once; see Appendix 5 for a photographic
reproduction:
I will prepare the American part and if it takes in a second edition
enlarge and incorporate the English and Continental Bibliography.
. . . In this way there will be a continual opportunity of
improvement.
Perhaps it will be best to omit the
Continental writers for a new work.
How would it do to include the continental with the
other and make a sort of an Encyclopedia of Legal Biography?2 11
We see Marvin here in the very act of conceiving the encyclopedic legal
bibliography.
And there is more to be gleaned, thanks to Marvin's hopes of a second
edition of the Legal Bibliography.2 12 Marvin inserted interleaf pages in a
copy of his bibliographical masterwork, and made copious handwritten
entries on them adding further citations and commentary.2 13 We can be
sure that Martin made these amendments between February 13, 1847,
when he signed off on the printed Legal Bibliography,2 14 and July 3,
1849, when he departed for California and the Gold Rush.2 15 I will call
this the Amended Legal Bibliography. This interesting volume shows
Marvin carrying on his campaign for foreign and especially German
Historical School sources. Marvin inscribed several encomia for the
German Historical School derived from recently published lectures on the
211. J. G. Marvin, Biographical and Bibliographical Notes, 1845, Harvard Law School MS 1069
(letter of permission to quote from this MS on file with the author). Thanks to David Warrington for
surfacing this remarkable item.
212. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 201, at vii.
213. J. G. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, OR, A THESAURUS OF AMERICAN, ENGLISH, IRISH,
AND SCOTCH LAW; TOGETHER WITH SOME CONTINENTAL TREATISES. INTERSPERSED WITH CRITICAL
OBSERVATIONS UPON THEIR VARIOUS EDITIONS AND AUTHORITY. TO WHICH IS PREFIXED A COPIOUS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson, 1847 (letter of permission to quote from
this MS on file with the author). The Harvard Law Library's HOLLIS entry for this unique item is
Law School Rare K 38 M37x 1847, and it notes: "Copy I ... is the author's own copy, interleaved
and extended to two volumes, with his extensive holographic notes." The hand is identical to that
quoted in note 212 above, from J.G. Marvin's MS booklist of 1845 (letter of permission to quote from
the manuscript portions of this document on file with the author).
214. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 201, at vii.
215. Howard Jay Graham, John G. Marvin and the Founding of American Legal Bibliography,
48 LAWLIBR. J. 194, 211 (1955).
60 [Vol. 23:1
60
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1
Halley
history of Roman law, given at the Middle Temple by George Long and
published for some reason not in London but in Philadelphia 2 16-itself a
new entry in the Amended Legal Bibliography. I will return to the purpose
and contents of Long's lectures anon; here, I want to notice how Marvin
deployed them.
Long's Discourses declare themselves "indebted" to Savigny in terms
that are almost devotional. Of the four precursors which Long identified
as constituting his primary sources-Sir Matthew Hale's Analysis of the
Civil Part of the Law, John Austin's Outline of a Course of Lectures on
General Jurisprudence, Savigny's System des Heutigen Rd'mischen
Rechts, and Thibaut's System des Pandekten Rechts2 1 7-Long devoted a
special tribute to Savigny:
[O]bligations may be so great, and the character of him to whom
they are due so exalted, that the receiver can only present with all
humility the tribute of his gratitude and admiration, and express a
hope that he has made a worthy use of those lessons of wisdom, to
the understanding of which he has diligently devoted whatever of
218ability he may possess . . ..
For his Amended Legal Bibliography, Marvin added Long's Discourses
and selected not this passage but another to adorn his entries for Savigny:
'It is nothing extravagant when I say that any praise which could
be bestowed on the writings of Savigny and Thibout, by any man
the most competent to judge, would not be exaggerated. They are
characterized by a soundness of knowledge, clearness of
expression, perspicuity of [argument] and subtlety and depth of
thought, that seldom have been equaled by any writer on any
subject, and cannot be surpassed.' 2 19
And he quoted from another treatise the following recommendation
about Long's lectures themselves: "On the Civil Law, Mr Long's two
discourses delivered in the Middle should be read. In these discourses
Students will find whence the excellence of the Roman Law arose, and an
interesting historical account of it." 220 Marvin was eager to guide his
readers to an English language source for Savigny and the German
216. GEORGE LONG, Two DISCOURSES DELIVERED IN THE MIDDLE TEMPLE HALL BY GEORGE
LONG WITH AN OUTLINE OF THE COURSE (Philadelphia, T. &. J.W. Johnson, 1848).
217. Id. at 62.
218. Introduction to LONG, TWO DISCOURSES, supra note 216.
219. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 201, at interleaved page facing 631.
220. Id. at interleaved page facing 474 (alteration in original).
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Historical School, eager to endorse Savigny as a font of legal wisdom, but
careful to select passages that tone down Long's introductory rave. He
adds praise for Thibout (whose books he never listed, perhaps because he
never got a chance to see any of them), Savigny's opponent in the
codification debates. Compared to Long, Marvin's attitude of reception is
slightly cooler, more reserved.
Long is of particular interest for the reception of German legal thought
in America because, at almost exactly the same time that he published his
lectures on Roman law, Luther S. Cushing was giving a parallel lecture
series at "the Law School at Cambridge"-Cambridge, Massachusetts,
that is22 1-and because we have direct evidence that Cushing consulted
Long's Discourses while he was preparing his lectures for publication.
The premise of the German Historical School that Roman sources were
not to be imitated slavishly but adapted to the needs of contemporary
legal minds was important for both Long and Cushing. Here is a passage
from Long's Discourses that Cushing wrote onto a slip of paper and
inserted into his MS lectures, whence it was included in the printed
version of his Harvard lectures:
The merits of the Roman jurists did not consist in making a
systematic arrangement of the whole matter of law, though they
have done much towards helping us make it. Their merit lay in
their skilful application of principles to the resolving of particular
cases in which they display a rectitude of purpose, a happy brevity
of expression, and a mastery of their matter, that have commended
the admiration of all judges and the best models for our
imitation.222
Cushing's selective admiration of Long's Discourses can help us
identify the path chosen by the Americans. The outtakes are significant.
Long had been appointed to a new position in the Middle Temple, as the
Reader on Jurisprudence and the Civil Law, after a Committee on Legal
221. LUTHER S. CUSHING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (Boston, Little,
Brown, 1854). Cushing indicates that he gave his lectures in 1848-49. Id. at v.
222. LONG, Two DISCOURSES, supra note 216, at 26 n.1. The identical passage can be found in
Luther Steams Cushing, Notes for Lectures on Criminal Law, Roman Law, and Real Property (1848)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Special Collections). Volume 2 of
this manuscript is titled Roman Law. A torn half-sheet of paper is inserted between pages 26 & 27 of
Volume 2 of the manuscript. On one side appears the quotation from Long in a hand that resembles
that of the main text, but shakier, surely that of an older or ailing Cushing. On the other side and in
another hand appears an account of loans, one of which is dated Oct I to Oct 10 1853. Query whether
this suggests that the quotation from Long was written after October 1853? At any rate, Cushing
borrowed from his transatlantic colleague sometime between 1848 and 1854.
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Education in the Middle Temple selected this as the "first step for the
promotion of Legal Education[.]" 2 23 Long was responsible for "General
Jurisprudence," that is, for producing a "'Philosophy of Positive Law, as
being something which comprehends the principles of all systems of law.
By virtue of its universality, it is rightly called General; and inasmuch as
it is a systematic exposition of principles with their logical consequences,
it is appropriately called a Philosophy."'2 24 The Committee added a focus
on Civil Law to "indicate what may be called Modem Roman Law, that is
to say, those portions of the civil law which being of a universal character
and applicable to the relations of modem society, have formed the basis of
the jurisprudence of many continental nations, and entered so largely into
our own."'
225
Long's Discourses include an "Outline of a Course of Lectures on
General Jurisprudence and the Roman Law to be Delivered in the Middle
Temple, 1846-7." This is a taxonomy of all of law. In English, the closest
exemplar is surely Austin's Outline of a Course of Lectures on General
Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Law, which he published as an
addendum to his Province of Jurisprudence Determined; both of them
seem to follow Arnold Heise's outline of civil law published in
Heidelberg, in German, in 1807.226 These outlines of all of law map it into
systematic divisions. They culminate, surely, in the stunning fold-out
tables of all of law included in Austin's Lectures on General
Jurisprudence, published posthumously by his wife Sarah Austin in
1863.227 Appendix 6 reproduces one of Austin's stunning tables. They
give visual shape to the idea of law as system. True to his mandate, Long
divided his lectures into a General Part and a Special Part: "There are
many general notions which pervade all Law and every part of it. These
General Notions can be properly explained independently of the Particular
223. LONG, Two DISCOURSES, supra note 216, at 5.
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting the "Report of the Committee of this Society on Legal Education").
226. JoHN AUSTIN, OUTLINE OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, in AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (London, John Murray,
1832), aft. 391 (hereinafter AUSTIN, PROVINCE); Arnold HEISE, GRUNDRISS EINES SYSTEMS DES
GEMEINEN CIVILRECHTS ZUM BEHUF VON PANDEKTEN-CORLESUNGEN (Heidelberg, Mohr und
Zimmer, 1807).
227. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, BEING THE SEQUEL TO "THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED" TO WHICH ARE ADDED NOTES AND FRAGMENTS Now FIRST
PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS (London, John Murray, 1863) [hereinafter AUSTIN,
LECTURES]. The LECTURES occupy two volumes, labeled Vol. 11 and Vol. III, respectively, on their
title pages. Sarah Austin's republication of Austin's 1832 The Province ofJurisprudence Determined
is Volume I in this series. I will follow her numeration.
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things to which they apply, and when they are properly apprehended, they
render the study of the Special Part easier." 2 28 Austin recommended
precisely the same procedure: "The object . . . is to distinguish the
Universal from the Particular." 22 9
But here we encounter a distinct difference between Long and Austin.
For Long, the General Part of the Outline first defines law and then sets
forth its "objects," the Rights and Duties of Persons, divided into the Law
of Things and the Law of Persons. 230 The topics of the Special Part are
four: "Property of Ownership;" "Contracts (Obligationes);" "Marriage,
and the Relations which arise from it;" and "On Testamentary Succession,
and Succession ab Intestuto." 231 For Austin,
The Law of Persons being the Law of Status, and the Law of
Things being the law minus the Law of Status, it is clear that the
distinction between the law of Persons and the Law of Things,
turns upon the notion of Status or Condition . . .. And the bulk of
the legal system, minus these status or conditions, is distinguished
by the name of "the Law of Things" from that peculiar department
to which conditions are banished. 232
As Kennedy observed, "The [American] Classics created . . . by
subtraction. . .. They created also by abstraction, by asserting and then
trying to show that there had been an essence hidden at the core of the
pre-Classical hodgepodge." 23 3 Heise, Savigny, the Pandektists, and Long
and Austin following them, all sought a general law, abstracting in part by
subtracting from it law that was irretrievably particular. As we will see,
the Americans did the same, but they did not do so in the form of outlines
of all of law, in fold-out tables, or in top-down establishment of general
principles. Nothing of the kind appears in Cushing's contemporaneous
lectures on Roman law for his Harvard students. The philosophical
approach was not for them. Instead, as we will also see, they built their
Classical order topic by topic, abstracting and subtracting topic from topic
and then within topics. And in doing so they hewed more closely to
Savigny and to Austin than Long did, by deeming Contract the perfect
228. LONG, Two DISCOURSES, supra note 216, at 58.
229. 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 227, at 420.
230. LONG, Two DISCOURSES, supra note 216, at 56-57.
231. Id. at 59-62.
232. 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 227, at 382-83. For the more concise
version to which Long had access, in the Outline included in PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED, see PROVINCE, supra note 226, at xvii, ix, lxiv, and lxvii.
233. KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at 207.
[Vol. 23:164
64
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1
Halley
candidate for generality and subtracting marriage and other statuses from
it. The resemblance is far too strong to be coincidental.
In a recent article, Duncan Kennedy gives a close reading of the only
English-language translation of Savigny's most explicit reflection on this
dichotomy.23 4 This text, first published in German in 1840,235 was
translated into English far too late to appear in any of Marvin's catalogues
or to influence Bishop directly, but it almost certainly influenced the
American classicizers through the ample routes for German Historical
School influence flowing through Edinburgh, from London, and
increasingly as the century progressed, directly from Germany. In it,
Savigny divided private law into two domains: family law and
potentialities law, the latter further subdivided into the law of property
and of obligations, or contract. (Though patrimonial law is the more
conventional translation for the latter, I will follow Kennedy in sticking
with the English translator's somewhat awkward term.)
In Savigny's formulation, the body of law that opposed contract was
family law. As I will show in Part II of this Article, this term was to
become deeply controversial in the U.S. context but not until the rise of
legal realism in the twentieth century. In the latter decades of the
nineteenth century, American jurists just ignored the term. The American
title for the field evolved under conditions that seem entirely indigenous.
In this they resembled legal orders influenced by French law: the Anglo-
Americans liked and stayed loyal to their own terminology (husband and
wife, parent and child, then the law of marriage and divorce, and finally
234. Duncan Kennedy, Savigny's Family/Patrimony Distinction and Its Place in the Global
Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 811 (2010) [hereinafter Kennedy,
Savigny's Distinction]; FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW
(Hyperion Press 1979) (William Holloway, trans., 1867) (hereinafter SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF MODERN
ROMAN LAW)..On Savigny's influence on Austin, see Andreas B. Schwarz, John Austin and the
German Jurisprudence offHis Time, 2 POLITICA 178, 179 (1934). "Austin's was first and foremost a
systematic mind, systematic in a very wide sense of the word.... [H]e saw the task of legal science in
the development of a 'system of law considered as an organic whole.' Austin's desire for system
found great satisfaction in German jurisprudence, which at that time was grappling particularly with
the problems of classification and in which the method of deriving the whole of law from general
principles was in full development." Id. at 190. Michael Hoeflich thinks that Austin derived more than
that from his studies in Roman law: "In the 'main course' of the Lectures, Austin utilized Roman and
civil law in several ways. First, Roman and civil law provided both an inspiration for and a source of
Austin's scheme of abstraction and systematization. Second, Roman and civil law provided the
necessary logical and precise set of legal terminology for exposition and explanation of the system
developed by Austin. Third, in those areas where Austin's efforts transcended systematization and
exposition and concerned substance, Roman and civil law also provided both vocabulary and rules."
Hoeflich, John Austin, supra note 53, at 47.
235. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HUTIGEN ROMISCHEN REcHTs (Berlin, Viet
und Comp., 1840) [hereinafter SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS].
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domestic relations), and French-influenced legal orders did the same
(personal status law). But it's important not to let the tail wag the dog
here: nomenclature had far less impact than structure, and the structure
that emerged, again and again, all over the world, through the influence of
German legal thought in the first globalization, was the construction of
legal orders around a market/family distinction.
A key point that we can gain from examining Savigny is that, when we
attribute family law to premodern legal orders, we are committing a small
sin of anachronism. Family law under its various labels-family law as a
category-was a nineteenth century invention. And it was not an only
child or an orphan: it came into being as part of a system, part of the very
idea that law is and should be a system. Let us begin a relinquishment of
the idea that family law had any existence before this moment of its
invention by setting aside the common misunderstanding that Family Law
is a Roman law category dating back to Justinian or other Roman law
sources. As Wolfram Miller-Freienfels informs us, "[e]ven during the
long reign of Roman law in antiquity, there was never a specific family
law as a systematic unit unto itself."236 It was not a legal category in
236. Wolfram Mtiller-Freienfels, The Emergence of Droit de Famille and Familienrecht in
Continental Europe and the Introduction of Family Law in England, 28 J. FAM. HIST. 31, 32 (2003)
(hereinafter MUller-Freienfels, Emergence of Droit de Famille). Do not be deceived by modem books
like BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. McGINN, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW (2004), into
supposing that family law comes to us from Roman law. As the editors indicate in their introduction,
the Roman term "familia" really meant household, id. at 3, and clearly this is a legal, not a social
household. Their Case 4, defining the Roman law term familia, comes from Ulpianus's Ad Edictum,
dated approximately 200 A.D. In the part of Ulpinius' definition that they include and translate,
familia is, "[b]y a particular rule, ... a number of persons who, either by nature or by law, are
subjected to the power (potestas) of one person: for example, a paterfamilias . . . ."; it is also, "[b]y a
common rule, . . . all agnates. . . . [even if] they each have their own familiae . . . , since they stem
from the same home and lineage"; in addition, "[w]e also customarily describe slaves asfamiliae." Id.
at 18-19. The family of Roman law is thus defined by the power of its head over its members; the
members include only one marital pair, that of the head, all agnates even if they also legally belong to
other familiae, and the slaves under power of the head-and all of this without any reference to where
anyone lives.
Frier and Thomas make an indicative omission from Ulpinius. They delete his first definition of
familia and thus project the modem concept of family law back onto their Roman source. Here is the
omitted passage: "nam et in res et in personas deducitur. in res, ut puta in lege duodecim tabularum
his verbis 'adgnatus proximus familiam habeto'. ad personas autem refertur familiae significatio ita,
cum de patrono et liberto loquitur lex: 'ex ea familia', inquit, "in eam familiam": et hic de
singularibus personis legem loqui constat." DIG. 50.16.195.1-4 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 46). This passage
can be translated to say that the term familia "relates both to things and to persons: to things, as, for
instance, in the Law of the Twelve Tables in the words 'let the nearest agnate have the household.'
The designation of household, however, refers to persons when the law speaks of patron and
freedman: 'from that household' or 'to that household'; and here it is agreed that the law is talking of
individual persons." Id. (Alan Watson trans.). Frier and Thomas omitted this first definition, I would
suggest, because they simply could not imagine inheritance and master/servant as "family law." As
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Justinian's Institutes, where the great division was between personae, res,
and actiones.23 Nor did the early rationalist synthesizer Samuel
Pufendorf acknowledge it as a legal topic.238 The makers of the French
Code Napoleon were explicitly hostile to the idea of family law, probably
pursuing an anti-corporatist idea: they incorporated instead the law of
marriage in the first book of the Code, Des Personnes. According to
Mtiller-Freienfels, Family Law as a distinct legal domain made its first
appearance in Gustav Hugo's Institutionen des heutigen Romischen
Rechts, published in 1789.239 Hugo, the founder of the German Historical
School, divided all of private law into five topics: real rights, personal
obligations, family laws, inheritance laws, and legal procedure. He
retracted this innovation in the second edition of his Institutionen,
reverting to the more widely known and familiar tripartite division of
Justinian's Institutes.240 But the idea had legs: Muiller-Freienfels next sees
it in the Prussian General Laws of the Land (the Preussische Allgemeine
Landrecht) of 1794, widely acknowledged as the first legal code produced
by natural law rationalizers.2 41 There, the second part, devoted to the law
of the community (as opposed to the law of the individual person, in part
one), begins with sections titled "Of Marriage," "Of the Rights and
Obligations of Parents and Children," "Of the Rights and Obligations of
the Remaining Members of the Family," and "Of Common Family
Rights." Here is how Mfiller-Freienfels tells the rest of the German
Historical School story:
Hugo's ... five-part division with the separate part "Family Law"
became widely known due to the fact that Hugo's younger
we will see later in this Genealogy, it is highly characteristic of modem conceptions of family law to
exclude these topics: that is what the classicizers did in creating the domain., Note that Watson
translates familia as "household": perhaps the better English term for this body of Roman Law rules
would be "household law"!
237. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod, trans., 1987).
238. SAMUEL FREIHERR VON PUFENDORF, DE JuRE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTo (Londini
Scanorum, 1672). The first English translation of this important treatise is PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW
OF NATURE AND NATIONS: EIGHT BOOKS (Basil Kennett, et al., trans., Oxford, L. Lichfield, 1710).
Book VI of the English translation includes only three chapters: "Of Matrimony," "Of Paternal
Power," and "Of Despotical Power, or the Authority of the Master over the Servant." Pufendorfs
taxonomy may well have influenced Blackstone's; it shows no trace of Family Law.
239. Muiller-Freienfels, supra note 236, at 37 (referring to GUSTAV HUGO, INSTITUTIONEN DES
HEUTIGEN ROMISHEN RECHTS (1789)).
240. GUSTAV HUGO, LEHRBUCH DER GESCHICHTE DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS (Berlin, A. Mylius,
1799).
241. Millier-Freienfels, Emergence of Droit de Famille, supra note 236, at 33-34 (referring to
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colleague in Gottingen, (Georg) Arnold Heise, adopted this system
for his Outline of a System of the General Civil Law for Pandectist
Lectures, which was tremendously successful. . . . His Outline
became hugely popular as an aid to students. Savigny, who knew
Heise from his student days, treasured the outline a great deal and
even used this scheme himself as a basis for his chief work, The
System of Today's Roman Law (1st volume 1840). . . . [T]his
scheme gained a great reputation and exerted a strong influence
since Savigny's "system" dominated from then on as no other
manual in "codification-free" German private law in the
nineteenth century would....
Throughout his entire life, Savigny was to remain true to his basic
view that family law ought to exist as an independent part of the
law....
This division set the basis for the Pandektensystem, which was to
characterize German law in the second half of the eighteenth [sic;
he must mean nineteenth] century.2 42
Miller-Freienfels thus posits that Savigny was the great propounder of
family law, not simply as the right way to classify the field but as the right
way to situate it in a complete legal order:
In his [The System of Modern Roman Law, Savigny] . . . upgraded
the scheme, and with it, the independent "Family Law" from a
simple "external systematization" to a truly "intrinsic
systematization." In doing so, Savigny idealistically understood
the "inner order of the Law" as an order of existing leading
principles. He also believed . . . that legal materials should be
compiled in such a way that each legal subject would "have its
own place, from which the answer to every legal question, the
solution to every judicial problem, could be derived."24 3
What did family law mean to Savigny when he crafted it into his
System ofModern Roman Law in 1840? According to Kennedy,
Savigny's family law and contract law address diametrically different
aspects of human nature:
Man is an "incomplete being," because men need women to be
complete and vice versa, and because men and women need
children, and children need paternal care, in order to overcome
242. Id. at 37-38 (referring to HEISE, supra note 226, and SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HUTIGEN
ROMISCHEN RECHTS, supra note 235).
243. Id. at 38. It is not clear whence Milller-Freienfels derives his quotations.
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mortality and live forward in time.. . . Family law governs the
relations of husband and wife and parent and child (plus guardian
and ward). By contrast, potentialities law governs the relations
between independent individuals exercising their wills vis-A-vis
one another: property deals with an individual will controlling an
object (to the exclusion of other wills), obligations with one will
controlling another.2"
This division of private law into one domain dedicated to the human
need to find completion through the marital and parental/child relations,
and a second domain dedicated to humans as sole individuals free in the
exercise of their wills, elaborates Hugo's community/individual
distinction and should be extremely familiar by now: it came into
American legal thought through the conjoint efforts of Story and Bishop
and was, by 1852, encapsulated in the notorious status/contract
distinction. As we have seen, Story was innocent of any idea that contract
protected an arbitrary, self-serving individual will; we will have to wait
until Bishop's Non-Contract law was published in 1889 for that idea to
emerge as an explicit tenet in our story; and Story and Bishop, following
Lord Robertson, saw the law of marriage not as private but as public law.
But the basic distinction is otherwise the same.
In Savigny's thought, family law and potentialities law have not merely
opposite but chiasmatically opposite relations to the general and the
particular. As Kennedy puts it:
Savigny is asserting that the abstract conceptual definition of the
nature of legal relations [in potentialities law, that is, property and
obligations], as establishing co-existing provinces of absolute
mastery for the individual will, provides a single, necessary
content for the actual rules of property and obligations. (In the
actual unfolding of potentialities law he consistently
acknowledges, as we will see, a large space for the merely
positive.)
By contrast, with regard to the rules of family law it appears that
"doubt" can "arise in what their real legal contents consist." The
reason for this seems to be that family law is not merely natural,
but also cultural, because it is intrinsically "moral," and morality
is an aspect of the Volksgeist, i.e., of the spirit of each particular
people. I have already quoted Savigny mentioning that in spite of
its naturalness and necessity, "the special shape, in which [family
244. Kennedy, Savigny's Distinction, supra note 234, at 814 (citations omitted).
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relations] are recognized is very manifold according to the positive
law of different peoples." True to the anti-natural-law program of
the historical school, Savigny recognizes that different peoples
with different spirits produce different norms fully deserving the
name of law[.]245
Elsewhere, Kerry Rittich and I have called this the Savignian pattern.246
Schematized, it looks more or less like this:
Family Law Contract Law
Family Law as the Domain of Contract Law as the Domain of
Status Will
Family Law as Universal in the Contract Law as Particular in the
Sense that it is Fundamental Sense that Every Contract is
Everywhere Unique
Family Law as Particular in the Contract Law as Universal in the
Sense that Each Nation's Family Sense that it is the Same
Law Expresses the Spirit of the Everywhere
People
For Savigny, potentialities law had to be transnationally smooth (with
the proviso that positive law may vary), whereas actual lived contracts
were infinitely particular. At the same time, though the family itself was
natural and universal, family law must differ from one nation to the next.
We have already encountered this concept, in Story's and Bishop's
master-rule for conflict of laws: international contracts cases would
choose their law by a single rule ensuring the uninterrupted transnational
enforceability of the contract consistent with the will of the parties at the
time it was made (lex loci contractus); whereas marriage, that universal
institution of ius gentium, would be enforced under the highly variable
law of the parties' residence. And we know that Story sought civilian
influence particularly in order to bring American commercial law up to
date and out of international isolation.
The remainder of this article tells how the idea of system moved this
pattem up from the level of choice of law rules to structural dignity. As
245. Id. at 816.
246. Halley & Rittich, supra note 2, at 757.
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American jurists understood the classicizing impulse and incorporated it
into their intellectual practice, they rendered contract general and
subtracted from it bodies of law that could not be left to the caprice of
individual will. Contract governed the faceless individual of liberalism;
status housed the particularized, increasingly deviant persons who could
not be entrusted with will-saturated freedom.24 7 Marriage joined other
statuses. such asinfancy and insanity, as the opposite of contract.
VIII. STATUS LAGS: MAINE
In Sir Henry Sumner Maine's version of our story, marriage was not
merely exceptional, and it was no longer fundamental: it was retardataire,
a throwback. This is the implication of his famous formulation of legal
modernity as a progress from status to contract:
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in
one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the
gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of
individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily
substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil society takes
account.. . . Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man
and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in
rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It is
Contract.24 8
Maine clearly thought that progress affected even the Family,
introducing elements of individualism and contract to relations which had
been intensely reciprocal and fixed-subtracting people and activities
from the Family and transporting them to Contract:
In Western Europe the progress achieved in this direction has been
considerable. Thus the status of the Slave has disappeared-it has
been superseded by the contractual relation of the servant to his
master. The status of the Female under Tutelage, if the tutelage be
understood of persons other than her husband, has also ceased to
exist; from her coming of age to her marriage all the relations she
may form are relations of contract. So too the status of the Son
under Power has no true place in law of modern European
247. As we have also already seen, Bishop has started the process of winnowing the individual
activated by will from the abnormal persons.
248. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
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societies. If any civil obligation binds together the Parent and the
child of full age, it is one to which only contract gives its legal
validity.249
Thus Maine explains the residual relations-the personal statuses that
could not be restructured as contract-as a coherent class of persons
lacking the capacity to contract:
The apparent exceptions are of that stamp which illustrate the rule.
The child before years of discretion, the orphan under
guardianship, the adjudged lunatic, have all their capacities and
incapacities regulated by the Law of Persons. But why? . . . [T]he
classes of persons just mentioned are subject to extrinsic control
on the single ground that they do not possess the faculty of
forming a judgment on their own interests; in other words, that
they are wanting in the first essential of an engagement by
Contract.2 50
As we have seen, Parsons didn't like putting wives on the list of
disabled persons, but he was willing to do it.25 1 Maine, by contrast, elides
wives altogether. Why? He has just told us that adult women, if they were
not married, had been emancipated from the Family and could deal for
themselves in Contract. Moreover, he's not just describing the rules; he's
justifying them. It made sense to exclude infants, orphans, and lunatics
from contract because they lacked not only the legal but also the mental
capacity to form their own agreements. To include married women in this
list would have made them not merely the legal but the cognitive equals of
children, orphans, and lunatics. The law making the wife a disabled
person is being subjected here to a highly motivated forgetting.
The final peroration gives us a new definition of status:
The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula
expressing the law of progress thus indicated, which, whatever be
its value, seems to be sufficiently ascertained. All the forms of
Status taken notice of in the Law of persons were derived from,
and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges
anciently residing in the Family. If we then employ Status,
agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to signify these
personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such
conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we
249. Id. at 169-70.
250. Id. at 170.
251. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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may say that the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto beenfrom Status to Contract.252
In Maine's retrospective view, status reigned in an era of thoroughgoing
legal and cultural ascription. At that time, all legal relations were
mediated in some way through the patriarchal Family, quintessentially an
ascriptive social form. Status survives as a residual legal category
reserved from the wreck of a bygone legal order because of the sad fact
that not all individuals can make themselves independent and walk
through the door that separates the family from the market and status from
contract. The patriarchal Family has disappeared, but that "Family, as
held together by the Patria Potestas, is the nidus out of which the entire
Law of Persons has germinated." 253 Status remains, in the law of persons:
now as then it is ascriptive; now as then it is amenable to complete state
control-but now it is marginal, the legal and cultural domain for those
who cannot progress.
Once again, this closing paragraph does nothing to clear up the place of
then-contemporary marriage at the Status/Contract threshold. It is the
"immediate or remote result of agreement"-everyone was still insisting
that marriage was a civil contract and that the agreement of husband and
wife to enter the relation was essential to its formation-but it also houses
the femme couverte and the infant, the legal equivalents of lunatics. Maine
relinquished the executed marriage to status, but he did so silently.
Understandably perhaps, these passages have been read to state Maine's
own aspiration for status-to-contract progress for wives. Clearly Maine
celebrated the emancipation of married women from tutelage and their
progress to contractual capacity; by implication we can imagine that he
would have cheered the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts
with their partial emancipation of wives from their traditional contractual
disabilities. But there was a deeper problem evaded by Maine's oblivion
about marriage as he worked his way to the climax of this chapter. No one
was suggesting that marriage itself-the portfolio of rules governing
entry into, duties during, and exit from marriage-be exempted from state
monopoly control and remitted to individuals and their agreements.
Sir Frederick Pollock noted this problem in his 1912 edition of Ancient
Law. Defending Maine from the implication that he thought marriage
could undergo such progress, he wrote: "Assimilation of marriage, as a
252. MAINE, supra note 248, at 170.
253. Id. at 152.
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personal relation, to partnership is not within the scope of practical
jurisprudence . . .. Status may yield ground to Contract, but cannot itself
be reduced to Contract." 2 54 He attempted to save Maine's formulation by
attributing to it a proviso excepting marriage from "the head of Status"
(then there would be no claim that it had been merged into contract): "if
the term is thus restricted, the gravest apparent objection to Maine's
dictum is removed." 2 55 (One marvels at the labor Pollock was willing to
undertake to save the classificatory scheme by seemingly heroic but
actually merely lexical revision.)
But Maine never said that marriage itself was shifting to contract:
rather, he ignored marriage altogether, arguing instead that the
replacement of the patriarchal family as the basic unit of social life and of
economic production by contract was definitive of modernity. For Maine,
marriage didn't even warrant a mention; it could remain a residual
institution producing individuals fit for modernity outside its bounds.
IX. THE NEWLY "DOMESTIC" RELATIONS: SCHOULER
In 1870, something new arrived into the Bishop-dominated legal
landscape I have drawn: A Treatise on the Law of the Domestic Relations
Embracing Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Guardian and Ward,
Infancy, and Master and Servant, by James Schouler.2 56 As far as I can
tell, this is the first domestic relations treatise published in the U.S. It
marks a big shift in the place of marriage in the legal order, pushing it
deeper into the exceptional recess which it will occupy in classical legal
thought. It will be worth our while to examine Schouler's intervention in
some detail.
Schouler admitted that he was substituting "domestic relations" for
Blackstone's "oeconomical relations."257 Why ditch "oeconomical"? By
254. MAINE, supra note 248, at 184.
255. Id. What really puzzled Pollock, interestingly, was whether the term "status" was now, as
some had apparently claimed, coterminous with social legislation, particularly public regulation of the
market. He asked: are modem company law (recognizing the corporate "person"), tax law, laws
governing worker's accidents, and the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 (exempting workers and employers
from some aspects of contract law)-are these all new contributions to the law of persons, new forms
of status? Id. at 184-85. He presages here the next solution to the anomalous place of marriage in a
legal order dominated by the will theory: de-exceptionalize marriage by making it just one, or the
paradigm, instance of the state's obligation to adjust social interests-of "the social."
256. JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EMBRACING
HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER AND
SERVANT (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1870).
257. Id. at 4.
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the time Schouler wrote, "economic" had completely ceased to refer to
the household and was primarily a term for monetary, financial, and
commercial relations, with a smattering of meanings tying it to thrift and
good management of those relations. 25 8  That is to say, the word
"economic" had been completely captured for the market For Reeve, in
1812, deleting it made sense, because it avoided the ambiguity latent in a
word that referred both to the well-managed household and to its not-yet-
opposite, the market. But by 1870 it would have made no sense at all to
carry forward Blackstone's term. It had to go.
The word "domestic," by contrast, had carried the meaning "[o]f or
belonging to the home, house, or household; pertaining to one's place of
residence or family affairs[,]" since Shakespeare's time, and still did (and
does).2 59 It seems a pretty anodyne choice, but some close reading may
reveal more content than is immediately visible.
Schouler not only claimed that the term "domestic relations" is "the
modem legal usage"; he claimed to derive it from none other than
Blackstone and Reeve! In fact, Reeve never used this term in his title. It
does appear in the Preface to Reeve's second edition,260 and this must
have been because, as we have seen,2 6 1 "domestic relations" had come
into common use as the everyday shorthand for Reeve's treatise. The term
did have respectable vintage through the lawyers, not the treatise-writers.
Among them, it was on the rise in the middle decades of the nineteenth
century as the "go to" heading. 262 And by mid-century, books began to
258. In addition to the senses quoted supra notes 12 & 15-16, see OED, Economic, supra note
12, at B.3.a (meaning "[e]sp. of a person: characterized by thrift (sometimes parsimony); careful in
the management of financial resources," first example dated 1755); id. at B.3.b (meaning
"[c]haracterized by or tending to economy in the use of resources; efficient, not wasteful," first
example dated 1794); id. at B.4.c (meaning "[rlelating to the generation of income; maintained for the
sake of profit," first example dated 1854).
259. Domestic Definition A.2.a, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/56663?redirectedFrom=domestic# (last visited December 20, 2010)
[hereinafter OED, Domestic].
260. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, OF GUARDIAN
AND WARD, OF MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF COURTS OF CHANCERY, WITH AN
ESSAY ON THE TERMS, HEIR, HEIRS, AND HEIRS OF THE BODY, at iii (Lucius E. Crittenden ed., 2d ed.,
Burlington, Chauncey Goodrich, 1846).
261. See supra note 20.
262. A Westlaw search for "domestic relations" in all U.S. cases of the 19t' century reveals the
following general trends. First, the term was simply not in use between 1800 and 1810. The search
revealed no cases in that interval. Between 1810 and 1840, several cases referred to Reeve's treatise
as Domestic Relations, and several used the term to describe his topics; in each case the numbers are
low, fewer than 10. Between 1840 and 1850, the rate of both of these uses tripled - the numbers are
still low, but both ideas (that Reeve's treatise is about domestic relations, and that "domestic
relations" is the right term for husband/wife, parent/child, master/servant and guardian/ward) are
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appear giving "domestic relations" a distinctly social-descriptive
meaning: they were the relations that actually, physically resided in the
home.263
Nevertheless, no book in the Harvard Law Library uses the title
Domestic Relations to describe anything close to our topic until a Scottish
treatise which Schouler explicitly relied on: Lord Patrick Fraser's A
Treatise of the Law of Scotland, as Applicable to the Personal and
Domestic Relations, Comprising Husband and Wife, Parent and Child,
Guardian and Ward Master and Servant and Master and Apprentice. This
treatise had been published in 1846; Bishop had relied on it.21 Schouler
noted that Fraser was expounding civil law, and that it would make no
sense for a common lawyer to follow him in including master and
apprentice as a separate topic. 2 65 For this reason also Schouler concluded
that it made no sense for him to speak of the "personal relations."2 66 But
Schouler's title page otherwise tracks Fraser's with typographical fidelity.
Where then did Schouler get his new title? I think it's clear that Fraser
was his textual model, but that the term had been established in common
usage. It replaced the now-unsuitable term "oeconomical" in Blackstone's
"private oeconomical relations"; but its colloquial connotation resonated
with the new separate sphere of home life. And why Domestic Relations
instead? From the 1820s forward it was in common use to describe
Reeve's topic, by the bench and the bar, and that was probably reason
enough.
What were the contents of The Domestic Relations? Schouler
acknowledged that "marriage and divorce constitute an important topic by
becoming more commonplace. An explosion in both usages occurs in the 1850s and continues in the
1860s. This is pretty good evidence that the practicing bar and bench adopted the term domestic
relations well before Schouler implanted it in the treatise landscape.
263. See, e.g., THE FAMILY AND SLAVERY, SHOWING THE INFLUENCE OF SLAVERY ON THE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS, BY A NATIVE OF THE SOUTHWEST (Boston, American Tract Soc. 185?) (date
does not appear on the original text and is ascribed by the Harvard Hollis Library Catalog); THOMAS
T. HENRY BAYLIS, THE RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND RELATIONS OF DOMESTIC SERVANTS, THEIR MASTERS
AND MISTRESSES: WITH A SHORT ACCOUNT OF SERVANTS' INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ADVANTAGES
(London, Sampson. Low, & Son & Co., 1857); JOHN THOMSON, THE DOMESTIC CIRCLE, OR THE
RELATIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND DUTIES OF HOME LIFE (Edinburgh: Johnstone, Hunter &, and
Co., [1867]).
264. FRASER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1st ed.), supra note 103. Schouler explicitly acknowledged
that Fraser's Domestic Relations was his immediate model. SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 4-5. Story
had died the year before Fraser's book was published; as we have seen, Bishop cited it, along with
Fergusson's Reports, as his source for Lord Robertson's canonical statement. Thus Schouler was the
first American to note Fraser as the authority for a new name for the field.
265. SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 4.
266. Id. at 4-5.
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themselves; and we find treatises which profess to deal with these
alone." 267 This oblique and skeptical reference to Bishop was as close as
Schouler came to acknowledging the treatise which had redefined and
come to dominate the field. But in his view, Bishop's title and his topic
made the wrong generalizations. Under Bishop's influence, Schouler
complained, "the term husband and wife is acquiring at law a more
limited and technical sense than formerly."268 Schouler objected to this
trend, especially in the face of dramatic legislative changes in the law
governing married women's property rights:
The many and rapid changes to which the entire law of husband
and wife has latterly subjected; the growth of divorce legislation
on the one hand, and of property legislation for married women on
the other, fully justifies a subdivision so important. We shall
subordinate, then, the topic of marriage and divorce to that of the
marriage status, following in this respect the modern legal usage;
at the same time noting that if some special term could be coined
to distinguish the subdivision husband and wife from that general
division which bears the same name, our analysis would be more
exact. 269
This is a little compressed, but here is what I think it means. "Marriage
and divorce" is the name for the rules about how parties get into and out
of marriage (and all the interstate and federal problems of marriage and
divorce recognition that these legal processes involved). That cannot be
the lead topic. The "marriage status" is the general topic, and Schouler
used the time-honored term "husband and wife" to designate it. But he
was little sorry about that, because the general topic "husband and wife"
includes both the rules of entry and exit ("marriage and divorce") and the
rules governing the legal relations of husband wife during marriage
("husband and wife"), thus setting up a lexical repetition that makes his
scheme less than perfectly exact. But it was worth making the taxonomic
change, because recent legislative changes both to divorce and to the
property rights of the wife warrant ample, and separate, space for the rules
governing the relations of husband and wife in the ongoing marriage
within the structure.
This is a significant innovation. Bishop thought he had covered the
beach when he added to his Law of Marriage and Divorce a separate
267. Id. at 5-6.
268. Id. at 5.
269. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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treatise on Commentaries on the Law of Married Women. 27 0 But Schouler
notes, correctly, that this framing of the marital domain omitted the
specific, reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife to each other-
rights and duties which were, thanks to Bishop himself, not contract.
Schouler's scheme would become the template for a new legal field,
travelling not under the retro term he invoked in his Introduction-
husband and wife-but the old/new one he supplies in his title: Domestic
Relations.
Schouler proceeded to criticize his own classification for not hewing
faithfully to the core meaning of the law of the domestic relations, which
was-and here we encounter something entirely new-"the law of the
family."2 71 I will return in a moment to the idea that the social subject is
no longer the household but the family and the extremely slow Anglo-
American uptake of the term "family law." First, let's focus on Schouler's
unhappiness with Reeve's legal relations as a categorical housing for this
social form and its law.272 They will help us to see what Schouler thought
the "law of the family" really was.
Schouler's first objection to his own title is that the law of guardian and
ward extends well beyond "the private or domestic relations." 2 73 He
declined "to trace with distinctness that shadowy line which separates the
temporary parent from the town officer" and wryly observed that, in his
chapter on guardian and ward, "one frequently finds himself gliding
unconsciously from the law of the family to the law of trusts." 274 He
wished he could limit his treatise strictly to the domestic relations, to "the
family"-but he was not ready to draw the necessary distinctions and
relinquish guardian and ward to the new, general topic of trusts.
270. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN: UNDER THE
STATUTES OF THE SEVERAL STATES, AND AT COMMON LAW AND IN EQUITY (Boston, Little, Brown
1873-75) [hereinafter BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN].
271. SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 7 (emphasis added).
272. There may be an influence from Scotland here again: the so-called Second Edition of
Fraser's treatise, now titled A Treatise on the Law of Scotland Relative to Parent and Child and
Guardian and Ward (Hugh Cowan ed., 2d ed., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1866). This topical idea is
entirely new: delete husband and wife and master and servant, and concentrate on the bodies of law
relating to children and wards and their various protectors. A Preface signed P.F. (presumably Patrick
Fraser) states that "[t]here is no necessary connection between the various subjects in" Fraser's First
Edition, indicating a loss of faith very similar to Schouler's in the idea that there was any remaining
coherence in the Blackstone/Reeve list of legal relations. Id. at Preface, n.p. Fraser's so-called Second
Edition may have promoted Schouler to criticize that list as now-outdated. Still, Schouler makes no
reference to this text, and, as we will see, proposes a new coherence quite independent of its terms.
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We see the same temptation-to generalize public and market-based
relations, subtracting out the family to stand in solitary splendor-and the
same disinclination to carry through on it, when Schouler turns to the
relation of master and servant. Here, "the rule of classification becomes
even more uncertain" 275:
If servants connected to the household were alone to be considered
in a treatise on the domestic relations, the modern cases would be
few and simple; but no writer has presumed to limit himself to
such narrow bounds. In former centuries, this relation had a
marked significance.27 6
The domestic servant still existed, but was numerically unimportant 277;
by implication the law of master and servant had increasingly little to say
about the household and thus was increasingly irrelevant in a treatise on
the law of domestic relations. It should, Schouler thought, migrate to
some other legal topic. Schouler here marked the defacto transition from
the household (both familial and oeconomic in Blackstone's sense) to the
family/market distinction, and regretted that his legal classifications were
not up to speed with social changes. The recent emancipation of the slaves
had wrought, moreover, a change in attitude: "In these days, we dislike to
call any man master." 2 78 The very title of this heading was a dismal
reminder of "the common barbarian accompaniment of barbarian
triumphs."279
In disparaging the terms master and servant as out of tune with
republican sentiment, Schouler acknowledged attitudes that had become
widespread almost one hundred years before. As Robert J. Steinfeld
demonstrates, by the late eighteenth century American workers were
shocking European travelers by refusing point blank to be called
servants. 2 o Here is one of his examples,a European visitor reporting in
the early nineteenth century that:
[t]he arrogance of domestics in this land of republican liberty and
equality, is particularly calculated to excite the astonishment of
strangers. To call persons of this description, servants, or to speak
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.; see also id. at 8 ("[lI]t cannot be denied that .. .as one of the purely domestic relations . .
[that of master and servant] rarely attracts attention.").
278. Id. at 7.
279. Id.
280. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR, supra note 148, at 126-27.
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of their master or mistress, is a grievous affront. Having called one
day at the house of a gentleman of my acquaintance, on knocking
at the door, it was opened by a servant-maid, whom I had never
before seen, as she had not been long in his family. The following
is the dialogue, word for word, which took place on this
occasion:-"is your master at home." - "I have no master." -
"don't you live here?" - "I stay here"-"And who are you then?"
= Why, I am Mr. -'s help, and I'd have you know, man, that
I am no sarvant; none but negers are sarvants.281
Schouler is the first text in my genealogy to take note of this strong social
trend, and he did so more than 100 years after it emerged, a remarkable
lag and an index of how successfully the classical legal order repelled
social inputs.
Increasingly, the law of master and servant was useful only in analogies
to legal relations that, Schouler implies, have nothing to do with the
family and everything to do with wage labor:
Apprentices are, without much violation of principle, included
under this head; they are generally bound out during minority and
brought up in families. Clerks are not so readily confined within
the circle of domestic relations as formerly; and the same is to be
said of factors, bailiffs, and stewards. The employds of a
corporation are frequently designated as servants; so are laborers
generally. But it cannot be denied that master and servant is rather
a repulsive title, and fast losing favor in this republican country; . .
. and that in sounding its legal depths one often loses sight of his
landmarks, and finds himself drifting out into the more general
subject of principal and agent.282
We can see here the work of generalization, begun but not completed.
Apprentices over the age of minority, apprentices boarding out, clerks,
factors, bailiffs, stewards: these relations, cut free of the household, were
in search of a generalization. And what about the employees of big
corporations and "laborers generally"? Perhaps these are all, at their most
abstract, really just relations of principal and agent. If someone would just
write the treatises on trusts, on public responsibility for orphans and
truants, and on principal/agency relations, the residue-the law of the
family, under the heading "domestic relations"-could achieve classical
281. Id. (quoting ALBERT MATTHEWS, THE TERMS HIRED MAN AND HELP 28 (Cambridge, John
Wilson & Son, 1900)).
282. SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 7-8.
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Clearly Schouler had read his Maine. But, as we have seen, Maine only
tacitly admitted that the family would lag behind the general progress of
civilization from status to contract. By contrast, Schouler avidly asserted
that the domestic relations were and should hang back, and that attempts
at progress in this domain were perverse. On the aboriginal antiquity of
this domain, he had this to say:
[T]he family may justly be pronounced the earliest of social
institutions. . . . Natural law, or the teachings of a divine
providence, supplied these regulations. Families preceded nations.
... But the law of the domestic relations is nevertheless older than
that of civil society. . . . The supremacy of the law of family
should not be forgotten.
We have seen this original, essential, mystical, transtemporal and
transpatial family before, in Bishop's representation of marriage as status.
By contrast with Bishop's "not contract" moves, however, Schouler's are
much more closely attuned to market ideology as the differand giving
conceptual and normative bite to the family as a separate sphere:
To an unusual extent, therefore, is the law of family above and
independent of the individual. Society provides the home; public
policy fashions the system: and it remains for each one of us to
place himself under rules which are, and must be, arbitrary.
So is the law of family universal in its adaptation. It deals directly
with the individual. Its provisions are for man and woman; not for
corporations or business firms.284
Family law exceptionalism has arrived. It is precisely on this template
that, almost 100 years later, Justice Douglas wrote that "[m]arriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."2 85 This uncanny
echo of Schouler's formulation, transposed into a vocabulary of
constitutional rights that was not ascendant until the third globalization,
signals the deep integration of the family/market distinction into
283. Id. at 8-9.
284. Id. at 9.
285. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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American legal thought.
As the family emerged from the household and differentiated itself
from the market, the word "family" made an etymological transition, one
which Schouler wished to track in his halting, intuitive, incomplete new
map of his field. The word derives from the Latin term for servant or
slave (famulus), and its first English meaning was "[t]he servants of a
house or establishment; the household." 286 Not husband and wife/parent
and child/master and servant: just the servants. The Oxford English
Dictionary (OED) indicates that this sense is quite old (the earliest
example dates from 1400) and that it is obsolete; it provides no examples
after 1794. But we could add an example from 1839, a rare item in the
Harvard Law Library, its first book titled "Family Law": The Family Law
Advisor: Containing Plain Advice to Landlord and Tenant. . . Master and
Servant ... Executors and Administrators ... To Make a Will.28 7 This
title shows that it still made sense then to think of the family as a
managerial network rather than a domestic space. The next sense to
emerge was "[t]he body of persons who live in one house or under one
head, including parents, children, servants, etc." 288 In 1631, the Star
Chamber heard a case involving a man of whom it was said, "[h]is family
were himself and his wife and daughters, two mayds, and a man." 28 9 This
sense emerges in the mid-sixteenth century; the OED doesn't say it is
obsolete but gives no examples after 1859, eleven years before Schouler
was to complain that master and servant no longer belonged in Domestic
Relations. And surely it is obsolete: when we now read about antebellum
Southern slaveowners expressing concern for "[m]y family, black and
white,"29 0 the expression strikes us as the absolute height of hypocrisy,
but I think we have to face it: to them it was merely descriptive.
Thus, before the Civil War "family" still meant the household, with its
286. Family Definition 1.1La, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ONLINE,http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/67975?redirectedFrom=family# (last visited Dec. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter OED, Family].
287. THE FAMILY LAW ADVISOR: CONTAINING PLAIN ADVICE TO LANDLORD AND TENANT ...
MASTER AND SERVANT ... EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS . .. To MAKE A WILL (London: Henry
Washbourne, 1839). This book has no author; the ellipses in the title do not reflect omissions but
rather appear on the title page and in the official entry in the Harvard Hollis catalogue. Hollis
describes this entry as "[a] publisher's collection of four of his own separately issued popular law
manuals, here bound up (without original title leaves) with a general title." Clearly someone thought
that this collection of topics made sense to the law-book-buying public.
288. OED, Family, supra note 286, at 1.2.a.
289. Id.
290. See ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND
WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH, 32, 100-01, 133, 204 (1988).
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relations of husband and wife, parent and child, and master and servant.
So far, the "family" cohered well with Blackstone's "private oeconomical
relations." But after the Civil War, servants were decidedly dropped from
the referent of "family": the standard sense of the word became "[t]he
group of persons consisting of the parents and their children, whether
actually living together or not; in wider sense, the unity formed by those
who are nearly connected by blood or affinity."29 1 The OED quotes James
Mill referring in 1869, just one year before Schouler's Domestic Relations
was published, to the still smaller unit sometimes called the
companionate, nuclear, or bourgeois family: "The group which consists of
a Father, Mother and Children, is called a Family."292
This modernized, nuclearized, and privatized group is Schouler's
family. And his new legal idea is that the law governing it should be
distinct from the law of the market and the law of the state. This is
something new. It transforms Robertson's and Bishop's status/contract
distinction, reframes Bishop's marriage/contract distinction, and
transposes them into a series of continguous distinctions: family/contract,
family/market, and family/state.
Why was Schouler willing to publish a confessedly defective treatise?
He was clearly aware of the classical project and knew how to modernize
Reeve's legal categories. His introduction is a virtual manual for
classicizing reform. But he didn't bother to do that work, mustering his
energies instead for a conservative attack on recent changes to the
substantive law governing the ongoing marriage. This was something
new: up until now, the treatises regretted coverture while conceding its
necessity. Schouler cemented a new conservatism for his field. It will be
worth our while, I think, to learn the contents of this new commitment.
Schouler's special targets were the Married Women's Property Acts
(the MWPAs), the earnings statutes, and readily available divorce:
The danger to be apprehended from all legislation of this sort is
that it will weaken the ties of marriage by forcing both sexes into
an unnatural antagonism; teaching them to be independent of one
291. OED, Family, supra note 286, at I.3.a. From the earliest to the latest dates comprised by this
story, an additional, always less salient meaning also existed: "Those descended or claiming descent
from a common ancestor, a house, kindred, lineage," id. at 1.4.a. Almost all the examples tip the term
in the direction of aristocratic lineage: "People of no 'family,"' id. at I.4.b. This is the sense in which
Savigny used the term. But there was no useable sense of "family" at this time, in America, to
correspond with the affinal patriarchal family which was Savigny's actual object of attention.
292. Id. at I.3.a (quoting 2 JAMES MILL, ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND,
xxii, 218 (London, Longmans Green 1869)).
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another, and to earn their own living apart; whereas God's law
points to family and the mutual intercourse of man and woman as
among the strongest safeguards of human happiness. . . . Add to
this loose divorce laws, loosely administered, and can it be said
that the marriage relation is encouraged and fostered by the State?
That it should be admits of no question.2 93
Schouler's is the first treatise we have examined which offered open
resistance to increased equality for wives. On this question he was
explicitly conservative. Schouler protested that the MWPAs gave wives
equality and freedom while preserving their paternalistic protections.
Male legislators were being pussy-whipped:
Either the ultimate object should be to place the wife on an
independent footing and enable her to maintain herself against the
world, or else providing honorably, faithfully, and generously
against all possible misfortune, to teach her still to lean upon the
stronger arm of her husband, and to look to man for guidance. But
our legislators sometimes appear to attempt both systems together,
as if goaded on by the gadfly of feminine persistency. Laws which
invite married women to embark in separate trade, tend plainly to
the wife's independence. Laws, on the other hand, which class
widows and orphans together as subjects for special protection,
preserve homestead exemptions, permit of settlements against the
husband's creditors, are founded on the policy of the wife's
dependence. . . . Certain it is that woman cannot claim the
privileges of the two sexes: if she would grasp at civil honors she
must surrender her time-honored tribute of chivalrous homage.294
Indeed, the MWPAs installed an unfair bias in favor of wives at the
expense of husbands. Wives could be individualists, but husbands were
required to carry on as altruists:
Equality and freedom are precious words; but if the respective
spheres of man and woman are equally honorable, equally useful,
equally free, need they be precisely identical? As a logical
proposition, if woman in her pursuits has the right to become a
man, man has no less the right to become a woman....
A calm and dispassionate investigation of many acts shows that
the common-law disabilities of the wife have been more carefully
pruned than those of the husband. Some legislative changes in
293. SCHOULER, supra note 256, at 17-18.
294. Id. at 18-19.
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favor of the latter are desirable. Thus the common law obliged the
husband to pay his wife's antenuptial debts, because he might
have received a fortune by her; if then she retains her property,
notwithstanding the marriage, this liability on his part should not
continue. Again, it is possible that the husband, in some States, has
lost his tenancy by the curtesy in his wife's lands; if so, is there
any reason why the wife should retain a dower interest in her
husband's lands. . . . Nor is it clear that where a married woman
being of ample means retains her property independent of her
husband, while his income continues slender, he ought to be held
as strictly liable for her necessaries as in the days when the
beneficial enjoyment of her property would have vested in him.2 95
This was all terrible, but the worst effect of the MWPAs, Schouler
concluded, was "the constant temptation they hold out to fraud and
perjury."296 By inviting debtor husbands to convey their property to wives
to protect it from creditors, the MWPAs forewent the protections against
frauds of this kind that were intrinsic to the common law, the community-
property and the civil law marital property systems. "Let us not forget that
the marriage relation is a close one, and in pecuniary matters places two
persons before the world somewhat in the light of partners."297 Here
indeed the man becomes a woman-a perverse travesty on natural and
divinely ordained sex differences. And "it is supreme folly to chafe and
fret and struggle continually against the fetters of sex." 298
Finally, Schouler resisted the trend towards readily available divorce.
He defined marriage "in the first instance, [as] that act by which a man
and woman unite for life . "299 And he insisted that, once the "status or
relation" of marriage is thus formed, "[b]eing once bound they are bound
for ever. . . . Death alone dissolves the tie[.]" 300
All of these conservative interventions lead me to suggest that Schouler
not only tolerated but actually liked the antique vibe sent by Reeve's table
of contents. It asserted the past purity of the common law rules against
new legislation. 30 1 And it asserted a new relation of domestic relations to
295. Id. at 19-20.
296. Id. at 20.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 17.
299. Id. at 22.
300. Id.
301. The conservative politics of Schouler's treatise were, if anything, intensified by his
posthumous editor Arthur W. Blackmore. See Joseph Warren, Book Review, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 88
(1922) (reviewing SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
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progress: it was no longer the locomotive speeding to modernity but a
defensive, almost reactionary, redoubt-a haven of dependency in the
heartless world of the modem market.
Kennedy argues that the characterization of marriage as status-not-
contract both relieved contract of the values of "regulation, paternalism,
community and informality" and cabined them in marriage.3 0 2 Schouler
proposed that domestic relations should be the principal new legal
housing for these values. He wanted to limit that domain, moreover, to the
"law of the family" and to the special setting of the household. This is a
newly separated domestic sphere. He did not want to set up a Law of
Altruistic Relations: rules governing non-family members with express
obligations to act paternalistically on behalf of others-whether guardians
of wards or town officers-should go elsewhere. Master and servant was
no longer, realistically speaking, a domestic relation; it should migrate to
a new domain, principal and agent, where it would be governed by the
values of "facilitation, self-determination, autonomy and formality"3 03
appropriate to the contracts of employees and laborers generally.
When all those changes had taken place-and more or less exactly, they
did-Domestic Relations would be residual, the remainder left in the field
defined and animated by Reeve after the law of work in the marketplace
and the law of wardship for incapacitated persons had departed for
elsewhere in the clarifying classical order. It would progress-as Maine
had suggested it would-by staying put.
X. THE RISE OF CONTRACT: KEENER AND BISHOP
Domestic Relations became residual because something else was
becoming general. Not surprisingly, given our story so far, that something
was contract. In this section, I retell Kennedy's story of the rise of
contract not merely as a category opposed to marriage and Domestic
Relations, but as the default legal topic, the general one, the one from
which Domestic Relations became a structural, not merely lexical,
exception.
Kennedy argues that the rise of the will theory-the theory that the
primary legitimate purpose of law is to give effect to the will of
individuals exerted as self-actualizing individuals or, if legally bound to
DOMESTIc RELATIONS (Arthur W. Blackmore ed., 6th ed., Albany, Matthew Bender 1921) (1870)).
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each other, by willed agreement-caused legal thinkers of the late
nineteenth century to rename and reorder the basic topics of private law:
The adoption of the will theory was manifested in (a) the
dismantling of contracts by spinning off of Quasi-Contract and
Tort; (b) the rise in jurisprudence of an ordering of private law
based on two distinctions: rights against the world versus rights
against individuals; and rights arising from private agreement
versus those created by the state; (c) the emergence of the concept
of status to deal with legal relationships inconsistent with this
scheme; (d) the reordering of the residuum of pure contract in
terms of the will of the parties and the will of the sovereign; and
(e) the organization of the brand new field of tort law into
intentional tort, negligence and absolute liability.30
Implicit in these shifts is a desire to make the system make sense as a
system: a classically classical impulse.
Kennedy's account of this classicizing rise of contract identifies two big
shifts affecting the "status" element:
1.The undermining and eventual rejection of the ideas of "status,"
"relation," and "condition" as the operative sources of the great
mass of contract rules.
2. The emergence of a specialized law of persons, and of a new
category of status, that grouped together and explained the
peculiar character of rules incompatible with the new vision of the
nature of 'real' contracts.30 5
Contract was increasingly the domain of "facilitation, self-
determination, autonomy and formality"; rules formerly thought to be
about contract, but actually implicating "regulation, paternalism,
community and informality" had to go elsewhere.3 06 The former was
abstracted in part by the piecemeal but relentless subtraction of the latter:
The Classics created . .. by subtraction. It was these authors of the
1870's [Leake, Langdell, Pollock, Anson, Holmes, Markby and
Holland] who purged quasi-contract, status and tort from the
subject. In the place of the imperialistic claims of Parsons, they
began with elaborate descriptions of all the things "contract" was
not. They created also by abstraction, by asserting and then trying
to show that there had been an essence hidden at the core of the
304. Id. at 171.
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pre-Classical hodgepodge.307
To the extent that contract was modern, quasi-contract, tort and status
were residual. They progressed along with everything else, but by being
segregated.
As Kennedy indicates, Domestic Relations was not the only domain to
emerge in this way. The Classics recruited the old term quasi-contract to
house legal obligations that were formerly "implied," leaving "contract"
for assented-to obligations.308 Torts, too, broke off from the great glacier
of Blackstone's Law of Wrongs and gained its independence as a legal
topic-a new iceberg on its own trajectory.309 As we have seen, marriage,
now status-not-contract, eventually docked in Domestic Relations,
understood as the "law of family"--the law of the people who, with the
rise of bourgeois companionate marriage and its nuclear family, share life
in the home.
The resulting order was not born in a day. Instead, the treatise writers
seem to be staggering to revise a large, recalcitrant body of legal material
to conform to a system whose principles were only glimmeringly visible
and whose shape emerged only through intensely competitive sallies of
publication. The relationship between ideology and taxonomy would
become clear only in retrospect. Consider, for instance, James Kent's
immensely influential Commentaries on American Law, first published in
1826-30 and remaining in print almost to the end of the century. This
super-authoritative treatise followed precisely Blackstone's Table of
Contents, and thus included a section on the "rights of persons" complete
with corporations. 310 Holmes produced a new edition of Kent's
Commentaries in 1872, adding a footnote updating the text to conform
with Bishop's status-not-contract conception of marriage. 3 1  But
Holmes's edition, like all the others, followed Kent's original plan.
Indeed, throughout its publication history Kent's Commentaries retained
307. Id. at 207. See STEPHEN MARTIN LEAKE, THE ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(London, Stevens & Sons 1867) and THERON METCALF, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AS
APPLIED BY COURTS OF LAW (New York, Hurd & Houghton 1867), for early examples of the
contracts-only treatise.
308. KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at 173-75.
309. For what may be the first effort in this direction, see FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF
TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1859).
310. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW at Table of Contents (New York, 0.
Halstead 1827).
311. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 129 n.1 (0. W. Holmes ed., 12th ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (1826). Thanks to KENNEDY, RISE AND FALL, supra note 6, at 198
for calling this edition and amendment to my attention.
88 [Vol. 23:1
88
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol23/iss1/1
Halley
their original outline in toto; revised editions added and modified lower-
level headings without redrawing the basic structure. We can imagine
some date after 1896, the date of Kent's last published edition (again with
Holmes on the masthead),3 12 as the moment when the classical order
finally shed earlier taxonomies, merged into legal common sense, and
rendered Kent's Commentaries a relic.
Meanwhile, Bishop struggled mightily to get his oeuvre right, and his
changes of heart show us how lurching and exploratory the process was.
In 1871-73, almost 20 years after the first edition of Marriage and
Divorce, he published his two-volume Commentaries on the Law of
Married Women. 3 13 This book was, basically, the law of coverture. He
thus persisted until the end of his career in missing Schouler's
generalizing point that the central core of husband-and-wife as a legal
topic was the full panoply of legal relations between them.
But Bishop made several substantial efforts to get the contradisguished
field, contracts, right. His first effort was a little handbook, Doctrines of
Contract, published in 1878,314 which he effectively withdrew as
mistaken in 1887. That year he published his Commentaries on the Law
of Contracts upon a New and Condensed Method, noting on the title page
that it is "A New Work, Superseding the Author's Smaller One.""'s This
pentimento illuminates the coevolution of our topic and is worth spelling
out.
Bishop's first contract treatise offered a new ordering for this legal
topic: contracts were general as to subject matter but distinguished
primarily as to form, so that the first chapters addressed Contracts Under
Seal, Contracts of Record, Oral Contracts, Simple Contracts in Writing,
Contracts Implied as of Fact, Contracts Implied as of Law, and Contracts
312. The last edition of which I am aware appeared in 1896. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1896) (claiming on the
title page Holme's 12th edition as its own pedigree).
313. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 270.
314. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, THE DOCTRINES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, IN THEIR PRINCIPAL
OUTLINES, STATED, ILLUSTRATED, AND CONDENSED (St. Louis, Soule, Thomas & Wentworth 1878)
[hereinafter BISHOP, CONTRACTS IN THEIR PRINCIPAL OUTLINES].
315. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: UPON A NEW AND
CONDENSED METHOD (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1887) [herinafter BISHOP, CONTRACTS UPON A
NEW AND CONDENSED METHOD]. For the retraction, see BISHOP, CONTRACTS UPON A NEW AND
CONDENSED METHOD, at iv ("In most respects, [the earlier] work satisfied me, as far as it went. But,
on reflection, I deemed that its sphere might be most profitably enlarged. So I have extended its scope
... have changed in a measure the arrangement; and above all, have made more prominent the
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Implied from Express Ones." 6 It was no easy task deducing this new
taxonomy:
This book is the outgrowth of a plan to collect, in simple and
compact language, and arrange in an order of my own, the
essential doctrines of the law of contracts; referring mainly to the
larger books, which the reader was expected to consult as he had
occasion, for illustrations and the adjudged cases. But on
proceeding to do what I had thus undertaken, I found the plan
impossible . . . . When I felt, in those books, for the ribs in the
body of the law of contracts, and for the spinal column, I could not
distinguish rib or backbone from muscle."'
Only in his second contracts treatise did Bishop find the armature of
classical contract. Here we find an introduction to "The More General
Doctrines" divided into two parts: "Elements of a Contract" and "The
Consideration." Only then did Bishop list off the various special contract
forms. The struggle to generalize, and the impediments offered by the old
legal forms, could hardly be more patent. It's almost as though Bishop
knew, but could not himself say, that even his reformed taxonomy was
"not only unscientific, and therefore theoretically wrong, but is also
destructive of clear thinking, and therefore vicious in practice."" It was
left to William A. Keener, from whom I take this scornful judgment, to
make the break.
Keener's 1893 Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts insisted that:
A true contract, whether it be a simple contract, a specialty, a
contract in the nature of a specialty, or a contract of record, exists
as an obligation, because the contracting party has willed, in
circumstances to which the law attaches the sanction of an
obligation, that he shall be bound.3 19
That is, contract law was the law of the will of the parties; nothing else
belonged there. Keener's exceptionalizing treatise rejected any idea that
express contracts and those implied in fact were categorically different:
only a willed contract was a contract, and if the parties had willed an
obligation, the distinction between express and implied-in-fact
316. BISHOP, CONTRACTS IN THEIR PRINCIPAL OUTLINES, supra note 314, at vii.
317. Id. at iii (emphasis added).
318. WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 3 (New York,
Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1893).
319. Id. at 4.
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agreements was merely evidentiary. 32 0 Abstracted, contract is willed
obligation. The subtracting move? Contracts implied in law weren't
contracts at all, and should be restyled "quasi-contract." The will of the
state had to migrate out of contract proper into quasi-contract. Here
Keener parked obligations to act arising by record and by positive or
customary law, and also obligations imposed by judicial doctrine to
prevent unjust enrichment.3 21 That is to say, where official stipulation of
some kind was wanting, quasi-contract was the law of ethical obligation
to make restitution of unjustly acquired benefits. It was the will of the
state, not that of the parties. It did not belong in contract at all.
Keener also subtracted some rules which Schouler would have housed
in Domestic Relations from that domain, and made them rules of quasi-
contract. For instance, the duty of husbands to reimburse third parties who
supply necessaries to their wives was more properly understood to arise
from the doctrine of unjust enrichment than from marriage itself.3 22
Where the doctrine of unjust enrichment has nothing to say, however,
Keener laid off of the law of husband and wife and of parent and child:
the duties of husband and wife and of parent and child to each other
simply don't appear. Those could stay where their specializers had put
them-in the new legal categories, marriage and divorce and the special
rules of coverture (Bishop), or, more classically, in Domestic Relations
(Schouler). We are seeing the residualization of Domestic Relations not
only from contract but now from contract's other new opposite, quasi-
contract.
The emerging map was divided into four parts: contract was the modal
law; quasi-contract, tort, and domestic relations all stood together in
opposition to it. Bishop then took this process one step further,
constructing a high legal barrier between his Marriage and Divorce and
all the other domains of "regulation, paternalism, community and
informality." In Bishop's last classicizing effort, he redivided the legal
field in partes tres: contract, non-contract law, and marriage and divorce.
Non-Contract Law required a treatise of its own.3 2 3 This "follows a
natural division in the legal field, instead of driving a mere artificial
320. Id. at 5.
321. Id. at 16. How is quasi-contract distinct from tort? The former brings an obligation to act;
the latter an obligation to refrain. Id. at 15.
322. Id. at 15, 22.
323. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW AND ESPECIALLY AS
TO COMMON AFFAIRS NOT OF CONTRACT OR THE EVERY-DAY RIGHTS AND TORTS (Chicago, T. H.
Flood, 1889) [hereinafter BISHOP, NON-CONTRACT LAW].
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furrow."324 Prior treatise-writers who had tried to make torts a topic325
labored in hopeless conceptual error; tort was to noncontractual duties as
breach was to contractual ones. It was not a general topic at all but merely
the "civil wrong" housed within it.3 26 The general topic was "common
affairs not of contract." 3 27
The newly-fundamental will theory provides the principle against
which these noncontractual duties could arise. Bishop now understood
freedom of individual will in ferocious Darwinian terms. The two chief
principles from which the non-contract law arises are these:
§ 10. The Right to Exist. Every person is entitled to live as long
as, without feeding on his fellows or otherwise injuring them, he
can. This is a self-evident truth. Hence,-
§ 11. Active-Do as Will. As no man can live by simply sitting
down and breathing, every one has the right to be constantly
active. And as necessarily each one is moved by impulses from his
own mind, not another's, all are permitted to obey, because they
must, their several wills. The consequence is that, while one
abstains from the purpose to injure another and, beyond this, is
careful to avoid such injury, he cannot be called to account though
an unintended harm results to the other.328
Where intentional injury or a failure to take legally required care could
be assigned, then a noncontractual duty arose and the law required a
remedy. But this was the special case; the right to obey one's own will
was general. Vast swaths of uncompensated injury were a necessary
consequence of the will theory, but Bishop did not blink: "Better is it for
all that the law should keep the other vigilant by stimulating him to look
out for himself."3 29 We may well now have travelled as far as it is
possible to go from Parsons's idea that contract, express and implied,
324. Id. at iii.
325. Bishop indignantly claimed that he had foreseen the need for a treatise on torts long before
anyone else, but that demented law-book publishers had refused his proposal to publish one. Id. at 2
n.1. Instead, in Non-Contract Law, he found himself obliged to recognize the first wave of torts
treatises: C.G. ADDISON, WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES, BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS
(V. and R. Stevens & Sons, 1860); HILLIARD, supra note 309; FREDRICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF
TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE
COMMON LAW (London, Stevens & Sons, 1887). Bishop, NON-CONTRACT LAW, supra note 323, at 2,
2 n.l.
326. BISHOP, NON-CONTRACT LAW, supra note 323, at 3.
327. Id. at title page, 3.
328. Id. at 5-6.
329. Id. at 6.
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permeated all of social life, forming the very "web and woof' of human
interaction.
What of the relations among the deviant legal fields? Bishop did
include a summary of the duties of husbands for their wives' torts and the
duties of parents, masters, and guardians for those of legal infants. He
made a weaker distinction between the law of family and his own topic
than Keener did: while for Keener, the law of marriage ended where the
law of quasi-contract began, Bishop thought that marriage and parentage
might be the site of non-contractual duties and provide rules conditioning
their legal extent. Of the two, Keener was the stricter classicizer. But even
for Bishop, despite its appearance as a "tangle" of canon law, common
law, and equitable sources, the law of marriage was "a whole"; it could be
"made luminous" to legal minds if they were willing to "understand the . .
parts and the combined whole." 330
Bishop's topic "non-contract law" was not to survive, but the larger
divisions he respected and helped to construct were intrinsic to the
classical order. Contract was general; it housed the will of the parties; the
domains of law assigned to "regulation, paternalism, community and
informality"-quasi-contract, tort, and the law of family-were special.
Bit by bit they were subtracted from the classical center of the legal field.
As we have seen, marriage was the first to go: even before this process
had really discernably begun, it was already status-not-contract. Again
this parole is settling into a new langue. This time, given the exalted place
accorded contract and the will theory in classicizing thought, given the
idea of progress which Maine's authority injected into the work, we now
see the sheer deviance of domains of law dedicated not to the will of the
parties but to the will of the state. And with this came a felt need to keep
them narrow so as to enlarge the scope of freedom of contract.
Nor was marriage-or Domestic Relations or the law of family-
continuous with its co-deviant fields, quasi-contract and tort. The latter
were general, just as contract was general, in that they governed all
persons equally. But Domestic Relations retained a commitment to its
highly specific legal persons and to the idea that they were differentiated
from the faceless liberal individual by status.
Finally, we can see in Bishop's struggle signs that the retardataire,
special, state-pervaded domain of marriage and divorce (or, in the
increasingly common usage, domestic relations) was losing prestige as a
330. Id. at 241-42 n.1.
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legal field. Recall that, in 1891, Bishop crowed that he had made marriage
and divorce coherent. The introduction to the 1891 edition of his Law of
Marriage and Divorce, Bishop celebrated himself not only for replacing
the incoherent, contradictory, and fragmented body of case law described
in his first edition on this topic by a (supposedly) consolidated, coherent,
and fully rational legal order, but for convincing his colleagues to see the
field his way."' That's not how his achievements looked to him in 1898,
when he published Non-Contract Law:
The profession has never looked upon the subject [of the law of
married women] as one susceptible of being made luminous, or
even as proper for any thorough instruction to students. I do not
think there ever was a practitioner, a judge, or a law student who
even so much entertained the suggestion of reading this work of
mine [Married Women]. Simply it was used as a digest is,
therefore with little more profit. And the thought that it or any
other book on the subject can be made more useful has probably
never entered a half dozen minds in the entire country. I will
illustrate this by saying, that a very eminent lawyer of my
acquaintance who, I know, reads and appreciates my works
generally, instead of reading this, wrote me,-"You may have
removed the difficulties of the subject, but I do not believe it." If I
could have begun to untangle things in the right place,-namely,
in the professional mind of the country,-I should have made a
great success of this Married Women book.3 32
What a poignant testimony to the degradation of marriage law in the
emerging classical order!
CONCLUSION
This Part tells how the law of husband and wife, parent and child,
master and servant, and guardian and ward evolved into the law of
status-also designated the law of marriage-and became the opposite of
contract. It tells how the law of marriage underwent further evolution into
the law of Domestic Relations, became public law, became conservative,
and became deviant; and how the law of contract shed its public
normativity and became the archetypical domain of the will theory,
became private law, became emblematic of progress, and became
331. See supra notes 107, 108 and accompanying text.
332. BISHOP, NON-CONTRACT LAW, supra note 323, at 241-2 nA.
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fundamental to the legal order. It tells how the law of master and servant
migrated to contract; and how contract shed its will-of-the-state elements
for reconstruction as quasi-contract and tort. At the time that the
status/contract distinction took hold in America, marriage-as-status-not-
contract was deemed both exceptional and fundamental to the legal order.
By the time all the categorical changes I've described in this Part were
completed, it was exceptional but no longer really fundamental: it lost is
diacritical command, shed its epistemic and professional prestige, and
became a backwater in the law.
To this day, our law curriculum and legal ideology retain this basic
structural template dividing the law of the family from the law of the
market. This family/market, status/contract, law-of-intimacy/law-of-
business distinction is not ideologically innocent. It carries with it the idea
of marriage as status, the idea that it is either status or contract, and the
idea that it is exceptional. Thus it carries the idea that the market is free,
while the family is entrenched in moral or natural command; it carries the
idea that the market is the site of progress, while the family is or should
be slow to change. It is a linchpin of liberal legal thought-so large and
pervasive that it is almost hidden in plain sight. My goal in this genealogy
is to make its historicity and its varying ideological investments
discernable and available for resistance.
952011]
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